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Abstract 
 
In an international context framed by heightened anxiety about ‘radical Islam’, this 
thesis inquires into how one kind of ‘radical Islam’ often referred to as ‘Wahhabism’ 
has been represented by liberal, neo-conservative and Marxist intellectuals especially, 
though not exclusively, in the US. The thesis begins by establishing that ‘Wahhabism’ 
itself is a contested category associated with how scholars have represented 
‘Wahhabism’ in the literature. This opens up into a consideration of problems to do 
with how intellectuals represent complex social and political phenomena and issues 
like how competing truth claims are adjudicated and how these issues have been 
addressed in the sociology of intellectuals.   
 
This matters given the roles intellectuals play as mediators or producers of knowledge 
in a modern political context characterised by a heightened sense of anxiety about 
Islamic terrorism. These representations have the ability to influence things like 
public opinion and the policy and decision making process including foreign policy. 
With a view to understanding how and why these intellectuals have represented 
‘Wahhabism’ in particular ways, the thesis outlines an approach based on critical 
discourse analysis.  In this way the thesis shows how different kinds of intellectuals 
use devices like metaphors and analogies as well as draw on themata to generate their 
‘representations’ of ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
The thesis argues that liberal, neo-conservative and Marxist intellectuals adopt the 
roles of ‘Movement intellectuals’ and treat ‘Wahhabism’ as a threat albeit in quite 
different ways to provide mostly negative representations of ‘Wahhabism’. For 
liberals influenced about ideas about ‘progress’ and individualism, ‘Wahhabism’ is 
typically seen as denying freedom, a threat to secular society and an obstacle to 
progress. For neo-conservatives influenced by religious ideas about Israel and fated 
endless conflict between ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’, the ‘Wahhabi’ is a savage and 
‘Wahhabism’ is an enemy of Israel. For Marxists influenced by ideas about 
‘progress’, atheism and man’s relationship with nature, ‘Wahhabism’ is typically seen 
as a ‘natural’ part of Capitalism, a tool used by the ruling class to maintain their 
positions of influence and as indicative of ‘backwardness’.  
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An intellectual is someone whose mind watches itself.  
I like this, because I am happy to be both halves, the watcher and the watched.  
“Can they be brought together?”  
This is a practical question.1  
 
Albert Camus, Notebooks 
 
 
  
                                                 
1 NB: In Camus’ political and intellectual tradition i.e., a European one, he understood 
that the word ‘practical’ means ‘ethical and political’ not whatever people here think 
they mean by it…probably nothing in fact… 
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Introduction 
 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
 
T.S. Eliot, The Four Quartets 
 
Like so many other authors involved in writing a book or doctoral 
dissertation there is always some kind of deeply personal motivation 
involved in what may otherwise seem to be a purely intellectual or 
theoretical enterprise. In my case it began when my love of travelling and for 
a Swedish woman led me to Stockholm in 2008. Living in a small apartment 
in a student complex in a suburb south of Stockholm called Hammarby 
Sjöstad, it soon became clear to me that if I wanted to have an ‘authentic’ 
Swedish experience then I needed to at least understand and speak some 
Swedish. I decided to enrol in a beginner-level Swedish language course 
taught in an adult education institute in a small suburb called Huddinge 
located on the outskirts of Stockholm. 
 
The beginner’s Swedish class ran twice a week for a couple of hours with no 
more than half a dozen people attending each class. The classes were 
intimate, relaxed and enjoyable. I eventually learned enough Swedish to 
understand the checkout girl at the local supermarket. More interesting were 
the friends I made in class. It was a chance encounter with one young man in 
particular that would forever change how I would see and make sense of the 
world and that would inspire this thesis. 
 
My new friend was from Palestine. As we got to know each other during 
lunch and coffee breaks, my new friend began to share more and more about 
his life particularly what it was like for him, his family and other Palestinians 
living under Israeli occupation. He told me about how Israeli Defence Forces 
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had forcibly removed him and his family from their homes. With no place to 
live, they fled to Jordan where they lived in a refugee camp for the next few 
years. According to him he was simply ‘born in the wrong place at the wrong 
time’.  
 
His subsequent application for asylum was eventually accepted and he was 
resettled in Kiruna, one of Sweden’s most northern, darkest and coldest 
cities. It could not be any more different to the parched landscape of 
Palestine. Following the end of his employment in a factory in Kiruna, he 
moved to suburban Stockholm where he lived with three other Arab 
refugees. Unable to speak Swedish, his desire to communicate with the 
people of his adopted nation inspired him to join the Swedish language class.  
 
I had not previously been interested in the ‘situation’ in Palestine. To me the 
‘situation’ was easily understood. The Palestinians were ‘terrorists’ inspired 
by ‘radical Islam’. It was their religious beliefs that inspired them to kill 
Israeli-Jews. I understood this because I relied on Australian mainstream 
media. However this narrative was completely contradicted by what my 
Palestinian friend was telling me. He was not a terrorist nor did he hate Jews. 
In fact he abhorred violence. Instead of making bombs and planning terrorist 
attacks, he played soccer, enjoyed smoking (a habit he picked up in the 
Jordanian refugee camp to help suppress his hunger and pass time) and 
drinking coffee. Like most people he dreamed of falling in love and having a 
family. What was most interesting was that he did not hate nor did he speak 
of exacting revenge against those responsible for evicting him from his home 
and breaking up his family. 
 
After speaking with my Palestinian friend I began to understand there was 
another side to the story. He offered a competing narrative I had not heard 
before. Here I was in cold and dreary Stockholm getting a first-hand account 
of the pain and suffering inflicted on this man, his family and his people. I 
remember thinking if this happened to me I would be filled with such rage 
and hate that I would dedicate the rest of my life to exacting revenge on 
those responsible. The stories I had been told about the ‘situation’ in 
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Palestine simply did not match up with what I understood to be happening on 
the ground. So I began to go online searching for alternative news sites and 
websites. The more I read the more I was aware of the many different 
narratives and categories writers were using when representing the ‘terrorist 
threat’ allegedly posed by Palestinians. One of the categories that tweaked 
my interest was something called ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
I had remembered hearing this term ‘Wahhabism’ immediately following the 
9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Commentators used it 
when describing the religion of the Saudi Arabian hijackers. In 2008 I 
noticed that many writers online were linking it to Saudi Arabia, claiming it 
was their ‘state-sanctioned religion’ and that it inspired ‘radicalism’ and 
‘extremism’. However the more reading I did the less sure I was about the 
relation between this version of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia and the 
situation in Palestine. My Palestinian friend had certainly never mentioned or 
used the term.  
 
My friendship with a Palestinian and my reading about the situation in the 
Middle East planted a seed that has since grown to become this PhD thesis. It 
has motivated my research and helped me to formulate the research questions 
I want to address.   
 
Research Questions 
 
My research seeks to understand how the phenomenon of ‘Wahhabism’ has 
been represented by authors writing in a post 9/11 world characterised by 
anxiety about terrorism between and inside states and in particular how 
different groups of intellectuals belonging to the liberal, neo-conservative 
and Marxist intellectual traditions and the different truth claims they rely on 
to support these representations of ‘Wahhabism’. My research is also 
designed to understand something of the way the different ethical, political 
and religious motivations might inform these representations.  
 
 6 
I want to address a number of research questions to help me focus my 
research.  Firstly how has ‘Wahhabism’ been represented in the scholarly 
literature? What kinds of problems are there with these interpretative 
exercises? Secondly what kinds of problems that can be found in the 
sociology of intellectuals warrant this enquiry? Thirdly how do liberal, neo-
conservative and Marxist intellectuals represent ‘Wahhabism’? Finally how 
should we understand and make sense of the particular ways liberal, neo-
conservative and Marxist intellectuals represent ‘Wahhabism’?  
 
A Rationale  
 
At this point it is important to set out briefly why I am focusing on 
intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’ and not whatever it is that is 
referred to as ‘Wahhabism’. There are a number of considerations that 
warrant the shape my inquiry has taken. Firstly though this proposition needs 
and gets some more elaboration later in the thesis, the basic difficulty with 
engaging with ‘Wahhabism’ itself is that there are good grounds for doubting 
that it has some natural or objective reality that can be ‘grasped’ immediately 
as if it were some natural object. 
 
We cannot see, feel or touch the social and intellectual processes constituting 
it. What we can do is examine the various representations of ‘Wahhabism’. 
Secondly it is impossible to study a phenomena in the social world for which 
we do not have a standard or widely agreed upon conceptualisation or 
definition. ‘Wahhabism’ as I also indicate is a contested category. Let me 
start with the first proposition which owes a good deal to the far-reaching 
critique of a long standing tradition running through the history of Western 
philosophy after Aristotle and Augustine that treated language and its 
categories as if they were labels that could be simply applied to real things.  
 
This view holds that a ‘real thing’ exists in some external reality and 
corresponds with the concept in human thought to which the linguistic word 
refers. What we can quickly refer to as the ‘Linguistic Turn’ associated in 
anglo-American philosophy with philosophers like Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
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Richard Rorty and in Europe with the deconstructionist turn announced by 
Ferdinand de Saussure and later by Derrida has subverted that tradition.  As 
Saussure explains, this approach   
…assumes that ideas already exist independently of words; it does 
not tell us whether a name is vocal or psychological in nature… 
finally, it lets us assume that the linking of a name and a thing is a 
very simple operation—an assumption that is anything but true. But 
this rather naive approach can bring us near the truth by showing us 
that the linguistic unit is a double entity, one formed by the 
associating of two terms...2 
 
It was Ferdinand de Saussure who pointed out that it is impossible for 
definitions of concepts to exist independently of or outside a specific 
language system. Concepts like ‘Wahhabism’ cannot exist without humans 
creating a name for and attaching meaning to it. Authors like Gustav 
Bergmen have built on these ideas, emphasising the key role language plays 
in constituting the representations of reality that we can then work with.3 
This is why my thesis focuses on representations and because they are a 
major focal point of my study it matters that we have an initial understanding 
of what I mean when I speak about “representations of ‘Wahhabism’” and 
how they work.   
 
The term ‘representation’ means ‘to bring to mind by description’ and ‘to 
symbolise, serve as a sign or symbol of, serve as the type or embodiment of’. 
It comes from Old French representer meaning ‘present, show, portray’ and 
from the Latin term repraesentare meaning ‘make present, set in view, show, 
exhibit, display’. We can trace the study of representations to Classical 
Greece when Plato and Aristotle considered literature to be an important 
form of representation. In fact Aristotle believed all of the arts to be valuable 
forms of representation seeing them as a distinctly human activity. 
According to Aristotle “From childhood, men have an instinct for 
                                                 
2 Ferdinand de Saussure, “Signs and language,” Culture and Society: Contemporary Debates, eds. 
Jeffrey C. Alexander and Steven Seidman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),56. 
3 Gustav Bergmann, Logic and Reality. (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964). 
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representation, and in this respect man differs from the other animals that he 
is far more imitative and learns his lessons by representing things.”4  
 
Since then modern philosophers like Ernst Cassirer have focused their 
attentions on representations.5 They have tended to understand man to be 
homo symbolicum or a ‘representational animal’ treating him as a creature 
whose distinctive character is the creating and manipulating of ‘signs’, which 
are understood as things that ‘stand for’ or ‘take the place of’ something 
else.6 As I will indicate later, representations are very important elements of 
political theory. Political theorists have focused on them since at least the 
eighteenth century when Edmund Burke sought to deal with the reoccurring 
question about the relation between aesthetic or semiotic representation 
(things that ‘stand for’ other things’) and political representation (people who 
‘act for’ others).7   
 
W. J. T. Mitchell offers a useful way of thinking about representations. He 
says we should think of a representation as a triangular relation of something 
or someone, by something or someone and to someone. It is only the third 
part that must be a person. In light of this ‘Wahhabism’ can be understood as 
a representation of something, by an author or authors and given to an 
audience. The second relation in particular is of central importance in this 
study.  
 
                                                 
4 Aristotle, “Poetics IV,” cited in “Representation” by W. J. T. Mitchell in Representation in Critical 
Terms for Literary Study, eds. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995.) http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/uchicagols/representation/0, 
paragraph 1. 
5 Cassirer's works on the philosophy of symbolic forms appeared as studies and lectures of the Warburg 
Library from 1922 to 1925 and the three-volume Philosophy of Symbolic Forms itself appeared in 
1923, 1925, and 1929. See Ernst Cassirer Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Erster Teil: Die 
Sprache (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1923) Translated as The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Volume One: 
Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955). Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Zweiter 
Teil: Das mythische Denken (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1925) Translated as The Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms. Volume Two: Mythical Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955). Philosophie der 
symbolischen Formen. Dritter Teil: Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1929). 
Translated as The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Volume Three: The Phenomenology of Knowledge 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). 
6 Mitchell, “Representation,” paragraph 2.  
7 Edmund Burke, Philosophical Enquiry, ed. J. T. Boulton (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 
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Aristotle wrote that representations differ from one another according to 
object, manner and means.8 The ‘object’ is that which is represented, the 
‘manner’ is the way in which it is represented and the ‘means’ is the material 
used. In this study the ‘object’ is ‘Wahhabism’, the ‘manner’ is the ways in 
which intellectuals use language to represent it and the document i.e. the 
newspaper article, magazine article or publication online is the ‘means’. 
Authors are then able to use language in different ways to help achieve their 
desired outcomes. Authors can for example use particular rhetorical 
techniques like analogies, metaphorical language, similes, neologisms and 
they can also construct violent accounts in such ways that persuade the 
reader to either condemn or condone particular acts of violence. A major 
focus of this thesis is understanding how intellectuals use these particular 
rhetorical techniques to help achieve their intended aims. 
 
It is also important that we have a deeper understanding of the relation 
between the representational material and that which it is said to ‘stand in 
for’ or represent. Semioticians typically differentiate between three kinds of 
representational relationships, the ‘icon’, ‘symbol’ and ‘index’.9  It is the 
symbolic representation that is pertinent to this thesis. Symbols tend to be 
based on arbitrary stipulation rather than their resemblance between the sign 
and the thing signified. Authors of texts representing ‘Wahhabism’ use text 
to stand in for what they believe to be ‘Wahhabism’ ‘out there’ because ‘we 
say so’ and because we have agreed to regard it this way. Representation in 
language is symbolic in that letters, words and whole texts can represent or 
‘stand it for’ states of affairs without actually resembling the situation ‘out 
there’. We are, as Ludwig Wittgenstein famously points out, playing 
‘language games’.10   
 
                                                 
8 Aristotle. “Poetics IV,” in “Representation,” Mitchell, paragraph 7. 
9 Mitchell. “Representation,” paragraph 8. 
10 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans G. E. M Anscombe (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1953). Throughout the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein constantly returns to the 
concept of ‘language-games’ to make clear his lines of thought about language, see for example §2, 
§23, §65and §66 
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Ian Hacking is among the authors to have raised some important questions 
when studying representations.11 His ideas encourage us to consider whether 
we are explicitly or implicitly denying the existence of the natural world and 
if we are ignoring the possibility that some representations of the world are 
better than others? What I mean when I say ‘Wahhabism’ is an observer-
dependent phenomenon represented by an author and to audience is that the 
experience of ‘Wahhabism’ in the social world comes into existence when 
categories are created for it, and that these categories are shaped by authors 
with differing prejudices operating in different social and cultural contexts. 
As we will see the variability in representations of ‘Wahhabism’ across time 
and space (between intellectuals belonging to different traditions) are 
illustrative of this. Pursing this line of reasoning provides for powerful 
insights into the cultural fabric pertaining to the constructing ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
I am not denying that an observer-independent reality exists in the natural 
world nor am I asserting that everything is socially constructed. In terms of 
my ontological and epistemological approach I accept that a reality does 
exist and my interest is in how people make sense of it. I am not deciding 
which representations are more ‘truthful’ or ‘better’, rather I am critiquing 
the different truth claims authors rely on when representing ‘Wahhabism’. 
Just as is the case with Hacking’s work on ‘making up people’ in which he 
argues the creating of classifications like ‘fugue’ creates ‘new ways to be a 
person’, the ideas motivating my study of representations is that authors 
conceptions of the phenomenon ‘Wahhabism’ shapes both the ways in which 
we respond to it and treat the people and groups we ascribe as belonging to 
it.12  
 
‘Representations’ have indeed been the source of much scholarly debate 
especially in the field of literature and have drawn the attention of 
preeminent thinkers like Plato. He accepted the common view that literature 
                                                 
11 Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
12 Ian Hacking, Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998). 
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is a representation of life and for that reason he believed it should be 
banished from the state. He understood representations as substitutes for the 
things themselves or, even more worryingly, as ‘false’ or ‘illusory 
substitutes’ that have the ability to inspire ‘antisocial’ emotions.13 In Plato’s 
republic of rational virtue only particular kinds of representations carefully 
picked and controlled by the state were allowed to exist.14 If we look at the 
situation in the world today we can see that many states think and act in the 
same way, however the emergence of new social media continues to 
challenge this control.  
 
As will become clear in this study, this is just one reason why ‘Wahhabism’ 
means very different things to different people, a point accepted by some of 
the better studies of ‘Wahhabism’.15 In effect ‘Wahhabism’ is a deeply 
contested category.   
 
‘Wahhabism’: A Contested Category 
 
‘Wahhabism’ is conventionally and popularly understood to be a 
conservative version of Islam, which has its origins in Saudi Arabia, where it 
has said to have a substantial following to this day.16 It is generally agreed 
that Muhammad Ibn Abd-al Wahhab was the founder of this version of Islam 
and that this tradition played a decisive role in creating the modern Saudi 
state in 1932.17 Beyond these understandings ‘Wahhabism’ is a heavily 
                                                 
13 Cited in Mitchell, “Representation,” paragraph 9. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Alexander Knysh, “A Clear and Present Danger: ‘Wahhabism’ as a Rhetorical Foil,” Die Welt des 
Islams 44, no. 1(2004): 3-26. doi:10.1163/157006004773712569; Muriel Atkin, “The Rhetoric of 
Islamophobia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, no.1 (2000): 123-132.http://www.ca-
c.org/journal/2000/journal_eng/eng01_2000/16.atkin.shtml; Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the 
Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no.3 (2006): 207-239. 
doi:10.1080/10576100500497004. 
16 Joseph Nevo, “Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia,” Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 3 
(1998): 36-50, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283951; Joseph A. Kechichian, “The Role of the Ulama in 
the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 18, no.1 (1986): 56-59, http://www.jstor.org/stable/162860; William Wager Cooper and Piyu 
Yue, Challenges of the Muslim World: Present, Future and Past (Bingley: Emerald, 2008), 271-272. 
Stephen E. Atkins, “Wahhabism (Saudi Arabia)” in Encylopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and 
Extremist Groups (Wesport: Praeger, 2004) http://www.praeger.com.ezproxy.lib.rmit.edu.au/.  
17 David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London: I:B. Tauris, 2009), 104-129; Jon 
Armajani, “Saudi Arabia,” Modern Islamist Movement History, Religion, and Politics (2011): 122-133, 
doi:10.1002/9781444344394.ch4; Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: 
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contested category. This quality is captured in the Wikipedia entry on the 
‘Wahhabi’ movement. Drawing as is so often the case with Wikipedia on a 
rich assortment of sources of varying degrees of credibility, Wikipedia 
variously and tendentiously describes ‘Wahhabism’ as:    
a reactionary religious movement or offshoot branch of Islam 
variously described as “orthodox”, “ultraconservative”, “austere”, 
“fundamentalist”, “puritanical” (or “puritan”), an Islamic “reform 
movement” to restore “pure monotheistic worship”, or an “extremist 
movement.”18 
 
In the ‘West’ ‘Wahhabism’ has been frequently singled out for attention as 
the source of modern Islamic terrorism. For example the final report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks claimed that ‘Islamist terrorism’ 
had found its inspiration in a ‘long tradition of extreme intolerance’ that 
flows ‘through the founders of ‘Wahhabism’’, the Muslim Brotherhood and 
prominent Salafi thinkers.19  As recently as June 2013 the Directorate-
General for External Policies of the European Parliament issued a report 
whose author Claude Moniquet warns that:  
The risks posed by Salafist/Wahhibi terrorism go far beyond the 
geographical scope of the Muslim world. The attacks on New York, 
Washington DC., London and Madrid reminds us of this. 20 
  
Equally and given long-standing and close ties between a succession of US 
Administrations and the Saudi Government, it has mattered that Saudi 
officials have long insisted that Islam is tolerant and peaceful, and have 
denied allegations that their Government ‘exports’ religious extremism or 
                                                                                                                                           
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 15-17; Khalid S. Al-Dakhil, “Social Origins of the Wahhabi 
Movement” (PhD dissertation, UCLA, 1998), 1-19, ProQuest (UMI Number: 9906191); Natana 
DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2004), see chapters ‘Muhammad Ibn Ad al-Wahhab and the Origin of Wahhabism: The 
Eighteenth-Century Context,’ 7-40 and ‘The Theology and Worldview of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab,’ 41-92.  
18 “Wahhabi Movement,” Wikipedia, last modified November 2, 2014, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabi. 
19 Christopher M. Blanchard, CRS Report for Congress: The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and 
Salafiyya, (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2008), Order code RS21695. 
20 Claude Moniquet, The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhibism in the support and supply of arms to rebel 
groups around the World. Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament Brussels, 
2013. EXPO/B/AFET/FWC/2009-01/LOT4/23.  
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supports extremist political movements.21 Likewise careful scholarship by 
writers like Trevor Stanley suggests the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism 
cannot be adequately explained as the export of Saudi ‘Wahhabism’ as many 
claim. Stanley for example claims that Salafism, which he identifies as a 
movement beginning in Egypt and imported into Saudi society during the 
reign of King Faisal, is the ideological heritage of groups such as al-Qaeda.22  
 
This contest also involves Islamic scholars. Different representations of 
‘Wahhabism’ offered by ‘Islamic’ scholars like Khaled Abou El Fadl and 
Stephen Schwartz are a microcosm of a much larger intellectual debate 
taking place in a range of scholarly and public intellectual forums.23 Both are 
inspired and motivated by different religious and political interests when 
representing ‘Wahhabism’. El Fadl claims to represent the majority of 
Muslims he believes to be ‘moderate,’ ‘peace-loving’ and who like many in 
the ‘West’ believe in human rights, embrace ‘modernity’ and respect women. 
According to his ‘moderate’ Islamic approach ‘Wahhabism’ is a corrupted 
version of Islam existing on the lunatic fringe of the wider Islamic faith.  
 
Schwartz seems strongly motivated by a desire to promote his Sufi Islamic 
beliefs. Based on his personal experiences with Sufism in the Balkan region 
throughout the 1990s, Schwartz claims Sufism can provide the much needed 
‘voice of reason’ at a time when ‘radical Islamists’ like the ‘Wahhabis’ with 
the support of the Saudi state are inspiring terrorism. Like El Fadl, Schwartz 
understands ‘Wahhabism’ to be a ‘corrupted’ and ‘perverse’ version of 
Islam, however this is because it does not align with his own Sufi beliefs 
rather than the ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’ interpretation of Islam El Fadl 
claims to follow. 
                                                 
21 Wael Mahdi, “There is no such thing as Wahabism, Saudi prince says,” The National, March 18, 
2010, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/there-is-no-such-thing-as-wahabism-saudi-
prince-says?pageCount=0#ixzz3FsvFSvG.; Mohammed bin Nawaf Al Saud, “Saudi Arabia does not 
support Islamic State terrorists – or any others,” The Guardian, August 18, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/17/saudi-arabia-not-support-islamic-state-terrorists. 
22 Trevor Stanley, “Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism,” Terrorism Monitor, 3.14 
(2005), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=528&#.U-
uIZtwxHlI., paragraph 1. 
23 Khaled Abou El-Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (HarperCollins: San 
Francisco, 2005); Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa’ud from Tradition to 
Terror (Doubleday: New York, 2002). 
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As both intellectuals are offering different particular Islamic views both are 
clearly inspired by differing political and religious interests. It is 
unsurprising that both also rely on different kinds of evidence to support 
their claims. In terms made famous by Benedict Anderson, both El Fadl and 
Schwartz are constructing slightly different ‘imaginary communities’.24 The 
differences in approaches and reasoning only increase as we consider other 
scholarly representations of ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
The Role of Intellectuals 
 
This discussion begins to indicate why we might pay some attention to the 
work of intellectuals and the way intellectuals represent ‘Wahhabism’. There 
are a number of good grounds for doing so. As the sociology of intellectuals 
acknowledges, what intellectuals do matters deeply.25 Intellectuals writing in 
newspapers, scholarly journals, online and in magazines, produce a lot of 
what we think we know and understand to be ‘Wahhabism’. As many writers 
have acknowledged it is these intellectuals who are ‘producing knowledge’ 
in the social world in the form of representations which are informing our 
judgments and decisions particularly with regards to foreign policy.26 If we 
want to understand and make sense of some of the information informing the 
modern political debate and policy and decision making processes regarding 
‘Wahhabism’ then we must pay some attention to the way intellectuals 
                                                 
24 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism, 2nd 
ed. (London: Verso, 1991).  
25 Charles Kurzman and Lynn Owens, “The Sociology of Intellectuals,” Annual Review of Sociology 28 
(2002): 63-80, doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.28110601.140745; Karl Mannheim, “The Sociology of 
Intellectuals,” Theory, Culture and Society 10, no.3 (1993): 69-80. doi:10.1177/026327693010003004; 
Patrick Baert and Joel Isaac, “Intellectuals and Society: Sociological and Historical Perspectives,” in 
Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory, 200-211, ed. Gerard 
Delanty and Stephen P. Turner (London: Routledge, 2011).   
26 Thomas Osborne, “On mediators: Intellectuals and the ideas trade in the knowledge society,” 
Economy and Society 33, no.4 (2004): 430-447. doi:10.1080/0308514042000285224; Hisham M. 
Nazer, Power of a Third Kind: The Western Attempt to Colonize the Global Village (Westport :Praeger, 
1999): 13- 24; James Q. Wilson, “‘Policy Intellectuals' and public policy,” The Public Interest, no. 64 
(Summer 1981), 31-46. 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080708_1981643policyintellectualsandpublicpolicyjamesqwil
son.pdf; Said, “The Public Role of Writers and Intellectuals,” in The Public Intellectual, 19-39, ed. 
Helen Small (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).   
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represent ‘Wahhabism’. The pertinent issue in this study is that different 
intellectuals make sense of ‘Wahhabism’.   
 
The contest I have referred to seeking to define, explain and understand 
’Wahhabism’ has been engaged by intellectuals, commentators and 
polemicists drawn from different intellectual and political traditions and 
frameworks, using different rhetorical techniques, making different claims to 
truth and who are motivated by different ethical, political and religious 
considerations. The sites of this contest include the scholarly literature, mass 
media publications like newspapers and magazine articles as well as the 
blogosphere. The significance of this becomes readily apparent when we 
consider the effects intellectuals’ representations of phenomena like 
‘Wahhabism’ can have on politicians, public opinion and policy making in a 
context characterised by heightened anxiety about terrorism. This suggests 
there are a number of issues about the role played by intellectuals in public 
opinion formation and policy making worth exploring.  
 
We currently have a situation where a rise in ‘spin’ has been accompanied by 
an increasing demand on the part of policy makers and governments that are 
increasingly relying on evidence when making policy.27 Both the use of spin 
and the appeal to evidence rely on appeals to a heritage of Enlightenment 
assumptions and approaches to securing the conditions of truth: on the one 
side public administrators lay claim to the rigorous collection of evidence to 
evaluate the value of their legislative programs and policies, while 
governments rely on the scientific study of the effects of the science of 
public relations invented by Edward Bernays in the 1920s on the state of 
public opinion.28    
 
This conjunction has meant that since 2001 we have seen governments rely 
on the creative presentation of facts or ‘spin’ presented as ‘evidence’ to 
manipulate public opinion and mobilise support for policies involving armed 
                                                 
27 Rob Watts, “Truth and Politics: Thinking About Evidence-Based Policy in the Age of Spin,” 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 73, no.1 (2014): 35-36, doi:10.111/1467-8500.12061. 
28Ibid., 36. 
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invasions of countries like Afghanistan and Iraq and dramatic increases in 
security and intelligence gathering measures to protect ‘the West’ from 
Islamic terrorism. Certain ‘Western’ government’s intent on pursuing their 
own political aims and goals have proved to be disingenuous and deceptive 
when manipulating and fabricating ‘facts’ to support their policies. The 
quintessential example of this was the intelligence failure inspiring the 
Coalition’s invasions of Iraq in March 2003. US and British governments 
claimed to have evidence that Saddam Hussein’s regime possessed Weapons 
of Mass Destruction which threatened the security of the West.29 The result 
is a situation Hannah Arendt commented on when writing about the politics 
of the ‘Cold War’ in the 1960s, when she argued that even factual truths have 
become open to manipulation.30   
 
What is interesting to me and what helps animate and legitimate this research 
is the role intellectuals representing ‘Wahhabism’ are playing in the modern 
political context. I am especially interested in intellectuals’ roles as 
representatives of particular interest groups keen to promote their beliefs and 
values. I share this interest with many prominent scholars who have 
dedicated a lot of time and energy to making sense of the role of intellectuals 
in the modern political context as part of a tradition we call the ‘sociology of 
intellectuals’.  
 
This tradition began with groundbreaking work by Mannheim.31 Since 
Mannheim we have seen an evolving tradition of inquiry and debate between 
                                                 
29 Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: “The Assessment of the British Government” also known as 
the “September Dossier”, was published by the British government September 24, 2002. It alleged that 
Iraq possessed WMD including chemical weapons and biological weapons. It also alleged that Iraq had 
reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. All of the allegations have been since proven to be false. 
US Senate Intelligence Committee found many of the administration's pre-war statements about Iraqi 
WMD like Bush’s claim that “The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at 
the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder,” were not 
supported by the underlying intelligence. See “Press Release of Intelligence Committee Senate 
Intelligence Committee Unveils Final Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence-- Two Bipartisan 
Reports Detail Administration Misstatements on Prewar Iraq Intelligence, and Inappropriate 
Intelligence Activities by Pentagon Policy Office.” 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=298775 
30 Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics,” in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political 
Thought (New York: Penguin, 1993), 257. 
31 See Karl Mannheim, “The sociological problem of the ‘intelligentsia,’” (1929) in Ideology and 
Utopia, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), “The 
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intellectuals as diverse as Gramsci, Sartre, Aron, Shils, Nettl, Berger,  
Foucault, Habermas, Butler, Chomsky, Watzer and Said, who have 
attempted to say what is that defines an intellectual and how we are to best 
understand their social significance.32 Some of these writers like Foucault, 
Chomsky and Said have understood intellectuals as living on the margins or 
even outside of ‘society’, a circumstance warranted by their pursuit of ‘truth’ 
and of speaking ‘truth to power’.33 Others like Habermas treat them as 
critical to the maintenance of a ‘public sphere’ and to the health of a 
democratic order.34 There are also scholars like Gramsci who treat 
intellectuals as social animals bound to particular interest groups who use 
various ideological apparatuses like the media to help impose particular 
values and beliefs on society and then legitimate them.35 The debates about 
the role of intellectuals which I reprise at length in the first chapter helps 
shape some of the issues I explore later in this thesis.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
Sociology of Intellectuals”, in Theory, Culture and Society 10 no.3 (1993 [1932]) and “The problem of 
the intelligentsia,” in Essays on the Sociology of Culture (London: Routledge, 1956).  
32 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. & ed. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971); Jurgen Habermas “Heinrich Heine und die 
Rolle des Intellektuellen in Deutschland” (1986), Stefan Müller-Doohm, “Two Ways of Being a Public 
Intellectual: Sociological Observations Concerning the Transformation of a Social Figure of 
Modernity,” European Journal of Social Theory 8, no.3 (2005), 269-280, 
doi:10.1177/1368431005054794; Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, trans. by George G. Becker 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1948); Raymond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2000); Edward Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers and Other Essays 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); J.P Nettl, “Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of 
Dissent,” in On Intellectuals: Theoretical Case Studies, ed. by Philip Rieff (New York: Doubleday, 
1969), 63-87;Peter Berger, Invitation to Sociology. A Humanistic Perspective (New York: Anchor 
Books, Doubley and Company, 1963); Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, “The Intellectuals and 
Power: A Discussion Between Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault,” Telos 16 (1973), 103-109; Noam 
Chomsky, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,” The New York Review of Books, February 23, 1967; 
Judith Butler and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Who Sings the Nation State? Language, Politics, 
Belonging, (Calcutta: Seagull Books, 2007); Michael Walzer, The Company of Critics (New York: 
Basic Books, 1988); Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual: the 1993 Reith Lectures 
(London: Vintage, 1994).   
33 Foucault and Deleuze, “The intellectuals and power,” 103-109; Said, Representations of the 
Intellectual, see chapter ‘Speaking Truth to Power’, 85-102. 
34 Habermas, “Heinrich Heine,” 274-276. 
35 Gramsci writes  
Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the 
world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of 
intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the 
economic but also in the social and political fields.  
See Antonio Gramsci, “The intellectuals,” in Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. D 
Boothman (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1995), 5. 
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The ‘public sphere’ is an important concept I refer to numerous times throughout this 
study and therefore warrants closer attention. The representations of ‘Wahhabism’ 
provided by the intellectuals studied in this thesis appear in places like mainstream 
American newspapers, magazines, online and books. I maintain that we can 
categorise these different mediums as belonging to a ‘public sphere’. Often when we 
think about the nature of the public sphere we think of a community or public acting 
in a particular space. It is sometimes assumed civil dialogue flourishes in this setting 
so as long as it is free from domination and exclusion. This kind of approach fails to 
recognise that communication in public rarely involves widespread and equal 
participation. We must appreciate the fragmented nature of these spaces in which 
there are few who receive attention and many who give it. We must also understand 
that these spaces are largely comprised of audiences who are generally watching, 
reading or observing what is happening.  
 
Jürgen Habermas is often credited as providing the quintessential notion of the public 
sphere.36 He conceptualises a public sphere as a society engaged in critical public 
debate and argues that certain conditions must be meet in order for a space to 
constitute a public sphere i.e. it must allow for the formation of public opinion, all 
citizens must have access to it, there must be freedom from economic and political 
control that allows citizens to speak about matters of general interest and there must 
be debate about the general rules governing relations. Habermas’ normative account 
has been extremely influential and is an interesting philosophical idea however I 
believe we need a much more pragmatic conceptualisation of the public sphere like 
that offered by Ari Adut.37  
 
Adut offers a semiotic theoretical conceptualisation of the public sphere that fits 
perfectly with my understanding of how representations work. Key to his 
conceptualisation is the idea of ‘access’. According to Adut there are three ways 
people can access the public sphere. One is to physically access a space like for 
example when we meet to talk in a street. Two we can have representational access 
meaning one’s name, image, sounds or words can appear in spaces like newspapers or 
                                                 
36 see Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1989). 
37 Ari Adut, “A Theory of the Public Sphere,” Sociological Theory 30, no. 4 (2012): 238-262, doi: 
10.1177/0735275112467012 
 19 
magazines. Three we can have sensory access when the contents of the space are 
made available to our senses.  
 
The term ‘public sphere’ implies general access however the reality is very different. 
Many public spaces have obstacles preventing most of us from being seen or having 
our opinions heard. This is especially the case when dealing with spaces that tend to 
receive a lot of publicity. Generally speaking the more publicity a space receives the 
harder it is to be heard or seen. Mainstream US newspapers like the New York Times 
and Wall Street Journal and Television studios broadcasting the daily news are good 
examples. Conversely forums on websites that encourage inclusivity like 4Chan 
provide examples of spaces that receive relatively less publicity but are easier to 
access.  
 
When dealing with spaces that receive relatively high amounts of publicity physical 
access becomes very hard and representational access is highly valued. Nearly anyone 
can submit an opinion piece to these newspapers but very few if any will ever have 
their articles printed. Despite this few would deny that newspapers like the New York 
Times form an important part of what we conceptualise as the public sphere. As a 
space it does not grant general access but it does provide many with sensory access. 
 
The public sphere as conceptualised by Adut is thus a generic term denoting all 
virtual or real spaces, the contents of which obtain general visibility or audibility. Key 
here is the term ‘virtual’ which points to the important role played by spaces online. 
The internet as the new public sphere or as a key part of the public sphere continues to 
be a focus of much scholarly enquiry as more users go online to get information.38 
The integral role played by social media in the recent Arab Spring shows just how 
important the online world has become.  
 
At this point it is also important to clarify whom I believe to be an 
intellectual and on what basis I make these claims. There has and continues 
to be a lot of discussion about who is and who is not an intellectual. As we 
                                                 
38 Peter Dahlgren is a prominent author studying this—see for example Peter Dahlgren, “The Internet, 
public spheres, and political communication: Dispersion and deliberation,” Political Communication 
22 no. 2 (2006): 147-162, doi:10.1080/10584600590933160.  
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see with authors like Gramsci, Mannheim, Foucault and Said the 
conceptualising of who or what is an intellectual is often tied to the role and 
responsibilities these authors believe intellectuals should adopt and adhere 
to. In this thesis I reject the narrow and arguably prescriptive conception of 
the intellectual offered by authors like Said and Foucault where the 
intellectual is someone existing on the margins of society.39 Instead I adopt a 
much more inclusive approach that aligns more with the conceptualisations 
promoted by authors like Gramsci. In this study I understand the intellectual 
to be anyone who uses ideological apparatuses like the print and mass media 
and the newer digital technologies to produce and disseminate 
representations of ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
Whereas those adopting a more narrow definition of the intellectual may 
distinguish between a commentator understood here as someone who 
expresses a written opinion on a subject in the ‘public sphere’ and an 
intellectual, my relatively more inclusive approach means that I treat a 
commentator as an intellectual. While I am influenced by authors like 
Gramsci, my conceptualisation of the intellectual is not Marxist in that I do 
not rely on any determinist assumptions about the work of the intellectual in 
relation to their class origins or affiliation. I do however link my 
understanding to a particular group which in this study are those writers who 
promote liberal, Marxist and neo-conservative ideas when representing 
‘Wahhabism’.  
 
I am also interested in the broader academic question about the role 
intellectuals play in creating what Anderson calls ‘Imagined Communities,’ 
and what Said calls ‘Imagined Geographies’.40 These scholars in addition to 
those like Hobsbawn, Smith, Suny and Kennedy are among those to 
recognise the important roles intellectuals play as catalysts in a variety of 
nationalist ideologies and movements.41 Animating and legitimating this 
                                                 
39 See chapter “Intellectual Exile: Expatriates and Marginals” in Said, Representations of the 
Intellectual, 47-64.;Foucault and Deleuze, “The intellectuals and power.” 
40 Anderson, Imagined Communities; Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1977).  
41 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism (London: Duckworth, 
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thesis is the desire to understand and make sense of the role intellectuals 
representing ‘Wahhabism’ play in socially constructing a community that is 
imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group and 
the way intellectuals use text to create a perception of space that has helped 
inspire the modern Global War on Terror. It is in this sense then that 
intellectuals play a crucial role in shaping the politics of modern societies.  
 
 
 
The Nature of the Political 
 
The nature of the political is the second wider intellectual problem at stake in 
this study. How we are to understand politics including how we define it and 
what we think the aims of goals of politics are has been central to much 
scholarly debate. Early twentieth century authors like Carl Schmitt and Max 
Weber offer challenging accounts of ‘the political’ that controvert the 
conventional liberal framework. Weber and especially Schmitt have 
indicated why that tradition has assumed too readily that legal, rational and 
ethical norms have undergirded the legitimacy of liberal democracies, a 
position which has long been accorded a hegemonic conceptual status in the 
West.42 Authors like Bernard Crick and Simon Critchley have also 
contributed to a different kind of critique of the liberal tradition.43  For Crick 
and Critchley politics is about helping to end injustice and wrongs suffered 
by the Other. Like these scholars it is important to understand that 
intellectuals representing ‘Wahhabism’ make different assumptions that 
influence their representations. This matters when we begin to consider the 
influential role these representations can play in the policy-making process.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
1971); Ronald G. Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (eds.), Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). 
42 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: Chicago University of Press, 1996); Max 
Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” (1919) in Max Weber, Political Writings, ed. and 
trans. P.Lassman and R.Spiers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).   
43 Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992); Simon Critchley, 
Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (London: Verso, 2013). 
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The relation between intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’ and the 
policy and decision-making process is the third key intellectual problem 
animating and legitimating this research. Bacchi provides an important and 
revisionist account of policy as a product of processes that leads to a 
particular way of representing political or policy problems. Her work is 
important because it helps show how policy works, how we are governed and 
how the practice of policy making implicitly constitutes us as subjects. 
Bacchi highlights the integral role intellectuals play in this process as it is 
they who are framing, choosing to highlight or ignore particular aspects of 
problems in their representations which then inform the policy making 
process.44 
 
This raises some very important questions when we think that these 
intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’ have the ability to influence 
foreign policy in an age where ‘Western’ liberal governments are obsessed 
with the real or imagined threat posed by ‘radical Islamists’. This 
circumstance requires that we ask what are the bases for these 
representations? What are intellectuals choosing to emphasise and ignore and 
why? What particular claims to truth are intellectuals relying on to support 
their assessments of the situation? 
 
This takes me to my fourth and final problematic animating and legitimating 
this research which is making sense of and dealing with the relation between 
truth and politics. This issue has been raised by a number of writers 
including Hannah Arendt. Arendt writes that we live in an age of mass 
manipulation where even the status of factual truth is likely to be 
challenged.45 We have as Stephen Toulmin and John Caputo more recently 
pointed out, moved beyond a conception of truth framed in terms of timeless 
and universal propositions, without needing to give up on the idea of truth 
itself.46 This entails that we still find ways of dealing with different claims to 
                                                 
44 Carol Bacchi, What’s the Problem Represented to Be? (New Jersey: Pearson Education Australia, 
2009). 
45 Arendt, “Truth and Politics,” 252. 
46 Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding: The evolution of Concepts, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982); John Caputo, Truth (London: Penguin, 2014). 
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truth particularly those that are religious and political in origin or in 
substance. 
 
Unable to make certain assumptions about truth that then requires me to both 
defend a particular view and test the veridicity of particular representations 
of ‘Wahhabism’ against this view, I instead propose dealing with the role 
prejudice plays in truth claims. In this study I follow Arendt’s advice and 
deal with the relation between truth and politics by identifying and 
unpacking the prejudices attached to and inspiring these truth claims.47 This 
speaks to the much larger problem of how we should treat truth claims in the 
political sphere which has major implications for things like making foreign 
policy.  
 
In this research I have decided to focus on intellectuals belonging to three 
traditions, namely neo-liberalism, neo-conservatism, and Marxism. I have 
identified these traditions because they are among the most prominent 
traditions in fields like political theory and international relations and 
because they have had the most influence on governments in the modern 
political world. Neo-conservatives for example played a major role in the 
Bush Presidency (2001-8), an administration determined to both wage and 
lead the ‘Global War on Terror’ in a project that continues to dominate the 
modern international political context.48 Liberalism has long provided a large 
framework of political vocabulary and ideas which have informed ‘Western’ 
governments and international and local activists keen on transforming 
totalitarian Middle Eastern regimes into liberal democratic states.49 Finally 
                                                 
47 Hannah Arendt, Was Ist Politik?, ed. Ursula Ludz (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1993), 19. 
48 Jim George, “Leo Strauss, Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy: Esoteric Nihilism and the Bush 
Doctrine,” International Politics 42 (2005): 174–202. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800106; Scott Kline, 
“The Culture War Gone Global: ‘Family Values’ and the Shape of US Foreign Policy,” International 
Relations18, no.4 (2004):453–466. doi:10.1177/0047117804048489; David Grondin, “Mistaking 
hegemony for empire: Neoconservatives, the Bush doctrine, and the Democratic empire,” International 
Journal 61, no.1 (2005–2006): 227-241. doi:10.1177/002070200606100115.  
49 John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (New York: Farrar, Strauss 
and Giroux, 2007); Eric A. Heinze, “The New Utopianism: Liberalism, American Foreign Policy, and 
the War in Iraq,” Journal of International Political Theory 4, no.1 (2008):105-125. 
doi:10.3366/E1755088208000116; Nick Bisley, Great Powers in the Changing International Order 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2012); James Mayall, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira eds, The New 
Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States (London: C. Hurst & Co., 
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while Marxism at this point in time does not exercise the same degree of 
political influence as liberalism or neo-conservatism, it nonetheless remains 
intellectually significant in the wider academic and intellectual community.50 
 
To access the work of intellectuals from these three traditions I have chosen 
to analyse texts from a variety of sources including books, journal articles, 
mainstream US newspapers, online magazines and sites found in the 
blogosphere. Part of my reasoning for deciding to focus on US newspapers 
when analysing texts written by neo-conservatives is that while neo-
conservatism is hardly an exclusively American phenomenon it tends to be 
US-centric.51 While its effects are global especially when neo-conservatives 
have positions of influence within the US government, its intellectuals write 
articles aimed at a populace responsible for electing its representatives.  
 
There are a number of reasons why I have selected a range of articles 
appearing in scholarly literature, newspapers, online magazines and in the 
blogosphere. First these different forms can be conceptualised as providing 
key parts of what we can call a ‘public sphere’. This means that there are 
sites where information can be translated from an intellectual to a wider 
audience. Some of these sites are very popular in terms of numbers of people 
that access them. For example newspaper articles written by liberal and neo-
conservative intellectuals appearing in the New York Times, Wall Street 
Journal, Washington Times, Washington Post, online at Newsweek.com and 
Huffingtonpost.com and in magazine articles like USA Today are read by 
large numbers of people.52   
                                                                                                                                           
2011); Georg Sorensen, A Liberal Order in Crisis: Choosing between Imposition and Restraint (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2011). 
50 John Holloway, “The relevance of Marxism today,” in Common Sense: Journal of Edinburgh 
Conference of Socialist Economists no. 15 (April 2014): 38-42. 
http://commonsensejournal.org.uk/files/2010/08/CommonSense15.pdf; Kenneth Surin, “The continued 
relevance of Marxism as a question: some propositions,” in Marxism beyond Marxism, 181-213 (New 
York: Routledge: 1996).  
51 Justin Vaïsse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement (Cambridge: Belknap, 2010);  
Brandon High, “The Recent Historiography of American Neoconservatism,” in The Historical Journal 
52, no.2 (2009): 475-491. doi:10.1017/S0018246X09007560. 
52 In March 2013 Alliance for Audited Media reported that the Wall Street Journal (the most circulated 
newspaper in the US), The New York Times (2nd most circulated), USA Today (3rd), and Washington 
Post (7th) were among the 10 most circulated newspapers including print and digital subscriptions in 
the US. In June 2014 Cision Research reported that USA Today, The Wall Street Journal and New 
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I have also chosen to include lesser-known and less popular sources. 
Sometimes this has been a deliberate choice and other times it has been a 
necessity. An example of the former is my decision to include an analysis of 
neo-conservative intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’ that appear in 
the online magazine The Weekly Standard. This publication is regarded as 
one of the most prominent neo-conservative opinion publications. In addition 
to applying my ideal type this helps ensure those writing about ‘Wahhabism’ 
are in fact neo-conservative intellectuals. It also complements my analysis of 
other articles because The Weekly Standard is a different medium than the 
popular US newspapers.  
 
It was necessary for me to use less popular sources when analysing Marxist 
intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’. My analysis includes articles 
appearing on Marxist websites like www.marxist.com, 
www.socialismtoday.org, www.socialistworld.net, ideologicalfightback.com, 
magazine articles appearing on www.isreview.org and in Proletarian 
Revolution magazine and newspaper articles appearing on alternative news 
sources like RT News at RT.com. I have had to search within these lesser-
known Marxist publications because Marxist intellectuals do not have the 
same access to mainstream news sources especially when writing about 
‘Wahhabism’. Marxism is not as prominent as the liberal and neo-
conservative ‘ideologies’ and consequently its proponents have been pushed 
to the margins of the ‘public sphere’ and have to publish in relatively more 
obscure locations. Again in addition to applying my ideal type choosing 
articles from these Marxist sources has the added value of ensuring that 
intellectuals representing ‘Wahhabism’ are in fact Marxist.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
York Times respectively were the top three most circulated daily newspapers in the US while the 
Washington Post was ranked 10th. For precise circulation numbers see ‘Top 10 Newspapers By 
Circulation: Wall Street Journal Leads Weekly Circulation,’ April 30, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/01/newspaper-circulation-top-10_n_3188612.html and ‘Top 
10 Daily Newspapers’ June 18, 2014, http://www.cision.com/us/2014/06/top-10-us-daily-newspapers/.  
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On Method 
 
In terms of method I have framed my work by drawing on a dialectical 
tradition which Ollman has done a lot to both resurrect and clarify.53 This 
tradition as Ollman and Smith argue, is a way of thinking about and using a 
set of categories that captures the real changes and interactions happening in 
the social world. They explain that it offers a method for investigating social 
reality and presenting what we find to others. A dialectical imagination 
encourages us to think less about things and more about relations and 
processes that are constantly affecting each other, because it emphasises the 
evolving nature of things and the relational nature of the social world. This 
approach has two key elements namely a philosophy of internal relations and 
a process of abstraction.54 
 
As part of a project designed to show how this process of abstraction works, 
I will highlight the role played by several important elements that play a 
major role in constituting these kinds of representations. These elements are 
what Gerald Holton calls ‘themata’ or what Kurt Danziger calls ‘generative 
metaphors’.55 I want to argue here that my ability to make sense of these 
liberal, neo-conservative and Marxist representations of ‘Wahhabism’ relies 
in part on my ability to abstract the roles both of these processes play when 
considering how intellectuals make sense of the world and the representing 
process.  
 
This dialectical framing is particularly congruent with a Critical Discourse 
Analysis approach when analysing different intellectuals’ representations of 
‘Wahhabism’ as they appear in newspapers, magazines and in the 
blogosphere. Since foundational work by key figures in this approach like 
Ruth Wodak and Norman Fairclough and Clive Holes, this kind of approach 
                                                 
53 Bertell Ollman and Tony Smith, “Dialectics: The New Frontier,” Science and Society 62, no.3 
(1998): 333-337; Bertell Ollman, Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx’s Method (Chicago: University 
of Illinois Press, 2003);Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society, 2nd 
ed. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1976): 52-70. 
54 Ollman and Smith, “Dialectics,”: 333-334. 
55 Gerald Holton, “The Role of Themata in Science,” Foundations of Physics 26, No. 4 (1996), 
doi:10.1007/BF02071215; Danzigar, Metaphors. 
 27 
has helped to focus on the ways social and political domination are 
reproduced in text and talk.56 As a result of this work Critical Discourse 
Analysis has become a well-known interdisciplinary approach to the study of 
discourse as a social practice and seems especially appropriate when 
engaging the work of intellectuals whose practice is essentially discursive in 
nature.  
 
That Critical Discourse Analysts treat language as a social practice means it 
is especially helpful in highlighting the dialectical nature of language as a 
constitutive medium that is made in and makes the world. This approach 
appreciates in particular the relational character of power, and the often 
opaque nature of the relations between discourse and society. It also 
recognises that these relations play integral roles in securing the interests of 
those in power. 
 
Intellectuals have a plethora of rhetorical techniques available to them when 
constructing their representations of ‘Wahhabism’. The limitations 
associated with a PhD dissertation however means I will only focus on five 
specific elements of discourse namely metaphors, similes, analogies, 
neologisms, and the structuring of accounts of violence. The general case for 
focussing on metaphors, similes and analogies as crucial elements of 
discursive practice has been made by Lakoff, Turner and Johnson in a series 
of ground breaking works, and more recently by Hofstadter and Sander.57 
Philosophers like Midgley have also acknowledged the way these central 
features of language are integral to the mythmaking process.58  
 
                                                 
56 Norman Fairclough and Clive Holes, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language 
(London: Longman, 1995); Ruth Wodak, “What CDA is about,” in.Methods of Critical Discourse 
Analysis, eds.Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2001). 
57 George Lakoff, “The Conceptual Metaphor: The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” in Cognitive 
Linguistics: Basic Readings, 185-238, ed. Dirk Geeraerts (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2006); George 
Lakoff.,Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think,  2nd  ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002); George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors we live by (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1980); George Lakoff and Mark Turner, More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic 
Metaphor (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989);Douglas Hofstadter and Emmanuel 
Sander;Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the Fuel and Fire of Thinking (New York: Basic, 2013). 
58 Mary Midgley, The Myths We Live By (London: Routledge, 2003), 1-20. 
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I have chosen to focus on neologisms primarily because many neo-
conservative intellectuals have chosen to use them when representing the 
apparent threat posed by ‘Wahhabism’. I think of how prominent neo-
conservative intellectuals like Gaffney are among those who use the 
neologisms ‘Islamofascist’ and ‘Islamofascism’ when representing this 
‘threat’.59 I have adapted Karen Cerulo’s cognitive approach to establishing 
the ways the architecture of narratives of violence works to mobilise a range 
of ethical and emotional responses on the part of readers.60 This is valuable 
because it allows me to ‘abstract’ and make sense of the way some 
intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’ characterise the relationship of 
it to the violence it is claimed it warrants. As I note earlier, the fact that 
‘Wahhabism’ received very little if any attention from ‘Western’ scholars 
pre-9/11 and pre-Global War on Terror suggests its relation to violence is 
significant to some of the intellectuals representing it in the modern political 
context. Focusing on structuring of violent accounts also helps to reveal 
some of the more subtle rhetorical techniques writers use in their attempts to 
persuade their audience.  
 
Finally I want to outline the structure of the argument found in this 
dissertation. In Chapter One I provide a cursory review of some of the 
scholarly literature dedicated to ‘Wahhabism’ and tease out some of the 
problems that help inspire this research. This involves looking at some of the 
truth claims scholars rely on when representing ‘Wahhabism,’ looking at 
how some scholars construct ‘Imaginary Communities’ and dealing with the 
problem of translation.  
 
In Chapter Two I take a more concentrated look at the role of the intellectual. 
This involves looking at some of the literature on the sociology of 
intellectuals and establishing some of the key issues it has set loose. I also 
look at how we can deal with different truth claims. 
 
                                                 
59 Frank Gaffney Jnr, “Seeing the threat for what it is,” Washington Times, May 8, 2006, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/may/8/20060508-091537-9132r/ 
60 Karen Cerulo, Deciphering Violence: The Cognitive Structure of Right and Wrong (New York: 
Routledge, 1998).  
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In Chapter Three I outline and detail how I will go about deconstructing 
different intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’. This involves 
describing the theoretical and analytical approaches specifically dialectics, 
abstraction, a philosophy of internal relations and a Critical Discourse 
Analysis that inform my analysis of these texts. I also describe the five 
elements I will be abstracting from intellectuals’ representations of 
‘Wahhabism’.  
 
In Chapter Four I begin the interpretative and analytic process and first deal 
with liberal intellectuals and their representations of ‘Wahhabism’. This 
involves describing the ‘ideal type’ that guides my analysis.  
 
In Chapter Five I offer ways of making sense of these liberal intellectuals’ 
representations of ‘Wahhabism’ which involves identifying and describing 
some of the key themata and generative metaphors that have influenced the 
way liberal intellectuals make sense of the world. Rather than include this 
information with the previous chapter to form one very long chapter, I have 
for stylistic and practical reasons decided to have two separate chapters. Not 
only do two smaller chapters make for easier reading but they also allow me 
to dedicate the space required to introducing and describing what themata 
and generative metaphors are and how they work.  
 
In Chapter Six I describe my ‘ideal type’ and then undertake the 
interpretative and analytic process for neo-conservative representations of 
‘Wahhabism’. I also offer ways of making sense of these intellectuals’ 
representations of ‘Wahhabism’ which involves identifying and describing 
some of the key themata and generative metaphors affecting their thinking. 
Given we now have an understanding of how the concepts themata and 
generative metaphors work, I only need to dedicate one chapter (and not two 
chapters as was the case with the liberal intellectuals’ representations of 
‘Wahhabism’) to making sense of neo-conservatives’ representations of 
‘Wahhabism’. 
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In Chapter Seven I follow the same process but this time deal with Marxist 
intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’. Again this means constructing 
an ideal type, deconstructing some representations of ‘Wahhabism’ and 
offering ways of making sense of these.  
 
Last is the Conclusion in which I explicate and clarify the wider significance 
of the study particularly in the context of the sociology of intellectuals and 
‘Wahhabism’ scholarly literature, speak about some of the implications 
associated with making policy and decisions based on the different 
representations of ‘Wahhabism’ provided by neo-conservative, liberal and 
Marxist intellectuals, note some of the limitations of the study and make 
suggestions for future research based on the insights of this thesis.
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Chapter One  
‘Wahhabism’ as a Contested Category  
 
For last year's words belong to last year's language  
And next year's words await another voice. 
T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets 
 
‘Wahhabism’ is both conventionally and popularly understood to be an extremely 
conservative even ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘radical’ version of Islam. Historians agree that 
it has its origins in Saudi Arabia in the eighteenth century. It is also generally agreed 
that the founder of this ‘sect’ was Muhammad Ibn Abd-al Wahhab who developed a 
version of Islam which insisted on a rigorous and conservative interpretation of the 
Koran. There is also a consensus that it is believed to have played a decisive role in 
creating the modern Saudi state in 1932.1  It is also generally credited with having a 
substantial following into the twenty first century.2 Beyond these understandings 
‘Wahhabism’ is a heavily contested category. That contest starts with the way many 
who are said to be followers of ‘Wahhabism’ reject the use of the term and prefer to 
refer to themselves as ‘Salafi’. The contest continues, as I show here to claims that 
‘Wahhabism’ is or is not directly linked to ‘Islamist terrorism’, or has directly shaped 
the growth and activity of al-Qaeda, or that it has played no such role. 
 
The scale of the contest and the issues at stake will be more fully developed and 
elaborated on later in the thesis. Here I want to present some of the ways 
‘Wahhabism’ has been represented. I demonstrate that there is little consensus among 
those writers and researchers who have dealt with ‘Wahhabism’ with what might be 
thought to be the kind of scholarly regard for careful, even nuanced inquiry found in 
academic centres devoted to the study of religions, contemporary political science or  
                                                 
1 Commins, The Wahhabi Mission,104-129; Armajani, “Saudi Arabia,” 122-133, 
doi:10.1002/9781444344394.ch4; al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia,15-17; Al-Dakhil, “Social 
Origins of the Wahhabi Movement,” 1-19, ProQuest (UMI Number: 9906191); DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi 
Islam, see chapters ‘Muhammad Ibn Ad al-Wahhab and the Origin of Wahhabism: The Eighteenth-
Century Context,’ 7-40 and ‘The Theology and Worldview of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab,’ 41-92.  
2 Nevo, “Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia,” 36-50, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283951; 
Kechichian, “The Role of the Ulama,” 56-59, http://www.jstor.org/stable/162860; Cooper and Yue, 
Challenges of the Muslim World, 271-272; Atkins, “Wahhabism (Saudi Arabia)”, 
http://www.praeger.com.ezproxy.lib.rmit.edu.au/.  
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international relations. While some would see this as the basis for setting about 
resolving the controversies and issues which this survey highlights by appealing for 
example, to some empirical or theoretical benchmarks of objectivity or accuracy, I 
doubt that this is possible. Though I have to leave off making the case why I think this 
here, I do think it provides a beginning point for indicating why we need to pay more 
attention to the issues of why and how it is that intellectuals represent phenomena like 
‘Wahhabism’ in the ways they do.    
 
In what follows I do not pretend to have identified and surveyed all of the literature 
on ‘Wahhabism’, rather I have taken some exemplars of some of the ways scholars 
have dealt with it. I begin with a group of scholars who emphasise the negative and 
dangerous aspects of ‘Wahhabism’ and I then turn to those who prefer a softer less 
threatening portrait of ‘Wahhabism’. In both cases there are important issues involved 
in translating ‘Wahhabism’ that I outline at the end of the chapter.  
 
Intellectuals and Imagined Communities: ‘Wahhabism’ as Threat  
 
Anderson’s famous account of the role played by intellectuals in constructing 
‘Imagined Communities’ seems especially pertinent when we examine how  
intellectuals like Dore Gold, Bernard Lewis,  David Commins,  Margaret Gonzalez-
Perez, and Muhammad Al-Atawneh represent Wahhabism.3 Each, albeit in different 
ways, draw on an historical account of a relationship between spaces and peoples to 
arrive at a distinctly negative portrait of ‘Wahhabism’. Whether Eyerman who claims 
that these intellectuals are projecting their own “needs and fantasies” and their “deep-
seated needs and interests” is right or not I leave to others’ better judgement.4  
 
Gold is an intellectual who constructs an ‘Imagined Community’ when representing 
‘Wahhabism’. Gold’s representation of ‘Wahhabism’ relies on a clear argument about 
                                                 
3 Bernard Lewis, “Freedom and Justice in Islam,” Society 44, no.2 (2007): 66-70, 
doi:10.1007/BF02819929; Margaret Gonzalez-Perez, “The False Islamization of Female Suicide 
Bombers,” Gender Issues 28, no.1 (2011): 50–65, doi:10.1007/s12147-011-9097-0; Muhammad Al-
Atawneh, “Wahhabi Self-Examination Post-9/11: Rethinking the ‘Other’, ‘Otherness’ and Tolerance,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 47, no.2 (2011): 255-271, doi:10.1080/00263206.2011.544098;Anderson, 
Imagined Communities;  Said, Orientalism. I draw on Anderson’s and Said’s work but discuss this 
fully in chapter two. 
4 Ron Eyerman, Between Culture and Politics: Intellectuals in Modern Society (Cambridge: Polity, 
1994) 198. 
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the relationship of the Jewish people to the land once called Palestine that in turn 
informs his political position about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.5 Gold treats ‘pro-
Palestinian’ violence as acts of terrorism. Underscoring this is the fundamental 
proposition that the land in dispute has always belonged to the Jewish people and to 
the state of Israel created in 1948 and that Israel is therefore justified in its refusal to 
recognise a Palestinian state. According to Gold the Israeli state is only for Jewish-
Israelis and he uses his representation to help create this idea of the Jewish-Israeli 
community. Gold represents the current Palestinian territories as ‘violent’ spaces 
which Israeli forces must enter into to quell the perceived ‘security threat’ it poses to 
Israel. 
 
Gold’s rejection of Palestinian claims to the land in question means he has a rationale 
for looking for alternative explanations for what he sees as a long history of ‘pro-
Palestinian’ ‘terrorism’ directed against Israel. Religion namely ‘radical Islam’ and 
more specifically ‘Wahhabism’ provides Gold with the relevant explanation.  
Gold explicitly links ‘Wahhabism,’ which he understands to be responsible for 
promoting and inspiring Islamist terrorism globally, to the Palestinian population. He 
claims the Palestinian desire to ‘wipe out’ Israel is inspired by their ‘Wahhabi’ beliefs 
which have been ‘imported’ from Saudi Arabia. This proposition in turn informs his 
argument that ‘Wahhabism’ is impelling the Palestinians to export terror to the 
‘West’: his representation of ‘Wahhabism’ is in part inspired by his desire to make 
sense of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US in 2001. Gold claims Saudi-
promoted ‘Wahhabism’ is responsible for ‘ideologically motivating’ these terrorists. 
Gold writes 
The commentators are right. The United States and its allies can win the most 
spectacular military victories in Afghanistan; they can freeze terrorists bank 
accounts and cut off their supplies of weaponry; they can eliminate terrorist 
masterminds. But even taken together, such triumphs are not enough to 
                                                 
5 Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism (Regnery: 
Washington D.C., 2003). Gold joins a number of Israeli Scholars and other writers who suggest the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine is fabricated and that Palestinians are incorrect in believing they have 
some kind of historical claim to the land. See for example Alex Joffe, “Fabricating Palestinian History: 
The Rhetoric of Nonsense,” Middle East Quarterly 19, no.3 (2012): 15-22.  
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1021411008?accountid=13552; Brian Wimborne, “The Tactical 
Myth of Palestinian Identity,” Quadrant Online. June 7, 2014. 
http://quadrant.org.au/magazine/2014/06/tactical-myth-palestinian-identity/ 
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remove the terrorist threat, for they do not get at the source of the problem. 
Terrorism, on the scale of the September 11 attacks, does not occur in a 
vacuum. People do not just decide spontaneously that they are going to hijack 
an aircraft, crash it into a building, and commit mass murder (and take their 
own lives) because of some political grievance or sense of economic 
deprivation. No, there is another critical component of terrorism that has 
generally been overlooked in the West: the ideological motivation to slaughter 
thousands of innocent people.6 
 
While it is beyond the remit of this chapter to systematically check the veridicity of 
claims like this, the proposition that Palestinian resistance to the policies of the State 
of Israel have been shaped by ‘Wahhabist’ ideology and that it sustains a Palestinian 
“ideological motivation to slaughter thousands of innocent people” seems to step well 
beyond what the evidence warrants.7 If anything Gold frames Israel’s ongoing 
occupation of Palestine and its ongoing policy of aggressive security measures against 
Palestinians as a part of the wider ‘Global War on Terror’. On the face of it Gold’s 
representation of ‘Wahhabism’ seems motivated and inspired by beliefs that align 
strongly with the political and policy stance favoured by Israeli ‘right-wing’ and 
Zionist movements, as well as by the US based ‘pro-Israeli’ lobby.   
 
David Commins is another prominent scholar whose representation of ‘Wahhabism’ 
provides a good example of a ‘Western’ intellectual using ‘Wahhabism’ to create an 
‘Imagined Geography’.8 Commins represents ‘Wahhabism’ as a religion for 
‘backwards’ and ‘uncivilised’ people that flourish in ‘backward’ and ‘uncivilised’ 
societies like Saudi Arabia. Commins claims for example that the Saudi Arabian 
regime is struggling to reconcile its nation’s ‘Wahhabi’ religious beliefs with the 
forces associated with globalisation. He claims the Saudi ruling regime feels 
threatened by ‘Western’ advances which includes the return of Saudi students who 
have been ‘liberalised’ in the ‘West’ to their homeland. Displaying the kind of 
‘Orientalism’ Said first pointed to, Commons shares with many political liberals and 
neoliberals the premise that ‘Western’-inspired economic and social globalisation to 
                                                 
6 Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom, 5-6. 
7 Ibid., 6. 
8 Commins, The Wahhabi Mission.  
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be a ‘natural’ and ‘progressive’ process which ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia should 
welcome and embrace. Commins blames the ‘backward’ ‘Wahhabi’ religious beliefs 
of the Saudi rulers for resisting these changes. Commins clearly adopts the role of an 
intellectual keen to advance the interests of neo-liberalism and his representation 
helps provide ‘Western’ policymakers with some of the ‘evidence’ they need should 
they ever decide to invade Saudi Arabia for ‘its own good’ and in the name of 
‘progress’.  
 
Bernard Lewis has long championed the spreading of democracy and ‘freedom’ 
throughout the Middle East. Like Commins, Lewis represents the Middle East as a 
‘backward’ and ‘regressive’ space. Lewis’ representation of ‘Wahhabism’ is inspired 
and motivated by the idea that the entire world and especially the nations of the 
Middle East can become ‘freer’ and change for the ‘better’. Lewis rejects the claim 
the Islamic world is impervious to change, arguing it is currently experiencing a 
historical low point in which it is dominated by ‘oppressive regimes’. He believes the 
people of the Islamic world like those in the ‘West’ and humans in general are entitled 
to the freedoms associated with democracy and he claims it is the responsibility of the 
‘West’ to help them achieve these goals. Lewis supports ‘Western’ efforts to spread 
democracy in Iraq and argues that ‘Western’ nations must also focus their attention on 
other Middle Eastern nations that are governed by oppressive regimes. According to 
Lewis ‘this is what they want’.  
Don’t be misled about what you read in the media about Iraq. The situation is 
certainly not good, but there are redeeming features in it. The battle isn’t over. 
It’s still very difficult …I have been told repeatedly by Iranians that there is no 
country in the world where pro-American feeling is stronger, deeper and more 
widespread than Iran…When the American planes were flying over 
Afghanistan, the story was that many Iranians put signs on their roofs in 
English reading, “This way, please.”9 
 
As a Liberal who claims membership in the Western Enlightenment tradition, Lewis 
believes he has an obligation to the Islamic world to show them how to ‘progress,’ 
‘evolve’ and ‘modernise’. Lewis sees his work as an intellectual as contributing to a 
                                                 
9 Bernard Lewis, “Freedom and Justice in Islam,” 69. 
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process of ‘Enlightenment’ in the Islamic world that began with an Egyptian Sheikh’s 
introducing ‘Western’ conceptions of freedom and justice at the end of the eighteenth 
century. This resonates with Shil’s claim that intellectuals must play a key role in 
‘bringing modernity’ to ‘traditional’ societies. Lewis writes 
…Egyptian sheikh – Sheikh Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi, who went to Paris as 
chaplain to the first group of Egyptian students sent to Europe – wrote a book 
about his adventures and explained his discovery of the meaning of freedom. 
He wrote that when the French talk about freedom they mean what Muslims 
mean when they talk about justice. By equating freedom with justice, he 
opened a whole new phase in the political and public discourse of the Arab 
world, and then, more broadly, the Islamic world.10 
 
Lewis blames ‘anti-Western,’ ‘anti-democratic’ and ‘anti-freedom’ forces throughout 
the Middle Eastern region for frustrating these efforts. Specifically he blames what he 
calls the ‘Islamic revivalist/awakening’ movement, which he understands to be a 
coalescing of interests in the Middle East between ‘Wahhabism’, al-Qaeda and those 
a part of the successful Iranian Revolution. 
 
Gonzalez-Perez is another scholar whose representation of ‘Wahhabism’ is inspired 
by quite particular political aims and goals. In her case she is inspired by the Western 
feminist intellectual tradition.11 She understands her role as intellectual is to draw 
attention to the injustices and wrongs perpetrated against women. The focus of 
Gonzalez-Perez’s analysis is the experience of female bombers specifically those used 
by al-Qaeda, Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas, all of which she categorises as 
‘terrorist organisations’. Gonzalez-Perez believes these terrorist organisations are 
using ‘radical,’ ‘violent jihadist’ and ‘un-Islamic’ interpretations of Islam to persuade 
women to carry out suicide bombings. She blames the writings of thirteenth century 
Islamic theologian Ibn Taymiyyah, ‘Wahhabism’ and key twentieth century Islamic 
ideologues like Sayyid Qutb, a key figure in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, for 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 66. 
11 For a basic understanding of this tradition see Genevieve Lloyd (ed.), 2002, Feminism and History of 
Philosophy (Oxford Readings in Feminism), (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Charlotte Witt and 
Lisa Shapiro, “Feminist History of Philosophy,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/feminism-
femhist/. 
 37 
providing these terrorist organisations with these ‘un-Islamic’ and ‘violent jihadist’ 
interpretations.  
 
Gonzalez-Perez’s representation relies heavily on the assumption that Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad and Hamas are terrorist organisations of the same kind as al-Qaeda. 
Gonzalez-Perez categorisation of Hamas as a terrorist organisation obviously leads 
her to including this group in her analysis of female suicide bombers. While many 
‘pro-Israeli’ scholars and neo-conservative intellectuals like Gold and Gaffney 
certainly agree with this assessment there is an equally large group of scholars who 
reject this claim and instead understand the violence that Hamas has relied on not as 
acts of terror but as a part of a struggle for nationhood against a colonial force akin to 
the African National Congress during apartheid South Africa.12 
 
 If Gonzalez-Perez had treated Hamas as part of the Palestinian resistance and not as a 
terrorist organisation then it is likely that she might have drawn the conclusion that 
‘Wahhabism’ was not among the ‘ideologies’ responsible for inspiring and promoting 
Hamas’ use of female suicide bombers. The important point to be made here is that 
one’s political prejudices i.e. how one categorises a ‘terrorist organisation,’ has 
implications for how one understands and represents ‘Wahhabism’. It is also 
significant that Gonzalez-Perez’s representation relies on an assumption that her 
particular interpretations of Islamic texts like those provided by ‘Wahhabism’ are ‘un-
Islamic’ and that those interpreting the texts in these ways are not ‘real’ Muslims. As 
will become clear this premise is also relied on by those who offer a less negative 
account of ‘Wahhabism’. Gonzalez-Perez is only able to reach these conclusions 
because she assumes there is an ‘objective’ and ‘truthful’ interpretation of Islam that 
does not promote violence and strictly prohibits suicide bombing. She writes   
The female suicide bombers of nominally Muslim groups like Hamas, the PIJ 
[Palestinian Islamic Jihad], and Al Qaeda are no more Islamic than the Hindu 
Tamil women bombers of Sri Lanka or the communist female suicide bombers 
                                                 
12 For an understanding of the Hamas movement especially its social welfare work see Zaki Chehab, 
Inside Hamas: the untold story of militants, martyrs and spies (London: I.B.Tauris, 2007). Authors 
highlighting some similarities between these two ‘situations’ and who argue Palestine is struggling 
against apartheid include Daryl Glaser, “Zionism and Apartheid: a moral comparison,” Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 26, no.3 (2010): 403-41. doi:10.1080/0141987032000067264; Rumy Hasan, “The 
Unitary, Democratic State and the Struggle Against Apartheid in Palestine-Israel,” Holy Land Studies: 
A Multidisciplinary Journal 7, no. 1 (2008): 81-94. 10.1353/hls.0.0009.  
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of the Kurdish Workers’ Party in Turkey. They are not Islamic martyrs nor 
any other manifestation of orthodox religious faith.13 
 
To bolster her case Gonzalez-Perez provides an extensive list of authors she believes 
provide a ‘truthful’ and ‘objective’ interpretation of Islam which includes the founder 
of the Fethullah Gülen’ movement, Shaykh Muhammad Afifi al-Akiti of Oxford 
University and the Grand Shaykh of Egypt’s Al Azhar University Mohammed Sayed 
Tantawi. She also adds her own ‘objective’ and ‘truthful’ interpretations of Islamic 
texts to this category. Gonzalez-Perez writes  
Within Islam, the rules of engagement and conduct of war have been 
established by over one thousand years of scholarly interpretation and 
precedent. According to the Qur’an and Islamic tradition, warfare is the 
domain of the state and can only be authorized by the executive of an 
established government [37: 124]…Mainstream scholars are unequivocal, 
‘‘The rules of Islam are clear. Individuals cannot declare war. A group or 
organization cannot declare war. War is declared by the state. War cannot be 
declared without a president or an army…. Otherwise, it is an act of terror’’ 
[22: 2].14 
 
Gonzalez-Perez’s representation raises many of the key issues pertinent to this study 
namely whether there can ever be an objective interpretation of social phenomena.  
 
A different case but one grounded in a close study of texts has been made by scholars 
whose representations of ‘Wahhabism’ are primarily based on the translating of 
‘Wahhabi’ school texts. A group of ‘Western’ scholars like Eleanor Abdella Doumato 
and Michaela Prokop have analysed ‘Wahhabi’-infused Saudi school texts searching 
for ‘evidence’ of ‘anti-Western’ sentiments and ‘extremist’ ideas to establish if there 
is a relation between Saudi Arabia’s ‘Wahhabi’ religious education and modern 
Islamic terrorism.15 Their works seem to parallel arguments made by prominent 
Marxist scholars like Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci that education is a key 
                                                 
13 Gonzalez-Perez, “The False Islamization of Female Suicide Bombers,” 62. 
14 Ibid., 51-52. 
15 Eleanor Abdella Doumato, “Manning the barricades: Islam according to Saudi Arabia's school 
texts,” The Middle East Journal 57, no.2 (2003): 230-247. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329879;  
Michaela Prokop, “Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Education,” International affairs 79, no.1 (2003): 77-
89, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.00296. 
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‘ideological apparatus’ that can be used to impose particular beliefs and values on a 
society.16 
 
Doumato’s understanding of ‘Wahhabism’ is primarily based on her analysis of 
religious texts produced by the Saudi state and prescribed for Saudi students in grades 
9 through 12. According to her subjective interpretation these ‘Wahhabi’ religious 
texts could promote hostility against non-Muslims, they could encourage exclusivity 
amongst Muslims and they could inspire ‘violent jihad’. Doumato writes 
Hostile messages there are, but the mood of these texts is less hostile than 
overwhelmingly defensive…They claw with self-doubt, conjuring up enemies, 
real and perceived, who are not only at the gates but inside themselves. 
Looking at the texts alone, the message in the religion curriculum is that “we 
Muslims are under siege, and it is the duty of every single one of us to man the 
barricades [Emphasis added].”17 
 
Like Doumato, Prokop’s representation of ‘Wahhabism’ relies on her English 
translation of Arabic religious texts used in the Saudi education system which she 
claims are “heavily influenced by the Wahhabi ideology.”18 Prokop focuses her 
analysis on the content in school textbooks designed for secondary school grades 1 
through 3 and also concludes that there could be a link between ‘Wahhabism’ and 
violence. She claims the texts occasionally promote ‘intolerance’ and sometimes 
incite ‘hatred,’ however they are often coupled with contradictory messages about 
‘peace’ and ‘tolerance’ between people of different faiths. Prokop writes  
The content of the official textbooks is heavily influenced by the Wahhabi 
ideology. Teaching about the ‘others’—other cultures, ideologies and 
religions, or adherents of other Muslim schools of jurisprudence or sects—
reflects the Wahhabi view of a world divided into the believers and preservers 
of the true faith and the kuffar, the unbelievers. The teachings about other 
religions, particularly those pertaining to the ‘People of the Book’, Christians 
and Jews, are contradictory. While some passages denounce Christians and 
Jews clearly as unbelievers, people whom one should not greet with 
                                                 
16 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”; Gramsci, Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks. 
17 Doumato, “Manning the barricades,” 242. 
18 Prokop, “Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Education,” 80. 
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salutations of peace or take as friends, or against whom jihad should be 
waged, other passages stress the peaceful nature of Islam.19 
 
Both Doumato and Prokop rely on translations from Arabic texts when making 
assessments about ‘Wahhabism’s’ ability to inspire feelings of ‘hatred’ and 
‘animosity’ in Saudi Arabian students. Again we must remember the translating 
process is not an exact science and that neither Doumato nor Prokop are able to 
achieve equivalence in their translations.  
 
There are a number of problems that shadow Doumato’s representation. First there is 
the problem of establishing the basis for claiming to have an objective or literalist 
way of translating texts. This seems especially problematic when it comes to 
capturing the ‘mood’ (as Doumato claims to do) of the texts. Many scholars could 
analyse the same ‘Wahhabi’ school texts and provide very different interpretations 
especially when it comes to capturing something so diffuse as ‘mood’. Second we 
cannot assume that Saudi students will uncritically accept what is presented to them in 
the school texts nor can we be sure they will act on these ‘hostile’ ideas. Each student 
is influenced by their own ways of making sense of the world into which they have 
been thrown. Indeed Doumato acknowledges that students can receive conflicting 
information from a wide variety of sources.   
In thinking about what students learn we also have to think about how or 
whether lessons taught in schools are reinforced outside of school, in the 
public media, in the mosque, or in the family.20  
 
Like Althusser, Gramsci and Doumato, Prokop recognises school education is only 
one element of a society’s ‘ideological apparatus’ that can be used to promote and 
impose a particular value and belief system. Prokop writes  
Formal education is only one element in shaping an individual’s perspective 
and religious inclinations. The perception of Saudi students is also shaped to 
an equal if not greater degree by informal teachings in mosques, in homes and 
through the new media. The mosque is particularly important for the older 
generation since adult illiteracy rates remain high. Additionally, the so-called 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 243. 
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‘hidden curriculum’—contextual factors, such as teacher personality, 
prevailing classroom dynamics, social background or place of residence—also 
determine how the message is received and interpreted.21 
 
With so many qualifications it is hard to be convinced that Prokop’s analysis 
demonstrates that there is a strong link between the Saudi school curriculum and 
violence and terrorism. In this case the truth claim rests on a premise that there are 
secure technical and methodical paths to be taken so as to arrive at the truth. That 
assumption and a relevant scepticism needs to also be adopted about the work of 
those who claim their interpretation of the evidence warrants a quite different account 
of ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
Intellectuals on ‘Wahhabism’: ‘Not so Bad After all’  
 
There are any number of scholars who have made a case for a quite different 
representation of ‘Wahhabism’. Juan Cole is a scholar who defends ‘Wahhabism’ 
against the common claim that it is responsible for inspiring modern Islamic 
terrorism. 22 Cole claims that a portrait of ‘Wahhabism’ as an ideological source of 
Islamist terrorism has been used as part of the intellectual arsenal deployed by 
‘Western’ governments to help achieve their imperialistic aims and goals in the 
Middle East. Cole writes  
It is sometimes implied that the Saudi effort to spread Wahhabism has the 
effect of spreading terrorism and anti-Americanism. That outcome would be 
difficult to demonstrate…Further, it is not at all clear that puritanism or 
Wahhabism, while it may produce negative attitudes toward consumerism and 
libertinism predispose people to commit terrorism, as some pundits have 
alleged. Most suicide bombings in the past thirty years have not been carried 
about by Wahhabis or persons influenced by them, but rather by individuals 
fighting what they see as the foreign military occupation of their 
country…connecting a religious tradition to terrorism would require more 
evidence than a few instances of guilt by association…23 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 82. 
22 Juan Cole, Engaging the Muslim World (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2010). 
23 Ibid., 97-98. 
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Cole clearly understands his role as an intellectual is to help dispel myths and 
misinformation promoted by ‘‘Western’ terrorist experts’ and ‘American hawks’ who 
he believes to be ‘racist,’ ‘ignorant’ and eager to wage war.  Cole writes  
As I’ve glared at the self-appointed “terrorism experts” who have paraded 
across my television screen since 2001, I’ve became more and more alarmed 
at the dangerous falsehoods many of them purvey. Most of them have no 
knowledge of the languages or cultures of the Middle East, or any history of 
residence there. The message of the right-wing pundits and pastors and 
politicians is that Muslims form a menace to the West unless they are subdued 
and dominated. In that sense, the military occupation of Iraq that began in 
2003 exemplifies the mind-set of American hawks.24 
 
Cole dismisses many of the ‘ignorant’ and ‘deliberately misleading’ claims made by 
‘Western’ commentators about ‘Wahhabism’ including the commonly asserted claim 
that it “predisposes people to commit terrorism.”25 To support his claim, Cole 
highlights the fact that the majority of suicide bombings in the last thirty years have 
been motivated by anti-imperial and anti-colonial ideas rather than by ‘Wahhabi’ 
religious ‘ideology’. Referring to incidents like the ‘pro-Palestinian’ suicide 
bombings in Israel, Cole’s claims rely on the assumption that conflicts like those 
between Israeli and Palestinian forces are anti-colonial and anti-imperialist in nature 
rather than acts of terrorism. Cole’s role as an intellectual or mediator representing 
‘Wahhabism’ aligns more with the approaches of authors like Chomsky who maintain 
that an intellectuals’ role is to ‘speak truth to power’ rather than promoting particular 
class and group interests.26 
 
Muhammad Al-Atawneh is a Muslim intellectual whose account of ‘Wahhabism’ has 
attracted some international attention. Many of the post 9/11 ‘Western’ commentaries 
about ‘Wahhabism’ and Saudi Arabia have focused on the Saudi state, its promoting 
of ‘Wahhabism’ and their relation to modern Islamic terrorism.27 Al-Atawneh claims 
Saudi Arabia and the ‘Wahhabi’ religious establishment have made the necessary 
policy changes to ensure that ‘Wahhabism’ does not in any way promote ‘violence’, 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 2.  
25 Ibid., 97. 
26 Chomsky, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals.” 
27 Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom; Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam; Commins, The Wahhabi Mission. 
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‘intolerance’ or ‘extremism’ amongst Saudi Arabians. Al-Atawneh wants to dispel the 
notion promoted by critics of ‘Wahhabism’ that it is responsible for promoting 
terrorism post-9/11. He argues strenuously that the Saudi state is in no way 
responsible for or complicit in modern Islamic terrorism. He refers to a variety of 
‘policy initiatives’ and government-organised forums in an attempt to show the 
measures the Saudi state and the ‘Wahhabi’ religious establishment are taking to 
promote tolerance, harmony, peacefulness and most importantly an embracing of the 
Other.28 
 
Unlike scholars like Gold, Lewis and Gonzalez-Perez, Al-Atawneh does not assume 
that ‘Wahhabism’ is ‘radical’ per se. He assumes rather that we can and ought to 
distinguish between ‘radical’ and ‘conventional’ versions of ‘Wahhabism’. Al-
Atawneh also rejects the claim that the Saudi state is engaged in the kind of politics 
typically associated with the political Realist tradition where the international political 
arena is conceptualised as a battleground of competing interests, and where anything 
that a state needs to do to secure its own interests is legitimate.29 Rather he claims 
Saudi Arabia adopts an approach to politics aimed at helping to end injustices and 
wrongs. This resonates with recent conceptualisations of the political provided by 
authors like Critchley and Crick.30 Instead of blaming the ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi state and 
establishment for inspiring modern Islamic terrorism, Al-Atawneh holds ‘rogue 
elements’ within the Saudi Kingdom as responsible for this behaviour. He argues for 
example that most “of the post-9/11 criticism appears to be lodged against extremist 
groups, described by Saudi officials as those who have ‘gone astray’ (ﬁrqa dalla).”31 
 
On the face of it, it can be seen why some of his critics treat him as an apologist for 
the Saudi state. Indeed though we need to approach such claims with a certain ironic 
detachment, Al-Atawneh is exactly the kind of intellectual others like Chomsky are 
extremely critical of. According to Chomsky Al-Atawneh should instead be 
“….seek[ing] the truth lying hidden behind the veil of distortion and 
                                                 
28 The Other refers to that which is alien and divergent from that which is given such as a norm, 
identity or the self. Its binary is the ‘Same’. The Constitutive Other often denotes a different, 
incomprehensible self outside of one's own. This concept is key to Edward Said’s work on Orientalism. 
See Said, Orientalism. 
29 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. 
30 Crick, In Defence of Politics; Critchley, Infinitely Demanding. 
31 Muhammad Al-Atawneh, “Wahhabi Self-Examination Post-9/11,” 259. 
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misrepresentation, ideology and class interest, through which the events of current 
history are presented to us.” 32 Whether Chomsky is in a position to make such claims 
again will have to be left to a later time and place.   
 
The question of the truth of claims made by scholars is again on display in work by 
Natana DeLong-Bas. She provides an historically informed account of ‘Wahhabism’ 
that leads her into a spirited defence of it. She claims ‘Wahhabism’ promotes peace, 
encourages tolerance, advocates women’s rights and is therefore not responsible for 
inspiring modern Islamic terrorism. She writes  
Ibd Abd al-Wahhab’s emphasis on the importance of Islamic values and the 
intent behind words and actions, as opposed to concern for ritual perfection, 
has opened the door for reforms in Islamic law, the status of women and 
minorities, and the peaceful spread of Islam and the Islamic mission in the 
contemporary era.33  
 
Her account is one of the most prominent—and widely criticised—representations of 
‘Wahhabism’ in the post-9/11 period.34 Her critics have amongst other things accused 
her of being an ‘apologist’ for extremist Islam. Schwartz for example claims DeLong-
Bas has “recently reached a depth of mendacity about radical Islam it is hard to 
imagine her exceeding.”35 DeLong-Bas is not a Muslim although it seems that she 
claims some adherence to Christianity. This suggests she is not likely to be motivated 
or inspired by Islamic religious beliefs in the same way that for example writers like 
Oliver are. The attacks by her critics appear to be based on the assumption that 
DeLong-Bas’ defence of ‘Wahhabism’ is also a defence of the ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi 
Arabian state which Schwartz believe uses ‘Wahhabism’ to promote and inspire 
terrorism. Neo-conservatives and hard-line pro-Israeli supporters like Caroline Glick 
share this view of DeLong-Bas.36 
                                                 
32 Chomsky, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,” paragraph 2.  
33 Ibid.,281. 
34 DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam.  
35 Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam, “Natana DeLong-Bas: American Professor, Wahhabi Apologist,” 
Real Clear Politics, January 19, 2007, accessed March 24, 2014 from 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/01/natana_delongbas_american_prof.html 
36 Glick for example writes “DeLong-Bas told the newspaper that she does ‘not find any evidence that 
would make me agree that Osama bin Laden was behind the attack on the Twin Towers of the World 
Trade Center. All we heard from him was praise and acclaim for those who carried out the operation’. 
This was not the first time the Brandeis faculty member acted as an apologist for jihadists. Indeed, she 
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 DeLong-Bas’ representation of ‘Wahhabism’ is not first and foremost a defence of 
Saudi interests but rather rests on a claim to truth. DeLong-Bas believes she offers a 
‘truthful’ interpretation of ‘Wahhabi’ doctrine which is primarily based on the 
writings of its founder Ibn Abd-al Wahhab. Her claims to truth rest on what she 
believes to be an ‘objective interpretation’ of sacred ‘Wahhabi’ Islamic texts, 
involving comparing and contrasting between these ‘Wahhabi’ Islamic texts and the 
beliefs and doctrines of modern Islamic terrorists. This is not the only issue with her 
representation. Her case depends on an appeal to the legitimacy of her translation and 
interpretation of ‘Wahhabi’ texts from the eighteenth century and on her capacity to 
compare these to what she understands to be the beliefs of the modern ‘Wahhabi’ 
movement.  
 
There is of course a problem here, that much of this exercise depends on an 
assumption that we are doing something meaningful when we compare and interpret 
the original texts of a new belief system with a much later and/or contemporary 
expressions of a belief system. It is doubtful that the modern nature of what we 
understand to be ‘Wahhabism’ can be established in this way. We use the term 
‘genetic fallacy’ to describe authors who make this kind of error in reasoning. To 
commit a genetic fallacy is to make conclusions about a movement based on its 
origins as opposed to considering the contemporary expression of ideas and beliefs 
and doing so on their own merits and in their current context. DeLong-Bas’ 
interpretation of ‘Wahhabism’ fails to fully appreciate the constantly evolving nature 
of the ‘Wahhabi’ movement. She fails to understand that ‘Wahhabism’ now in the 
twenty-first century is not an exact replica of how it appeared during eighteenth 
century Arabia.  We live in a different time and in a vastly different political context.  
 
Finally we can consider the contribution made by Oliver.37 Oliver claims to be a 
follower of Salafism which he considers to be the only valid interpretation of Islam 
                                                                                                                                           
seems to be making a career out of it.” See Caroline B. Glick, “Brandeis’ Jewish Problem,” Feb 21, 
2007, accessed April 9 2014 from http://carolineglick.com/brandeiss_jewish_problem/. At the time of 
writing Glick was a deputy managing editor of the Jerusalem Post. Her opinion piece was originally 
published in the Jewish Press and was also published in the well-known online neo-conservative 
publication Frontpagemag.com. 
37 Haneef James Oliver, The Wahhabi Myth: Dispelling Prevalent Fallacies And the Fictitious Link 
with Bin Laden (Trafford: Victoria, 2002); Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam; El-Fadl, The Great 
Theft.  
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and his defence of his faith is motivated and inspired by what he believes is an 
objective understanding of ‘God’s word’. Oliver’s defence includes rejecting claims 
that his Salafi faith, which he claims many mistakenly refer to as ‘Wahhabism,’ is 
responsible for inspiring modern Islamic terrorists like Osama Bin Laden. Oliver 
makes his motivations perfectly clear for his audience.  
My objective in doing so is not to deceitfully defend anyone or anything 
unworthy of a defence, as Islaam commands that a Muslim speak a word 
of truth, even if it be against him or herself, or followers of the same faith. 
Rather, it is my objective to deal only with those issues which have been 
unjustly brought against Islaam and Salaiyyah (Salafism) in particular, as 
opposed to defending the actions of the contemporary “Islaamic” groups and 
movements, which have only aided those who wish to harm the Islaamic 
Nation.  
…it is my objective to give the reader another perspective on some of these 
issues which they might never have been exposed to before. I have made 
every effort to avoid producing another book which is filled with opinion 
while lacking in textual proofs. Instead I have tried to produce a book in 
which Muslims and non-Muslims alike will be able to reflect upon the 
directives of the Qur’aan and the narrations (ahaadeetha) of the Prophet 
Muhammad for themselves [Emphasis added]. 38 
 
As we can see Oliver believes his role is to “speak a word of truth” which he believes 
can be supported by “textual proofs.” There are a number of issues with these claims. 
First the legitimacy of his claims rests on our accepting of his claim that his 
interpretation of Salafism/ ‘Wahhabism’ provides the ‘one big story’ about human 
history. If we are not willing to accept the legitimacy of this religious viewpoint then 
we can say as many Marxists would claim that Oliver’s representation of 
‘Wahhabism’ is a relation of his religious delusion.39Like some of the other 
                                                 
38 Oliver, The Wahhabi Myth, 1.  
39 Like Bertell Ollman I use the terms ‘relation’ and ‘Relation’ (capitalised) in different ways. As 
Ollman explains “I shall use the term ‘relation’ in two different senses: first, to refer to the factor itself, 
as when I call capital a relation, and also as a synonym of ‘connection’, as in speaking of the relation 
between different factors…I intend to capitalise ‘relation’ (henceforth ‘Relation’) when it refers to a 
factor, as opposed to the connection between factors, to aid readers in making this important 
distinction. Besides, such obvious alternatives to ‘Relation’ as ‘structure’, ‘unit’ and ‘system’ suggest a 
closed, finished character which is belied by Marx’s treatment of real social factors. ‘Relation’ appeals 
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scholarship dealt with here, Oliver’s defence of ‘Wahhabism’/Salafism relies on his 
interpretation of Koranic texts originally written in Arabic and translated into 
English.40  
 
The Problem of Translation 
 
There are a number of important issues pertinent not only to Oliver’s representation 
but to many other scholarly and intellectual representations of ‘Wahhabism’ that rely 
on translations from Arabic into English. Martin Müller points out that translation is 
too often treated as a process in which a translator assumes a ‘neutral relay’ role 
producing an objective outcome.41 This is certainly how Oliver understands his role 
when representing ‘Wahhabism’ for his audience. This is an issue that affects many 
social science researchers subscribing to Enlightenment and religious ideas of truth 
when making sense of phenomena in the social world. As Caputo points out we no 
longer live in age where one story can explain everything that happens in the social 
world.  
 
Müller has these ideas about truth and objectivity in mind when he writes that “if we 
are to take seriously the problems of representation and speaking for/with others” then 
“we are called on to problematize translation as a political act.”42 Recognising 
translation as a political act is integral to recognising the antagonisms and struggles 
for meaning that are taking place in a foreign language. Also recognising the 
‘observer-dependant’ roles intellectuals play when representing social phenomena 
like ‘Wahhabism,’ Müller writes that “[i]ncreased attention to the political 
                                                                                                                                           
to me, as it must have to him, as the concept which is better adapted to take account of the changes and 
uncertainties that constitute so large a part of social life.” See Ollman, Alienation, 16-17. 
40 Haneef James Oliver joins Khaled Abou El-Fadl and Stephen Schwartz as an intellectual who 
represents the ‘Wahhabi’ community as existing outside of the ‘mainstream’ Islamic community. 
Oliver, El-Fadl and Schwartz all have particular ideas about what ‘true’ Islam is and is not and all 
reject ‘Wahhabism’. While they are united in their representing ‘Wahhabism’ as a ‘corrupted’ version 
of Islam and ‘illegitimate,’ each differ in their understanding of what constitutes ‘real Islam’ or rather 
what is a ‘truthful’ and ‘objective’ interpretation of Islam. Schwartz’s representing of ‘Wahhabism’ is 
influenced by his desire to promote a particular interpretation of Sufi Islam. Contra Schwartz, El-Fadl 
is influenced by his desire to promote what he considers to be a ‘moderate’ and ‘progressive’ 
interpretation of Islam.  
41 Martin Müller, “What’s in a Word?”, Area 39, no.2 (2007): 207. 
42 Ibid.  
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implications of translation also spells out the case for broaching the translating 
geographer as an active agent who moulds the production of meaning.43  
 
These concerns about translation have preoccupied many scholars including Müller, 
Phillips, Shurmer-Smith, Esteva and Prakash, and Temple and Young all of whom 
identify equivalence as a key issue.44 Phillips for example notes that achieving 
equivalence in translation is an intractable problem given “almost any utterance in 
any language carries with it a set of assumptions, feelings, and values that the speaker 
may or may not be aware of.”45 He also writes that the transferring of meaning from 
language into another can only ever be partial and never complete.46 Different 
languages structure the world in different ways and translations are never able to 
completely convey the richness of connotations. Müller points out that this is 
especially the case when translating ‘God words’.47  
 
This problem has been addressed by one scholar who provides a more nuanced 
understanding of the ‘Wahhabi’ movement and who shows an awareness of these 
issues when making sense of what he calls the ‘Salafi’ movement. Wiktorowicz 
provides what he calls an ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’ (he prefers to use the 
term ‘Salafi’ rather than ‘Wahhabi believing the latter to be a misnomer) and claims 
that we can distinguish between different groups within the Salafi tradition according 
to their interpretation of Islamic religious texts.48 This for example includes 
difference in reasoning and interpreting regarding the use of ‘Weapons of Mass 
Destruction’. Wiktorowicz writes that jihadis today cite Prophet Muhammad’s 
sanctioning of the use of a catapult during war as providing religious justification for 
their use of weapons of mass destruction.  
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Martin Müller, “What’s in a Word?,” 207-209; H. P. Phillips, “Problems of translation and menacing 
in fieldwork,” in R. N. Adams and J. J. Preiss (eds.) Human organisation research: field relations and 
techniques (Dorsey Press: Homewood, 1960), 291; Pamela Shurmer-Smith, “The Trouble with 
Theory,” in Doing Cultural Geography, ed. Pamela Shurmer-Smith (London: Sage, 2002), 11-18; 
Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash, Grassroots Post-modernism: Remaking the Soil of Cultures 
(London: Zed, 1998), 118-119; Bogusia Temple and Alys Young, “Qualitative research and translation 
dilemmas,” Qualitative Research 4, no.2 (2004):  165-171. 
45 Phillips, Problems of translation and menacing in fieldwork, 291.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Müller, “What's in a Word?,” 207. 
48 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement.”  
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In drawing analogies, jihadis argue that the catapult was the WMD of the 
Prophet’s lifetime and that his example legitimates the use of WMD today. 
This conclusion is not rooted in an objective reading of the religious 
sources: it is entirely dependent on whether one views the catapult as the 
historical equivalent of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Human 
reasoning thus plays a critical role [Emphasis added]. 49 
 
Wiktorowicz makes a very important point that “human reasoning…plays a critical 
role” when it comes to making sense of things in the social world like religious texts 
and different events. As Gadamer and Arendt point out ‘human reasoning’ or how we 
make sense of the world is influenced by our prejudices.50 It follows that different 
scholar’s interpretations and representations of ‘Wahhabism’ are influenced by their 
‘prejudices’. 
 
This has important implications when dealing with intellectuals’ representations of 
‘Wahhabism’ whose truth claims rely on translation and which involve translating 
‘god words’. The works of these scholars remind us that translating is a not an exact 
science with an objective outcome but is instead a ‘subjective’ and political act. It is 
clear that Oliver’s translation of Arabic religious texts into English is influenced by 
amongst other things a desire to defend his understanding of his faith. This contest to 
make sense of ‘Wahhabism’ occurring between these different ‘Islamic’ scholars is a 
microcosm of a much wider debate occurring between intellectuals relying on very 
different analytical and theoretical frameworks and influenced by different interests 
commitments and what scholars like Gadamer have called ‘prejudices’.51  
 
Conclusion 
 
My cursory review of some of the scholarly literature dedicated to making sense of 
‘Wahhabism’ helps highlight a number of important issues that warrant and legitimate 
this research. It helps show that a scholar’s interests and truth claims have major 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 216. 
50 Hans Georg Gadamer, ‘The Problem of Historical Consciousness,’ in Interpretive Social Science, ed. 
Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979): 103-162; 
Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics.”  
51 Gadamer, “The Problem of Historical Consciousness.” 
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implications for how they make sense of and represent ‘Wahhabism’. I have shown 
how an intellectuals’ desire to promote the interests of a particular group or 
intellectual tradition can result in very different representations of ‘Wahhabism’. I 
will now turn my attention to looking at the role of the intellectual.
 51 
Chapter Two 
On Intellectuals  
 
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 
Juvenil, Satires 
 
For much of his adult life Socrates wandered through the Agora or marketplace in 
Athens, asking all those who would engage with him whether they had any 
knowledge to reveal to him. What we remember as his practice of the ‘Socratic 
dialogue’ making use of ‘Socratic irony’ (elencthia), implied that few of his fellow-
citizens knew what they were talking about.1 Just after he had been condemned to 
death by his fellow Athenian citizens, he told them in what has since become one of 
the best-known philosophical phrases in the Western philosophical tradition, that “the 
unexamined life is not worth living.”2 According to Socrates the more you lead such a 
life the more equipped you are to live a good life.   
 
Everything we know about Socrates as one of the first public intellectuals in the 
western intellectual tradition tells us that he set loose several permanent puzzles for 
philosophy. One of the enduring puzzles was how we were to both examine our life 
and establish the veridicity or ‘truth’ of the knowledge we claimed to possess. That 
problem continues to haunt the sociology of intellectuals and provides something of 
the big puzzle that sits behind this thesis. Yet in this respect a non-remediable 
problem attends any such exercise. It does so in terms that echo the ominous question 
‘who guards the guardians?’ When we ask ‘how are we to make sense of the sense-
makers?’ This is a central question in the evolution of what we can call a sociology of 
intellectuals.  
 
In the twentieth century Karl Mannheim did more than most to establish the modern 
contours of the sociology of intellectuals.3 Mannheim wrote in a time between two 
                                                 
1 Gregory Vlastos, Studies in Greek Philosophy, vol 2. ed. Daniel W. Graham (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press 1997).  
2 Plato, Apology, trans. G.M.A Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), 41. 
3 This is not to ignore his foundational status in setting off the sociology of knowledge. See Volker 
Meja and Nico Stehr eds, Knowledge and Politics. The Sociology of Knowledge Dispute (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1990). 
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World Wars when older and longstanding cultural values were being shaken 
profoundly and many of his fellow intellectuals were making dire predictions about 
the ‘future of civilisation’. Mannheim understood his work in Socratic terms as a 
search for knowledge that would help construct an equal society with a tolerant 
citizenry. Mannheim argued that citizens developed their freedom through self-
reflection and by understanding their cultural origins.4 This was not however meant to 
be an easy or effortless task undertaken by the individual. Mannheim pointed to the 
all-important role of the intellectual and to the intersection between the reflective 
practice of the intellectual and those decision-makers like politicians and policy-
makers who deal with day-to-day politics.  
 
Mannheim began his seminal work Ideology and Utopia by addressing the problem of 
how men think.5 He distinguished between everyday thinking and the kind that is 
done by philosophers, mathematicians and physicists in ‘special circumstances’. 
Mannheim designed a critical method he believed intellectuals could draw on to help 
create a ‘better’ society. This method acknowledged both the specificities of historical 
context and the need to achieve a certain ‘objectivity’ which would enable us to see 
the world as uncontaminated by ‘ideology,’ which is understood as the kind of 
knowledge shaped by social interests or partisan politics. 6   
 
At the same time Mannheim saw the intellectual as charged with the responsibility for 
developing utopian ideals without retreating into a contemplative state completely 
removed from political life. However Mannheim struggled to say how this would be 
possible. He argued that intellectuals necessarily enjoy a certain amount of freedom, 
because they are ‘free-floating’ and the ‘keepers of cultural standards’. According to 
him this allowed them to operate free from the constraints of ‘ideology’. Mannheim 
also offers important insights about dealing with competing value systems.  
                                                 
4 David Kettler and Volka Meja, Karl Mannheim and the Crisis of Liberalism (New Brunswick: 
London, 1995), 11.  
5 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (London: Routledge, 1936). 
6 Mannheim says the following about ‘ideology’.  
The Concept “ideology” reflects the one discovery which emerged from political conflict, namely, that 
ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are 
simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination. There is 
implicit in the word “ideology” the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of 
certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilises it. 
Ibid., 36. 
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Developing a sociology of knowledge was Mannheim’s method for arbitrating this 
competition. He argues that intellectuals capable of operating outside particular value 
and belief systems or ‘ideologies’ could use this method to discover how and why 
particular individuals and groups see the world as they do. Mannheim writes that:  
… the sociology of knowledge regards the cognitive act in connection with the 
models to which it aspires in its existential as well as its meaningful quality, 
not as insights into ‘eternal’ truths arising from a purely theoretical, 
contemplative urge . . . but as an instrument for dealing with life-situations at 
the disposal of a certain kind of vital being under certain conditions of life.7  
 
Mannheim’s prescriptions are not designed to be as he put it “blueprints: it is neither a 
list of abstract desiderata for the philosopher nor a detailed program for the 
administrator.”8 Indeed his work might be best understood as suggestions put forward 
with the intent of promoting discussion about the major political concerns of the 
moment. Whatever the success or failure of Mannheim’s own program, his thinking 
about the intellectual has in part inspired the subsequent development of the sociology 
of intellectuals. It poses important questions that have continued to be asked 
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and which are still relevant today. 
His work raises difficult questions about the relationship between political 
partisanship and ‘truth telling,’ the responsibilities of the intellectual, the relevant 
ethical and political motivations of intellectual practice and the standards by which 
we should judge intellectuals claims to truth. Mannheim’s work has certainly worked 
in this way and his ideas about the roles of the intellectuals have sparked a robust 
debate that helps inspire, legitimate and animate this study.  
 
Mannheim’s ideas point to the wider issue of sense making with regards to the social 
world. The social world is distinguishable from what we typically refer to as the 
natural world where we can come to know reality by using scientific measures. Our 
major tasks as researchers when dealing with the natural world is to design and 
implement particular research methods that help us to understand its different 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 268. 
8 Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1950), xvii.  
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elements and how they fit into the whole. Our roles as researchers are very different 
when dealing with things in the social world. 
 
Unlike the natural or physical world, the social world does not exist independent of 
human understanding and the sense making we engage in habitually: that is to say that 
our understanding of it is ‘observer-dependent’. Unlike the natural world there is no 
objectivity in the social world. Instead it is characterised by what is usually referred to 
as subjectivity or what writers like Alfred Schutz and Charles Taylor have insisted is a 
better way of denominating this, namely intersubjectivity.9 This shift away from the 
notion of subjectivity is meant to highlight the role played by shared systems of 
belief, symbolic schema and the various social practices we rely on to understand and 
live in our world. Writers as diverse as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap and 
Nelson Goodman pointed out that a variety of social and symbolic systems including 
language, play the crucial role in both understanding and structuring the social 
world.10 Ferdinand de Saussure was amongst the first to highlight that it is our 
linguistic system that enables us to define concepts that we understand as existing in 
the social world.11 It is differences in meaning that structures our perception meaning 
things like ‘Wahhabism’ only exist because of our decision to use and manipulate 
symbolic systems. 
 
A lot what we think we know about the social world and which is true for categories 
like ‘Wahhabism’ is produced by intellectuals. As writers of scholarly articles, books, 
newspaper and magazine articles, intellectuals hold privileged positions in society. It 
is their interpretations of what concepts like ‘Wahhabism’ mean or refer to that is 
both widely distributed and read by the general public and by policy and decision-
makers who in many instances may have never thought about or dealt directly with 
this phenomenon. That is to say that we tend to rely on intellectuals’ representations 
to make sense of things like ‘Wahhabism’ that we assume simply exists ‘out there’ in 
                                                 
9  Alfred Schutz, “The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity in Husserl,” In Collected papers III: 
Studies in phenomenological philosophy, 51–91 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970); Charles Taylor, 
‘The Politics of Recognition’, in A. Gutmann ed. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994): 25–73. 
10 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Über Gewissheit/ On Certainty, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright,  
trans. Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Harper and Row. 1969); Rudolf Carnap, 
“Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,” Revue internationale de philosophie  4 (1950): 20-40; Nelson 
Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978). 
11 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics. 
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the social world. This becomes extremely important when we consider that policy and 
decision-makers can draw on these representations when making policies that have 
the ability to cause great harm and destruction, and that the public’s support for such 
policies can also rely on the same representations.  
 
To borrow a concept from Deleuze that has since been expanded on by authors like 
Osborne, we can best understand intellectuals as ‘mediators’ of ideas in todays 
‘knowledge society’.12 Both authors emphasise the important role intellectuals play in 
communicating ideas about the social world to their audience. For Deleuze the 
modern intellectual as a mediator is a creative catalyst of ideas. Osborne writes “the 
mediator is interested above all in ideas…ideas which are going to make a 
difference…‘any difference which makes a difference in some later event’”.13 
However the major issue with Osborne’s conception is that he considers the 
intellectual as a mediator to be “value-neutral” unconcerned with “the ‘big ideas’ of 
the epoch of ‘grand narratives’”.14  
 
The important question I want to address and which is at odds with the account 
offered by Osborne, is whether intellectuals are indeed ‘value-neutral’ mediators 
communicating ideas about what is happening in the social world to their audience or 
whether there is something else going on? Additionally we also need to establish 
whether Osborne’s claim that many intellectuals are not concerned with the ‘big 
ideas’ and ‘grand narratives’ of our time is adequate. As will become clear later, a 
case can be made that those intellectuals whose representations of ‘Wahhabism’ I pay 
attention to in this study, are indeed concerned with promoting the ‘big ideas’ and 
‘grand narratives’ associated with popular intellectual traditions like neo-
conservatism, liberalism and Marxism. It is equally likely that many are also 
unknowingly or unconsciously promoting key beliefs that resonate with or get their 
authority and appeal from these ‘big’ intellectual traditions.  
 
                                                 
12 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Osborne, “On 
mediators.” 430-447. doi:10.1080/0308514042000285224  
13 Thomas Osborne, Ibid., 441. Osborne cites Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (London: 
Paladin, 1972), 381.  
14 Reference to Osborne’s claim that his conceptualisation of the mediator as relatively ‘value-neutral’ 
when compared to Deleuze’s conception is taken from note 9 on p. 446. The quotation appears on 
p.441. 
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In both instances the outcome is often the same, a particular sense of order is imposed 
on the social world and it is created and re-created in particular ways. Contrary to 
Osborne’s claim I think it is crucial to consider the intellectuals’ ideas within the 
political context in which they have been formed and appear. We only need to look at 
the fact that ‘Wahhabism’ was largely ignored pre-9/11 to see that the relatively new 
interest in it is related to the post-9/11 period in which many ‘Western’ governments 
and intellectuals are fixated with the ‘Global War on Terror’. 
 
Given the important roles intellectuals play in this ‘knowledge production’ process it 
matters that we pay close attention to the particular truth claims intellectuals make 
when justifying their interpretations and how we are best to understand this process. 
As has proven to be the case in the recent times, if we are going to make policies in an 
age of heightened anxiety preoccupied with ‘countering’ ‘Islamic radicalism’ or 
‘Islamist terrorism’, it matters that we understand the claims informing and 
supporting these decisions. If we in the ‘West’ are going to do things like invade 
Islamic sovereign nations in the Middle East with the aim of ‘promoting democracy’ 
or bomb civilians and ‘terrorists’ in the name of ‘security’ then we must have an 
understanding of the claims supporting and justifying these kinds of actions. This 
understanding requires intense scrutiny, which I argue involves the careful 
deconstruction of representations.  
 
In this chapter I set out the rationale for my research program. I argue that a review of 
the relevant literature points to a number of key problems or questions that have been 
the focus of considerable scholarly debate. These problems or questions provide the 
over-arching intellectual and analytical problematic for my inquiry into the ways 
certain groups of intellectuals represent ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
First it is clear there is an ongoing debate about the motivation and identity of 
intellectuals. I show how scholars have sought to make sense of the different 
motivations and inspirations influencing intellectuals. I aim to answer the question 
‘what is it that leads some men and women to become intellectuals?’ Related to this 
idea is how we define an intellectual. Here I ask ‘is the function of critique 
fundamental to the identity of intellectuals?’ Secondly there is discussion about the 
particular practices in which intellectuals play a special role. How important for 
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example is the proposition that intellectuals set about constituting our world? This 
leads me to consider their role in constructing what Anderson called ‘Imagined 
Communities’ and Said called ‘Imagined Spaces’.15  
 
Among the many issues about the relationship of intellectuals to conceptions of truth, 
I deal with the role prejudice plays in the ways intellectuals make sense of and 
represent the social world. The need to do this is raised by Chomsky’s provocative 
suggestion that ‘it is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose 
lies’ and Arendt’s more nuanced account of the problem of how we are to think about 
the relation of truth and politics.16 At stake here is how intellectuals justify their 
claims as ‘purveyors of truth’ including intellectuals like Chomsky.  
 
On the Collective Identity and Attachment of Intellectuals  
 
I began the previous section by outlining a particular approach adopted by scholars 
like Julien Benda when studying the sociology of intellectuals. Scholars differ in their 
understandings with regards to what defines or constitutes an ‘intellectual’, what their 
roles should be and are, and to whom or what they owe their allegiance. Charles 
Kurzman and Lynn Owens offer a useful typology that helps us to distinguish 
between three major approaches scholars adopt when considering these different 
issues. These are the ‘intellectuals as class-less,’ ‘intellectuals as class-bound,’ 
‘intellectuals as a class in themselves’.17 I prefer to think of and describe the second 
category as ‘intellectuals as class, group or movement-bound’. For me ‘class-bound’ 
implies a Marxist or quasi-Marxist understanding while ‘class, group or movement-
bound’ can be used to describe intellectuals with any affiliation to an interest group. 
Understanding this debate within the scholarly literature is important because it 
informs our understanding of and helps us to distinguish between the different roles 
intellectuals adopt when representing ‘Wahhabism’. More specifically this helps us to 
understand the different factors inspiring and motivating the intellectuals in their 
representing of ‘Wahhabism’ i.e. are they motivated and inspired by a desire to ‘speak 
truth to power’ or by particular class and group interests. 
                                                 
15 Anderson, Imagined Communities; Said, Orientalism  
16 Chomsky, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals.”; Arendt, “Truth and Politics.”  
17 Kurzman and Owens, “The Sociology of Intellectuals,” 63-80, 
doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.28110601.140745.  
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First we will deal with the group Kurzman and Owens call the ‘class-less 
intellectuals’. Prominent writers belonging to this long tradition include Karl 
Mannheim, Noam Chomsky, Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils and Christopher 
Hitchens.18 As the term suggests, these scholars maintain that intellectuals are non-
partisan and not attached or fixed to any particular group or class. Their critiques of 
the social world for their audience are said to be inspired by ‘utopian ideals’ rather 
than personal glory or class-interests. If we are to consider the roles these kinds of 
intellectuals play in representing ‘Wahhabism’ we can say they are motivated and 
inspired by such things as describing the ‘way things really are’ and bringing attention 
to injustices and wrongs with the ultimate aim of creating a more harmonious society.  
 
Mannheim saw intellectuals as “not too firmly situated in the social order”, “socially 
unattached” and as a part of an “unanchored, relatively class-less stratum.”19 He 
believed intellectuals to be motivated and inspired by a desire to encourage mutual 
understanding between different sections and groups of society or as he puts it “to 
create a form outside of the party schools in which the perspective of and the interest 
in the whole is safeguarded.”20 He believed intellectuals were entrusted with the 
responsibility of making sense of the current political situation for the society and he 
saw non-intellectuals as those members of society who are firmly entrenched in 
society participating in everyday activities. Incapable of having a deeper 
understanding of the different political forces operating and competing in society due 
to their relative lack of education, Mannheim believed these everyday people 
absorbed worldviews as if by some kind of osmosis. 
…while the person who is not oriented toward the whole through his 
education, but rather participates directly in the social process of production, 
merely tends to absorb the Weltanschauung [worldview] of that particular 
group.”21  
                                                 
18 Mannheim, “The sociological problem of the ‘intelligentsia’”; Chomsky, “The Responsibility of 
Intellectuals,”; Talcott Parsons, “‘The intellectual’: a social role category”, in Philip Rieff ed.,On 
Intellectuals: Theoretical Studies, Case Studies (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), 3-26.; Edward Shils, 
The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation 
(The Hague: Mouton, 1961); Christopher Hitchens, “The Plight of the Public Intellectual,” Foreign 
Policy, April 10, 2008, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/04/10/the_plight_of_the_public_intellectual. 
19 Mannheim, “The sociological problem of the ‘intelligentsia’”,153-164. 
20 Ibid., 161-162. 
21 Ibid., 156. 
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Mannheim however was extremely worried that intellectuals in the twentieth century 
were not living up to their responsibilities and were instead promoting the interests of 
particular groups to the detriment of wider society. Chomsky expresses a similar 
concern about intellectuals especially ‘Western’ intellectuals in the twenty-first 
century whose relative “…political liberty, from access to information and freedom of 
expression” means they have the responsibility “…to seek the truth lying hidden 
behind the veil of distortion and misrepresentation, ideology and class interest, 
through which the events of current history are presented to us.”22 Mannheim was 
worried that intellectuals were failing to transcend their class and instead joining or 
remaining in particular interest and class groups. He wrote that “the decline of a 
relatively free intelligentsia” during this period threatened “the comparative and 
critical approach which an atmosphere of multi-polar viewpoints stimulates.”23 As we 
will see Mannheim and Chomsky are right to worry. Many of the intellectuals 
representing ‘Wahhabism’ in the twenty-first century remain tied to particular interest 
and on some occasions class groups and favour the promoting of their interests 
instead of attempting to facilitate understanding between different groups with the 
ultimate aim of creating a more harmonious society.  
 
Talcott Parsons and Christopher Hitchens have adopted similar approaches. Parsons 
argued that intellectuals should aim to impose ‘universalistic standards’ as a way of 
promoting and creating a more inclusive and harmonious society rather than engaging 
in partisan politics. 24 Parsons also understood the ‘observer-dependent’ role people in 
general play when making sense of phenomena in the social world. He saw 
intellectuals are responsible for dealing with the meaning of symbolic systems 
arguing they should dedicate themselves to describing the symbolic interactions 
between competing groups. Parsons would certainly categorise my work in describing 
and analysing the symbolic interactions occurring between intellectuals from 
competing groups as that performed by an ‘intellectual’.  
 
Hitchens also sees intellectuals as unattached to a specific class or group and believes 
‘real’ intellectuals would never use the term when referring to themselves: “…I 
                                                 
22 Chomsky, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,” paragraph 2.  
23 Mannheim, “The problem of the ‘intelligentsia,’”. 166. 
24 Parsons, “‘The intellectual’: a social role category.”  
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cannot think of any – except [Alan] Wolfe who would have said on his or her own 
behalf, “I am an intellectual.”25 Hitchens claims it is important that we distinguish 
between the “true intellectuals” and the rival callings of “opinion maker” or 
“pundits”, especially as the last two are intimately bound up with the world of 
television.”26 Hitchens’ awareness of the major role television plays which is largely 
ignored by Mannheim and Parsons is understandable given his sociology of the 
intellectual has been provided in the modern political context.   
 
Hitchens maintains that a ‘true intellectual’ does not promote the interests of a 
specific group or class rather he or she “…attempt[s] to soar on the thermals of public 
opinion.”27 According to Hitchens the intellectual is subversive,“…makes his or her 
living through the battle of ideas” and is someone 
…who care[s] for language above all and guess its subtle relationship to truth; 
and who will be willing and able to nail a lie. If such a person should also 
have a sense of irony and a feeling for history, then, as the French say, “tant 
mieux.28 
 
While the intellectual does not necessarily have to ‘speak truth to power’ he or she 
should be sceptical of authority as well as claims about ‘utopia,’ ‘heaven’ and ‘hell’. 
The intellectual must also be able  
…to survey the present though the optic of a historian, the past with the 
perspective of the living, and the culture and language of others with the 
equipment of an Internationalist.29 
 
Shils’ understanding of the intellectual is somewhat similar to the accounts offered by 
Mannheim, Parsons and Hitchens. Like them he saw intellectuals as ‘free-floating’ 
and ‘class-less’. Basing his account on the political situation in post-colonial India 
where he saw intellectuals as playing “a great historical role on the higher levels of 
administration,” Shils conceded that some intellectuals were regrettably motivated by 
                                                 
25 Hitchens, “The Plight of the Public Intellectual,” paragraph 3. 
26 Ibid., paragraph 1.  
27 Ibid., paragraph 10. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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personal glory.30 According to Shils the intellectual as a ‘responsible critic’ should 
never give in to such selfish and egoistic motivations nor should he or she get too 
involved in partisan politics or promote Government interests. Contra Mannheim, 
Parsons and Hitchens, Shils accepts that intellectuals can play minor roles in 
government. 
 
However I believe there is a problem in linking Shils’ conceptualisation of the 
intellectual to those offered by Chomsky and Parsons. Whilst Kurzman and Owens 
encourage us to treat Shils’ conceptualisation in this way, there are contradictions in 
his work that suggest we should categorise his approach as one that treats intellectuals 
as tied to and promoters of particular class or group interests. There is evidence to 
suggest that Shils supported the view of intellectuals as key proponents of the political 
liberal tradition.  
 
Shils understood intellectuals as playing key roles in the ‘bringing of modernity’ to 
‘traditional societies’. Displaying some of the ethnocentric tendencies held by many 
in the political Liberal tradition, Shils advocated for the ‘modernisation’ of all 
‘backward’ nations and he believed that the US provided the blueprint for this ideal 
society.31 According to Shils “Modern means being western without the onus of 
following the west. It is the model for the West detached in some way from its 
geographical origins and locus.”32 Acutely aware of possible charges of racism, Shils 
chose to use the terms ‘modernisation’ and ‘modern’ because he (wrongly) thought it 
steered away from implications of Western superiority suggested by the terms 
‘Christianisation’ or ‘Westernisation’.33 This call for intellectuals to promote a 
particular belief system stands in contrast to the approaches adopted by authors like 
Mannheim, Parsons and Chomsky who champion ‘speaking truth to power’. 
 
My initial account of these key authors helps to make an important point that needs to 
be acknowledged when considering the different approaches within the field of 
                                                 
30 Shils, The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation, 8-9. 
31 Nils Gilam, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2003), 142. 
32 Cited in Hemant Shah, “Race, Mass Communication, and Modernization: Intellectual Networks and 
the Flow of Ideas,” in Anti-Racism and Multiculturalism: Studies in International Communication, ed. 
Mark D. Alleyne (New Jersey: Transaction, 2011), 25.  
33 Ibid., 141. 
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sociology of intellectuals. It is important we understand the political contexts in which 
these conceptualisations were offered. While Shils was largely concerned with the 
decolonisation of India both Mannheim and Parsons wrote during a time in the 
twentieth century that was dominated by a several global wars. Having experienced or 
learned about another global war only a few decades earlier, scholars studying the 
sociology of intellectuals were typically pessimistic about the future of humanity. 
Having seen many in the world taking sides and kill each other in the name of 
politics, many scholars including Mannheim and Parsons longed for a situation in 
which intellectuals could transcend these base instincts for the good of society and 
humanity. They wanted intellectuals to rise above politics, to be apolitical and to be of 
service to all humanity.  
 
A second approach used to understand the roles, motivations and inspiration of 
intellectuals involves treating them as a ‘class in themselves’. Advocates of this 
approach have included Julien Benda, George Orwell, Vaclav Havel and Leszek 
Kolakowski.34 Like Mannheim, Shils and Parsons, these writers understand 
intellectuals as existing apart from particular class and group interests. Advocates of 
this approach tend to see intellectuals primarily as ‘servants of truth,’ philosophers 
and educators inspired and motivated by the utopian ideals of creating a better 
society. This idea became prominent amongst intellectuals in the early twentieth 
century when the Dreyfus Affair in France inspired an appeal to a conception of 
intellectuals as defenders of the truth. Robert Levy was among those who called for 
the “Intellectuals of all countries, [to] unite!”  
Unite because the war, which decimated you, has reduced the survivors to the 
wages of misery; unite because, among other workers, your brothers, you 
[survivors] dare to speak of the material conditions of your miserable lives, 
which are brightened only by the will to learn or teach.35 
 
The Dreyfus intellectuals which in addition to Levy included prominent intellectuals 
like Emile Zola, Alan Montefiore, Octave Mirbeau and Anatole France, did not see 
                                                 
34 Julien Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969); 
George Orwell, “Writers and Leviathan,” in The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait, ed. George B. 
de Huszar (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960); Leszek Kolakowsk, Marxism and Beyond: On Historical 
Understanding and Individual Responsibility (London: Paladin, 1971); Vaclac Havel, Disturbing the 
Peace: A Conversation with Karel Hvizdala (New York: Vintage Books, 1991).  
35 Robert Levy, Intellectuals, unissez-vouz! (Paris: Michel Riviere, 1931), 164. 
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themselves as attached to a particular class of production i.e. the Proletariat or the 
Bourgeoisie but instead considered themselves to be their own class. Christopher 
Hitchens points out the term ‘intellectual’ was also one of abuse used by critics of the 
pro-Dreyfus intellectuals who saw them as preferring “…the urbane abstractions of 
‘the intellect’ to the verities of church and soil.”36  
 
Julien Benda, who was an early and prominent advocate for this approach, writes that 
intellectuals should be inspired by “non-material advantages” and not “the pursuit of 
practical aims.”37 He said they find “joy in the practice of an art or a science or 
metaphysical speculation…and hence in a certain manner say: ‘My kingdom is not of 
this world’”.38 Benda’s seminal work La Trahison des Clercs which along with 
Mannheim’s work is considered to be one of the founding documents in the sociology 
of intellectuals, was essentially an attack on contemporary intellectuals who failed to 
live up to their responsibilities as anti-class and non-partisan. “The modern ‘clerk’ has 
entirely ceased to let the layman alone descend to the market place” and in doing so 
“betrayed their duty, which is precisely to set up a corporation whose sole cult is that 
of justice and truth.”39  
 
Benda’s calls to ‘truth’ makes him a part of a long tradition of scholars who hold that 
one of the intellectuals’ chief responsibilities is to be, as is so eloquently stated by 
Ignazio Silone, in “the humble and courageous service of truth.”40 This tradition also 
includes George Orwell and Vaclav Havel who saw intellectuals as ‘disturbers of 
peace’ in constant pursuit of the truth irrespective of whether or not this infuriated 
authorities. Havel writes  
The intellectual should constantly disturb, should bear witness to the misery of 
the world, should be provocative by being independent, should rebel against 
all hidden and open pressure and manipulations, should be the chief doubter of 
                                                 
36 Hitchens “The Plight of the Public Intellectual”, 63. 
37 Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals, 43. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid., 57. 
40 Ignazio Silone, speech delivered at the International PEN Club Conference at Basle titled “On the 
place of intellect and pretension of the intellectual”, in George B. de Huszar ed. The Intellectuals: A 
Controversial Portrait (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960) 261-266. 
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systems, of power and its incantations, should be a witness to their 
mendacity.41 
 
Orwell’s legacy is so legendary that to describe a piece of writing as ‘Orwellian’ is to 
recognise that human resistance to terror is unquenchable.42 Orwell wrote during the 
mid-twentieth century which was a time dominated by imperialism, fascism and 
Stalinism. His claim to be identified as belonging to the ‘Left’ has proved a rich 
source of scholarly disagreement. He favoured an internationalist stand to nationalism 
and he was critical of many in the intellectual class who championed man-made 
‘ideologies’. Orwell was also a fierce critic of the Catholic intellectuals who colluded 
with the Catholic Church to advance their religious agenda.43 However it is his anti-
imperialism which is the strongest and consistent theme throughout his writings and 
the bulk of his efforts were dedicated to championing the emancipation of the 
formerly colonised world.  
 
British involvement in India was a central concern to him given his and his family’s 
personal experience with the British Imperialist forces in the country. His anti-
imperialist ideas are evident in both The Lion and the Unicorn and his introduction to 
Joyce Cary’s African Freedom where he demands a full and independent India free 
from British interference.44 Orwell lived the life he believed a responsible critic 
should live which meant always ‘facing power’ particularly when revealing its 
relationship with cruelty and force and ensuring his or her opinions are given without 
dilution particularly from the mass media.45  
 
Orwell believed that one should always ‘speak the truth’ and these efforts should be 
focused on the relationship between the dominated and dominator, and that one 
should never compromise oneself by associating with ‘ideological’ and ‘interest’ 
groups when doing so. Orwell’s ideas about the role of the intellectual and the 
                                                 
41 Havel, Disturbing the Peace, 167. 
42 Christopher Hitchens, Why Orwell Matters (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 5. 
43 Ibid. 
44 George Orwell, The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius (London: Secker and 
Warburg, 1962); Joyce Carey, African Freedom (London: Secker & Warburg, 1941), 1. 
45 Hitchens provides a good example of Orwell’s ‘power of facing’ where he constantly circumvented 
surveillance and interference during his time working at the BBC in India to disseminate ‘banned 
works and ideas’ like those which were critical of fascism. See Why Orwell Matters, 23-26. 
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constant anti-imperialism that pervaded his writings are made clear in his refusal to 
speak on the platform of the League for European Freedom at a meeting protesting 
Communist brutality in Yugoslavia.  
Certainly what is said on your platforms is more truthful than the lying 
propaganda to be found in most of the press, but I cannot associate myself 
with an essentially Conservative body which claims to defend democracy in 
Europe but has nothing to say about British imperialism. It seems to me that 
one can only denounce the crimes now being committed in Poland, Jugoslaiva 
etc. if one is equally insistent on ending Britain’s unwanted rule in India. I 
belong to the Left and must work inside it, much as I hate the Russian 
totalitarianism and its poisonous influence in this country.46 
  
Similar conceptualisations are offered by Emile Zola, Leszek Kolakowsi and Edward 
Said, who used his famous Reith Lectures in 1993 to remind us that the primary 
responsibility of the modern intellectual is ‘to speak the truth to power’.47 These 
scholars have also been labelled as belonging to a ‘Moralist’ tradition within a 
sociology of intellectuals and it is worth noting that critics of this tradition claim they 
offer a normative conception of intellectuals rather than one that is apparently 
‘empirically grounded’.48  
 
A third approach offered by Kurzman and Owens deals with scholars who understand 
‘intellectuals as class-bound’. To reiterate I believe we can also describe these 
intellectuals as ‘movement and group-bound’. This means their social class or interest 
group is the basis of their intellectual activity. When considering the role of the 
intellectual as a mediator, this approach advocates for mediations or representations 
of the social world by the intellectuals that serve or help advance the interests of a 
particular group or class. This can be understood as a political approach which often 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 29.  
47 For an understanding of the role of the ‘Dreyfusian intellectual’ during France in the 1890s including 
the prominent role played by Zola in organising the intellectuals see Lewis A. Coser, Men of Ideas: A 
Sociologists Views (New York: The Free Press, 1970), 215-225; Kolakowski, Marxism and Beyond; 
Said, Representations of the Intellectual, see chapter ‘Speaking Truth to Power,’85-102. 
48 Jerome Karabel advocates for a “realist’ tradition of intellectuals rooted in classical contemporary 
sociology. See Jerome Karabel, “Towards a theory of intellectuals and politics,” Theory and Society 25 
(1996): 205-207. 
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relies on truth claims inspired and motivated by partisan politics as opposed to more 
utopian ideals or ‘speaking truth to power’.  
 
This approach was pioneered by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci who argued that the 
role of intellectuals can only be understood by locating them within the class system 
of modern societies. Gramsci began his analysis by asking: “Are the intellectuals 
autonomous and independent social group, or does every social group have its own 
particular specialized category of intellectuals?49 Gramsci argued for the second 
option. According to him each social group creates with itself a set of organic 
intellectuals that provide the group with “homogeneity and an awareness of its 
function” in the political, social and economic fields.50 Intellectuals can be 
categorised as such when they use society’s ‘ideological’ apparatuses like the media 
and the education system to help promote their groups or class interests in an attempt 
to make their way of thinking the cultural norm. Gramsci’s key point was that 
intellectuals are not able to form their own class group but belong or work for other 
social classes.  
 
It is important to understand the political context in which Gramsci offered this 
conceptualisation. This was during a time when the Italian Communist Party was a 
major player in Italy and the Communist party in the USSR was dominating the 
international workers movements. Gramsci was himself a part of the Italian 
Communist Party whose concern for the welfare and wellbeing of those belonging to 
the lower and middle classes inspired and motivated him to act politically. Gramsci’s 
account of intellectuals can be understood as a call to the lower and middle classes to 
adopt activist roles in an attempt to revolutionise society with the ultimate aim of 
bettering their economic and social conditions. Scholars like William Domhoff who 
have adopted a Gramscian/Marxist approach, typically identify and criticise scholars 
they believe are representing and legitimating the interests of the upper classes and 
are inspired to maintaining the (capitalist) status quo.51  
 
  
                                                 
49 Antonio Gramsci, “Croce and Julien Benda,” (1932) in Further Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, trans. D. Boothman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 470. 
50 Ibid., 5. 
51 William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999).  
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Intellectuals and the Nation-State 
 
Kurzman and Owens identify three key questions in this ‘class and interest-based’ 
approach to understanding intellectuals that have helped advance it: “under what 
conditions do intellectuals aspire to organicity; what does it mean for an intellectual to 
be ‘organic’ in a community; and can intellectuals construct the community in which 
they claim to be organic?”52 The responses to these questions have been particularly 
pertinent for scholars dealing with nationalism. Whether or not intellectuals can 
construct the group to which they are said to have some kind of ‘organic’ connection 
has been key to scholars wanting to understand another and different kind of ‘organic’ 
connection namely that between intellectuals and their identity with and membership 
of nation-states.  
 
This scholarly debate is relevant to this study. I have already anticipated some of my 
argument by referring to the ways some intellectuals play in constructing ‘Imagined 
Communities’ and ‘Imagined Geographies’ when representing ‘Wahhabism’ in the 
previous chapter. As I discuss here, there is a long tradition of writers including Ron 
Eyerman, Eric Hobsbawn, Anthony Smith, Ronald Suny and Michael Kennedy, 
Benedict Anderson, Edward Said and Derek Gregory who claim that intellectuals 
often have a connection with particular communities and that they play key roles in 
helping to create these communities.53 This debate focuses on what inspires and 
motivates these intellectuals to act in this way and whether their constructing of 
particular spaces and communities has positive or negative implications for the 
situation on the ground.  
 
Building on the ideas of Gramsci, Eyerman claims that we can think of those helping 
to construct particular groups as ‘Movement Intellectuals’ because they are a part of a 
particular class or other social movement, group or intellectual tradition.54 However 
instead of groups producing their own intellectuals as Gramsci suggests, Eyerman 
maintains ‘Movement Intellectuals’ are producing ‘Organic groups’. This role of the 
                                                 
52 Kurzman and Owens, “The Sociology of Intellectuals,” 74. 
53 Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present (Blackwell, 2004); Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism: 
Smith, Theories of Nationalism; Suny and Kennedy eds., Intellectuals and the Articulation of the 
Nation; Anderson, Imagined Communities; Eyerman, Between Culture and Politics. 
54 Eyerman, Between Culture and Politics, 198. 
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intellectual has been central to scholarly debates about Nationalism. Eyerman is 
critical of intellectuals choosing to help create imagined groups claiming this allows 
them to project “their own needs and fantasies”—an important issue that we need to 
keep in mind when later considering neo-conservative, liberal and Marxist 
intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’.55   
 
Scholars like Anderson, Hobsbawm, Smith, and Suny and Kennedy have emphasised 
the roles intellectuals play as catalysts and agents central to the constitution of 
national ideologies and movements.56 Anderson argues nations are socially 
constructed communities ‘imagined’ by the people who think of themselves as part of 
that group. He writes “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face 
contact are imagined.”57 Imagined communities are not unreal by virtue of being 
‘imagined’ but constitute a network of socially consequential relationships with the 
same degree of reality as members of communities who enjoy face-to-face relations. 
We may not see everyone that is a part of our imagined community however our 
ability to communicate helps us to know they exist. Anderson points to the crucial 
role print media plays in creating these communities especially the first European 
nation-states.  
 
Many writers especially more traditionally inclined Marxists, have been hostile to the 
kinds of nationalism fostered by intellectuals in terms rendered by Anderson as 
‘Imagined communities’. They treat them as distractions that divert the lower and 
middle classes from understanding the real and true source of their subjugation and 
oppression. In spite of criticisms offered by authors like Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest 
Geller, Anderson does not see nationalism as a negative thing: he remarked “I am 
probably the only one writing about nationalism who doesn’t think it ugly.”58 
Anderson believes that there exists a ‘valuable’ utopian element in nationalism that 
helps give people meaning as it inspires comradeship and encourages feelings of 
belonging to a group much bigger than themselves. Unfortunately the reality is that 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Anderson, Imagined Communities; Suny and Kennedy, Intellectuals and the Articulation of the 
Nation; Smith, Theories of Nationalism; Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism. 
57 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.  
58 Interview with Benedict Anderson by Lorenz Khazaleh, trans. Matthew Whiting, University of Oslo. 
May 25, 2011. https://www.uio.no/english/research/interfaculty-research-
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any ‘utopian element’ is outweighed by its use as force to divide and encourage 
hatred and violence and between people. 
 
Edward Said’s ideas about ‘Imagined Geographies’ are similar to Anderson’s 
‘Imagined Communities’. Said uses this when referring to perceived spaces created 
by intellectuals through the use of particular images, texts and discourses.  Said’s 
ideas are based on his analysis of the ways in which the ‘West’ creates ‘Imagined 
Geographies’ of the Orient. He claims that Western culture’s modern understanding 
of the Orient is based on a selective imagination conjured up through intellectual 
representations including academic Oriental studies and travel writings. Said claims 
that intellectuals’ representations have feminised the Orient by portraying it as ‘open’ 
and ‘virgin’ space with no ability or concept of organised rule or government. Said 
saw the intellectuals’ ability to create these ‘Imagined Geographies’ as a powerful 
tool that can be used to one group i.e. ‘Western’ intellectuals to control and 
subordinate another group i.e. the ‘Orient’.  
 
Said’s ideas have inspired scholars like Derek Gregory who apply his theory to the 
modern post-9/11 political situation.59 Gregory claims that the ideas motivating and 
inspiring the ‘Western’-led Global War on Terror against ‘radical Islamists’ builds on 
the same ‘Imagined Geographies’ highlighted by Said. Aware of the ability of 
intellectuals’ representations to influence the policy and decision making processes, 
Gregory emphasises the crucial role intellectuals’ representations of particular spaces 
in the Middle East have played in the making of ‘Western’ foreign policy. This link 
between representing the problems and making of policy is a key point also 
emphasised by scholars like Carol Bacchi.60  
 
Gregory argues that ‘Western’ culture has a tendency to represent the Islamic world 
as ‘uncivilized,’ ‘backward’ and ‘failing’ and that this helps justify the recent Western 
military interventions in the Middle East especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. He 
criticises prominent ‘Western’ commentators like Huntington, Lewis and Zakaria 
(both Lewis and Zakaria are liberal intellectuals whose representations of 
‘Wahhabism’ I analyse in this study) for promoting Orientalist frames when writing 
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about international political space and he claims that the current ‘Western’-led Global 
War on Terror is a continuation of the European Colonisation process:  “what else is 
the war on terror other than the violent return of the colonial past, with its split 
geographies of “us” and “them,” “civilization” and “barbarism,” “Good” and 
“Evil”?61  
 
The works of Gregory, Anderson, Said and Eyerman are especially pertinent to this 
thesis given my interest in studying the relations between intellectuals’ 
representations of ‘Wahhabism’ (including their role in creating ‘Imagined 
Communities’ and ‘Imagined Geographies’) and the political, decision and policy 
making process. It must be noted that some scholars disagree about the flow of 
causality i.e. whether nationalist ideas are products of pre-existing communities with 
intellectuals playing the roles of midwives or whether intellectuals create and impose 
nationalist ideas reconfiguring communities. The roles intellectuals play in this 
process are pertinent to this study however issues regarding causality are not. Unlike 
many of those scholars engaging in this debate my view of how the world works is 
shaped in part by dialectics, a philosophy of internal relations and abstraction.  
 
Intellectuals clearly play an important role in constructing imagined communities and 
spaces. However it might be wise to avoid treating this as an issue needed to rest on a 
binary in which one element is required to ‘cause’ the other. Instead I recognise and 
appreciate the two are internally connected and therefore influencing each other. 
Rather than focusing on ‘measuring’ the impact these ideas have in concrete terms 
like scholars Adebayo Williams and Brindusa Palade have done, I propose to focus on 
the role intellectuals play in the process of representing ‘Wahhabism’ in the modern 
political world.62 This brings me to the vexed question of truth.  
  
                                                 
61 Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present, 11. 
62 Williams focuses on the situation in Nigeria arguing that intellectuals failed in their task to impose 
particular ideas onto the community. He claims they were instead co-opted by the state and joined the 
opposition pro-democracy movement. See Adebayo Williams, “Intellectuals and the crisis of 
democratization in Nigeria: towards a theory of postcolonial anomie,” Theory and Society  27, no.2 
(1998): 287– 307, http://www.jstor.org/stable/657869. 
Palade focuses on the situation in Romania arguing that intellectuals promoting of nationalism have 
helped the dominant Communist rule by suppressing opposition movements. See Brindusa Palade, 
“The Romanian utopia: The role of the intelligentsia in the communist implementation of a new human 
paradigm,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 3, no.2-3 (2007): 107-115, 
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Making Sense of Truth  
 
It was Julien Benda who argued strenuously that the intellectual’s essential role is to 
be a ‘servant of truth’. Benda argues that the intellectual’s allegiance must be to truth 
rather than to the interests of a particular class or group.63 Later Noam Chomsky 
joined Benda in his criticism of intellectuals who refused to ‘speak truth to power’ by 
favouring their material interests.64 But what do we mean exactly when we use this 
term ‘truth’? To what kind of ‘truth’ are these authors referring?   
 
It hardly needs saying that this question has been a major focus of many philosophers 
and scholars in the twentieth century and has inspired many ongoing discussions-
cum-controversies between contending schools of philosophy. Though it simplifies 
matters somewhat the case for a ‘realist’ ‘naturalist’ or ‘objectivist’ account of truth 
has been made by writers like Bertrand Russell, Alfred Jules Ayer, Rudolf Carnap, 
William P. Alston and Susan Haack in traditions like empiricism and logical 
positivism.65 Ranged against these traditions philosophers associated with 
pragmatism, critical theory, discourse theory and post-structuralism have made the 
case for a ‘constructivist’ ‘perspectivist’ and contingent account of truth. The 
arguments and controversies have involved writers like Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin 
Heidegger, Stephen Toulmin, Hannah Arendt, Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida and 
John Caputo.66   
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Since this is neither the time nor place to rehearse the often highly complex 
arguments made by these various antagonists, I want here only to briefly indicate the 
kinds of considerations that have influenced by account. These take off from 
observations made by both Toulmin and Caputo that we live in a time that has moved 
beyond a conception of truth framed in terms of timeless and universal propositions.67  
Caputo writes that truth is ‘perpetually on the go’ and that we are currently living in 
an age: 
… marked by modern transportation systems in which we can travel almost 
anywhere, and modern information systems, through which almost anything 
can travel to us, [now] is much more pluralistic than life in the past.68 
 
Caputo notes that travelling is a key part of our modern lifestyle and that when we 
travel we are able to experience many different views of reality. This new way of 
being and thinking has threatened our once cherished Modernist or Enlightenment 
ideas of truth. During that period in time we were committed to the idea there was one 
big story that explained all the world’s phenomena. The one big story was science and 
there are still many social scientists assume that we can use a natural scientific 
approach to measure, explain or predict social phenomena.  
 
The same ‘one big story’ idea was also pervasive in the age dominated by religious 
thought occurring immediately prior to the Enlightenment. During this period in 
history it was generally believed that all things could be understood in terms of God’s 
plan. Unfortunately and often dangerously there are still people who continue to think 
in this way today and who see our lives as a part of some divine plan for mankind. 
According to the standard Judeo-Christian interpretation this typically ends with the 
messiah returning to the earth and saving the ‘believers’. 
 
Caputo’s key point is that we now live in an age defined by multiple and competing 
interpretations of the world. However this does not mean we must go down the rabbit 
hole of the post-modern conception of truth where everybody’s conceptions of truth 
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are equally valid, where nothing can be confirmed or denied and where anything can 
be asserted in whatever style one chooses. This is tantamount to giving up on the idea 
of truth. Instead we must ‘save’ truth and we can do this by following a line of 
thought that started with Heidegger and was developed by two of his successors, 
Gadamer and Arendt.  
 
This is a tradition that can be traced back to the ideas of Martin Heidegger expressed 
in his seminal work Being and Time.69 Heidegger uses the concept Dasein to describe 
the process and responsibility man has for understanding and making sense of the 
world into which he has been ‘thrown’. The German word Dasein is usually 
translated as ‘existence’ though a more exact translation would be ‘being there’.70 
Heidegger uses this term to describe the specific human experience of being. 
Heidegger uses Dasein to help emphasise the responsibility we have as humans to be 
aware of and deal with a range of issues including our mortality and the dilemma of 
living in relationships with others whilst at the same time being alone with one’s self. 
It is a way of being that involves caring for the world in which one lives but at the 
same time remaining aware of the contingent element of that involvement, of the 
priority of the world to the self and the evolving nature of the self. Heidegger 
describes the opposite of Dasein as the forfeiting of meaning in favour of an escapist 
way of being.  
 
Heidegger’s ideas about ‘one’s own truth’ and making sense of one’s existence 
inspired Hans-George Gadamer’s formative work on prejudice. 71 Hans-George 
Gadamer takes a step back and identifies the existence of anticipatory structures that 
affect the way we come to know and understand the world. When it comes to 
‘knowing’ the German language distinguishes between the verbs kennen and wissen. 
Wissen implies the knowing of a fact whilst kennen implies knowing in the sense of 
being acquainted with and having a working knowledge of something.72 The terms 
are often used in the field of epistemology where it is useful when distinguishing 
between various settings of knowledge production and emphasises their contextual 
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aspects. Different fields of study are endowed with their own epistemic culture 
prescribing what is and what is not adequate knowledge and how this knowledge can 
be obtained. The knowing of a fact or wissen typically applies to the natural world 
which is ‘observer-independent’. Here we are concerned with kennen which deals 
with the social world and is ‘observer-dependent’ and which is influenced by our 
Vorurteile.  
 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic conception of knowledge holds that every act of 
understanding presupposes a pre-understanding, the elements of which are one's 
Vorurteile, prejudgments or prejudices. These “absolutely fundamental anticipations, 
that is, anticipations common to us all,” are what Gadamer calls “tradition”.73 This is 
an important point as we start to consider the Marxist, liberal and neo-conservative 
intellectual traditions. Our prejudices are affected by things like the context in which 
we are currently living, born into and raised or as Heidegger’s phrases it ‘the place in 
the world into which we are thrown’.  
 
There is a tendency for people to hear or read the word ‘prejudice’ and think of it in 
negative terms. One often thinks of racial or homophobic prejudice which are both 
certainly negative and hateful views. Rather than understanding all prejudices as bad 
Gadamer maintains that prejudices can also be understood as good things. It is 
Gadamer who is responsible for reviving the concept of prejudice recognising the fact 
there can be such things as legitimate prejudices.74 What this means is that some 
opinions can be true in that they speak to way things really are and some opinions are 
false because they do not describe how things really are.  
 
The key tasks when dealing with prejudices is not only to identifying them so as to 
understand the ways in which intellectuals for example make sense of the world 
which includes making and relying on particular truth claims, but to also consider 
what in those prejudices speaks to the way things really are and what do not. Gadamer 
writes that the fundamental epistemological question is not how can we remove 
prejudice or bias, a process that many social scientists mistakenly think can still be 
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done today, but rather to find answers to the question ‘what make makes prejudices 
legitimate?’ Or as Gadamer phrases it “What distinguishes legitimate prejudices from 
the countless others which it is the undeniable task of critical reason to overcome?”75  
This is precisely what Arendt recommends. She writes that this approach prohibits us 
from adopting a ‘rationalist method’ when seeking to then dispel these prejudices. We 
as ‘social scientists’ cannot develop ‘scientific methods’ aimed at ‘removing’ 
prejudice or bias from studies of phenomena in the social world because prejudice is 
an irremovable part of us. If we want to dispel these prejudices then we must find out 
and expose them for what they are which involves finding their Wahrheitsgehalt.76  
 
Arendt recognises that we have moved beyond the idea that there is a timeless eternal 
truth in the social world and that we now live in age of mass manipulation where even 
the role of factual truth is challenged. She points to Leon Trotsky’s erasing from the 
‘official’ Russian view of its recent history as a quintessential example of this 
manipulation: such was the fate “of a man by the name of Trotsky, who appears in 
none of the Soviet Russian history books,” comments Arendt.77 Despite this she 
maintains that we must still find a way of dealing with truth claims especially those 
that are religious and political in nature and which have the ability to influence the 
political and decision-making processes. She proposes that we shift our attention to 
the prejudices underscoring these truth claims. More specifically she recommends 
identifying and unpacking these prejudices with the aim of understanding what in 
them is true.78 
 
Conclusion 
 
One of my chief tasks in this research is to identify and unpack the prejudices 
influencing the ways in which intellectuals represent ‘Wahhabism’.  ‘Wahhabism’ is 
an ‘observer-dependent’ phenomenon given meaning by the intellectuals representing 
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it. If we are to take these representations seriously, and we must given they have the 
ability to inform public opinion and the policy and decision-making processes, then it 
is important to understand how and why these intellectuals have chosen to represent 
‘Wahhabism’ in particular ways. Additionally if we are going to make decisions and 
policies based on these kinds of representations then it is important that we make 
sense of the different kinds of truth claims that support them. It is important to 
understand whether these claims are erroneous, products of duplicity or delusion, or if 
they actually speak to the way things really are.
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Chapter Three 
On Method, Prejudice and Understanding the Social World 
 
Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the Shadow... 
 
T.S. Eliot, The Hollow Men 
 
The way intellectuals represent ‘Wahhabism’ is the fundamental focal point of my 
study. I have made a case in the previous chapters for why this is so. It is now 
incumbent on me to say how I propose to do this. A conventional approach would be 
to understand the relation between the phenomenon we choose to call ‘Wahhabism’ 
and the intellectuals representing by assuming that there is some kind of causal 
relationship between the reality of ‘Wahhabism’ and the way the representations are 
then constructed.  
 
Such an approach belongs to a philosophy of external relations which treats one thing 
as affecting another and which understands things as existing independently, as 
having a history and as having external communications with other things. It assumes 
an ‘observer-independent’ view of the social world and assumes we can somehow 
grasp, perhaps even ‘measure’, quantify or even provide causal and explanatory-
predictive accounts of the processes and relations in the social world. I was early 
persuaded by Bologh who is one of the many authors who offer a scathing critique of 
this naïve-realist and positivist view of the social world.  
[This approach] treats subjects and objects as separate and knowable in that 
separation, as if the sense of an object could be taken for granted as emanating 
from the object independently of any relation to the subject. In this way, the 
object as it is known, that is, the knowledge or meaning of the object, appears 
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to be natural and eternal rather than social and grounded in an historically 
specific form of life.1 
 
Though I was persuaded by this kind of critique about what I would not do, it was not 
clear what I would do or how I would do it. After a good deal of reading I came 
across several traditions of critical theory which seemed to provide both an approach 
and something like a method that was congruent with that approach. 
 
The results of that intellectual journey are outlined in this chapter in two parts. First I 
will describe something of the way I make sense of the world and more specifically 
how I understand and treat intellectuals and their representations of ‘Wahhabism’. 
This involves describing my dialectical approach. Because I was not so naïve as to 
think that we can enjoy some kind of unmediated access to the social world that is 
separate from human experience, I found that I was able to understand and appreciate 
Marx’s dialectical imagination.  
 
A dialectical imagination encourages us to think less about things and more about 
relations and processes that are constantly affecting each other and it emphasises the 
evolving nature of things. Dialectics encourages us to focus on how relationships 
arise, develop and fit into the larger context of which they are a part. It offers a much 
more complex and nuanced understanding of the social world which is sensitive to 
and aware of its relational nature. This approach has two key elements. These are the 
process of abstraction and the philosophy of internal relations.  
 
In the second part of the chapter I detail my epistemological assumptions outline and 
justify my use of a Critical Discourse Analysis paradigm. I describe the particular 
‘method’ I have chosen to use when deconstructing Marxist, liberal and neo-
conservative intellectual’s representations of ‘Wahhabism’. This involves focusing on 
a number of key features of language and discourse including the use of metaphors, 
similes, analogies and neologisms, as well as the structuring of accounts of violence.  
My ultimate aim is to show some of the key prejudices influencing the ways in which 
these intellectuals make sense of the world.  
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This analysis provides the information I require to then go about describing what in 
these prejudices is ‘true’ or ‘speaks to the way things really are’ and what does not. 
This allows me to help determine whether intellectuals are making duplicitous, 
erroneous, delusional or accurate claims about reality when representing 
‘Wahhabism’. This in turn helps me to understand the different kinds of roles these 
intellectuals have chosen to adopt i.e. are they ‘Movement Intellectuals’ promoting 
the interests of a particular group when representing ‘Wahhabism’ or did they see 
themselves as ‘unattached’, dedicated to highlighting injustices and wrongs and 
‘speaking truth to power’.  
 
Dialectics 
 
If one were to attempt to define in a single word the focus, so to speak, of the 
whole correspondence [between Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels], the central 
point at which the whole body of ideas expressed and discussed converges—
that word would be dialectics. The application of materialist dialectics to the 
reshaping of all political economy from its foundations up, its application to 
history, natural science, philosophy and to the policy and tactics of the 
working class—that was what interested Marx and Engels most of all, that was 
where they contributed what was most essential and new, and that was what 
constituted the masterly advance they made in the history of revolutionary 
thought.2 
V.I. Lenin, The Marx-Engels Correspondence, 1913. 
 
Bertell Ollman and Tony Smith point out that with such excellent press, one might 
think that dialectics would be well understood and that dialectical studies would be 
the norm rather than the exception. This however is clearly not the case. Ollman and 
Smith describe dialectics as a way of thinking and a set of related categories that 
captures the real changes and interactions happening in the social world. They say it 
offers a method for investigating social reality and presenting what we find to others 
many of whom do not adopt a dialectical imagination. Dialectics helps us to see and 
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analyse relations and processes of which we are a part as they have unfolded, are 
currently unfolding and have yet to unfold.3 
 
Ollman explains that the dialectical imagination takes the whole as a given. He points 
out the interconnections and changes that make up the whole are understood as 
inseparable from what anything is, internal to its being and essential to fully 
understanding it. We understand the world as consisting of processes in relations of 
mutual dependence rather than as existing of independent and ‘dead’ things. In the 
history of ideas this has been described as the ‘philosophy of internal relations’.4 
 
Ollman points out that the philosophy of internal relations can be traced as far back as 
the Greek philosopher Parmenides (515-460 BCE) whose ideas first came into 
prominence in the early modern period in the work of Spinoza (1632-1677). Spinoza 
grounded his philosophy on Aristotle’s definition of ‘substance’ and infused it with 
his own religious ideas. Spinoza understood the world as made up of transient things 
that were the sum of interrelations. He called this manifold system of interrelations 
constituting everything ‘God’. A century or so later Hegel dealt with the philosophy 
of internal relations. Ollman notes that the distinctiveness of Hegel’s treatment of this 
idea lies in the many means he used to keep our attention focused on the whole while 
also distinguishing between its parts. Hegel described things as ‘determinations,’ 
‘moments’ and ‘phenomena’, suggesting the impartial and unfinished nature of things 
whose full analysis requires that it be thought of as including much more than is 
immediately apparent.5  This is why I often choose to describe ‘Wahhabism’ as a 
‘phenomenon’ throughout this study.  
 
These ideas were again dealt with and further refined by Karl Marx who rejected 
Hegel’s claim that ideas somehow developed independently of man (Hegel called this 
the ‘Absolute Idea’). Rejecting the religious flavour that writers like Spinoza and 
Hegel had developed, which saw man as ultimately passive and at the will of a 
‘higher’ force, Marx emphasised the role played by man in the influencing and 
shaping of the world. According to Marx change becomes a matter of man 
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transforming his existence, he is not a passive observer of development as Hegel 
maintained rather he is the actor whose daily life brings about this change.6 This 
resonates with our understanding of ‘Wahhabism’ as ‘observer-dependent’ rather than 
‘observer-independent’ phenomenon. What we understand as ‘Wahhabism’ and the 
different elements we assign it are not changing by themselves or at the will of a 
higher force, rather it is how we choose to think and talk about it that makes it change.  
 
Key to the philosophy of internal relations is seeing the world as an interconnected 
whole rather than for example a conglomeration of loosely connected elements or 
things. No one thing can ever exist in isolation: rather everything in the social world 
is connected and in a constant state of flux. It because of this interconnectedness that 
changes in one element will result in changes in other elements. This helps us to 
understand the constant change in operational definitions and intellectual traditions as 
well as the phenomenon called ‘Wahhabism’ they are representing. For example 
contexts are constantly changing, people’s ideas and experiences and are also 
constantly changing and their understanding of the social world and phenomenon like 
‘Wahhabism’ in it are therefore also always in a constant state of flux.  
 
At this point we still do not really know anything specific about these relations. After 
assuming there exists a complex whole, the next step in dialectics is to abstract 
patterns in which most change and interaction occur. Seeing the world as composed 
of an infinite number of sense-perceptible qualities whose interdependence makes 
them a whole, it was Dietzgen who asked “Where do I begin and where do I stop?”7  
Unlike Marx I am not dealing with the entire social order dominated by the capitalist 
mode of production. My task is somewhat easier because I am dealing with 
intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’. Nonetheless ‘where do I begin and 
where do I stop’ or put another way ‘what elements do I choose to “abstract” for 
closer analysis’ is a question I need to deal with. 
 
The term ‘abstract’ which I borrow from Ollman who borrows it from Marx, comes 
from the Latin term abstrahere meaning ‘to pull from’: ‘to abstract’ is to extract or 
pull out. Abstraction can be used as both a verb (i.e. abstracting) and as a noun 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 42. 
7 Cited in Ibid.,45. 
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(abstraction). This technique is useful because it allows us to focus on a particular 
element or a few elements within a complex whole. Ollman points out that the 
abstracting process is one of six key successive and repeating moments in the 
dialectical approach.8  
 
First is the ‘ontological moment’ of having to deal with what the world really is, 
which as I have already described is understanding the world as an infinite number of 
mutually dependent processes that coalesce to form a totality. The second is the 
‘epistemological moment’ which concerns how we organise our thinking in order to 
understand this kind of world. This involves opting for a philosophy of internal 
relations and abstracting dominant patters where change interaction occurs. Third is 
the ‘moment of inquiry’ where one uses categories that convey these patterns of 
internal relations as aids to investigation. Four is the ‘moment of intellectual 
reconstruction’ where one puts together what has been found. Following is the 
‘moment of exposition’ which involves trying to describe the dialectical grasp of 
these ‘findings’ to an audience. Last is the ‘moment of praxis’ where one acts in the 
world, changing and testing what has been learnt which at the same times helps 
deepen one’s understanding of it.  
 
The ‘epistemological moment’ especially the abstraction process is a particularly 
useful technique in this study when it comes to constructing a Weberian ideal type for 
the Marxist, neo-conservative and liberal intellectual traditions and when focusing on 
particular rhetorical techniques intellectuals use when representing ‘Wahhabism’. As  
I point out, in the ‘moment of inquiry,’ the terms ‘Marxist,’ ‘neo-conservative,’ 
‘liberal’ and ‘Wahhabism’ can be understood as categories we can use to describe 
patterns of internal relations to help assist us in this study.  
 
However before I describe the ideal type in greater detail and highlight its relevance 
to this study, it is important to recognise the inherent fuzzy nature of these and all 
other categories. The idea of ‘fuzzy categories’ seems especially congruent with the 
dialectical tradition, and because of its association with the role played by metaphors, 
it is also congruent with the Critical Discourse Analytic tradition.  
                                                 
8Ollman, Dance of the Dialectic, 341. 
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On Fuzziness and Ideal Types  
 
Scholars studying the social world understand that humans always divide it into 
categories. Many of these categories have blurred edges and what Zadeh describes as 
‘grades of membership’.9 This is especially the case when dealing with concepts like 
‘Wahhabism’ in the field of social science. Many social science concepts are 
contestable precisely because they do not have an exact definition. In the field of 
mathematics Lotfi Zadeh’s classical set theory offers a way of handling categories 
that allow partial membership.10 Inspired by Zadeh’s work researchers like Charles 
Ragin have advocated the use of ‘fuzzy sets’ in fields like sociology and political 
science while Lakoff has pointed to the central and constitutive role played by 
metaphors in human language and thinking.11 
 
When we hear the term ‘fuzzy’ we tend to associate it with terms like ‘unclear’ and 
‘muddled’. It takes on a very different meaning when we think about ‘fuzzy set 
theory’ and ‘fuzzy categories’. Zadeh was amongst the first writers to use the term 
when using it to describe the ability of categorical types to refer to varying degrees of 
membership.12 A fuzzy set contrasts with a ‘conventional set’ where a thing is 
normally ‘in’ or ‘out’. This is comparable to a binary variable with two values. Unlike 
the conventional set, a ‘fuzzy set’ allows for membership between these two values.  
 
Fuzzy sets are particularly useful for imprecise and complex categories like those 
with which I am dealing in this study i.e. ‘Wahhabism,’ ‘neo-conservatism,’ 
‘Marxism’ and ‘liberalism’. As Ragin points out, ‘fuzzy sets’ give social scientists 
like me the ability to enliven, intensify and extend the dialogue between ideas and the 
information studied.  
In short, with fuzzy sets researchers can analyze evidence in ways that directly 
reflect their theoretical arguments…fuzzy sets have the potential to transform 
                                                 
9 Lotfi A. Zadeh, “Fuzzy Sets,” Information Control 8, no.3 (1965): 338.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Charles C Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Lakoff and 
Johnson, Metaphors we live by; Lakoff, “The Conceptual Metaphor,” 185-238. 
12 Zadeh, “Fuzzy Sets.”; Lotfi. A Zadeh, “A Fuzzy-Set-Theoretic Interpretation of Linguistic Hedges,” 
Journal of Cybernetics 2, no.3 (1972): 4-34, doi:10.1080/01969727208542910; Lotfi A. Zadeh, “A 
Note on Prototype Theory and Fuzzy Sets,” Cognition 12, no.3 (1982): 291-297, doi:10.1016/0010-
0277(82)90036-1 
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research that is oriented towards “discovery,” toward gaining new insights 
about the world.13 
 
Ragin describes a number of advantages when using fuzzy sets to study the social 
world.14 Chief among these is it encourages social science researchers to give up the 
idea of homogenising assumptions that typically underscore quantitative analyses of 
social phenomena. This is an idea that continues to motivate and inspire researchers 
stuck on the Enlightenment idea that there is a big (scientific) story that can explain 
all the happenings of the social world. Instead ‘fuzzy sets’ encourage researchers to 
focus on and appreciate diversity. They attend to heterogeneity and difference 
especially to differences in kind. They promote a configurational approach to 
analysing social phenomena meaning they encourage treating cases as specific 
configurations of aspects and features. This encourages the search for heterogeneity 
within given population, conceives of difference in terms of kinds and types of cases 
and allows for degrees of membership. As Ragin notes “Thus, the incorporation of 
fuzzy sets allows for ‘variation’ without forsaking the core emphasis on types and 
kinds of cases.”15  
 
For a better understanding of the differences between how ‘fuzzy set’ and the 
conventional approaches work we can refer to Ragin’s use of the concept 
‘Protestantism’.  Ragin writes  
Imagine that the conventional measure is based on a variety of indicators of 
Protestant behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs and that these different indicators 
strongly correlate with each other, justifying their combination into a single 
index of degree of Protestantism. Assume that this scale is both valid and 
reliable. But where on this scale is a full-fledged Protestant? Where on this 
scale is a full-fledged non-Protestant? Where on this scale is the cut-off value 
(or values) separating those who are more in the set of Protestants from those 
who are more in the set of non-Protestants?16 
 
                                                 
13 Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science, 2.  
14 Ibid., 5-7.  
15 Ibid., 5. 
16 Ibid,. 6-7. 
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To help answer these kinds of questions of who belongs, who does not and who 
partially belongs, Ragin would insist that the researcher possess and demonstrate 
substantive knowledge about each of three intellectual traditions I am dealing with, 
have a solid grasp of their theoretical relevance and provide some kind of index of 
each. “Without this infusion of theoretical and substantive knowledge the fine-grained 
measure of Protestantism remains vague and imprecise – uncalibrated.”17 I do 
precisely this when constructing the liberal, Marxist and neo-conservative categories. 
As Ragin notes it is my responsibility as the researcher to specify and justify my 
categorisation process and for Weber’s ideal type is an important tool I can use in this 
process.18  
 
Weber wrote that “an ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or 
more points of view” according to which “concrete individual phenomena … are 
arranged into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild).”19 He said that we can 
think of an ideal type as a “thought-picture” whose “conceptual purity…cannot be 
found empirically anywhere in reality.”20 Its purpose as pointed by Susan Hekman is 
to synthesise meaningful and characteristic aspects of individual phenomena in order 
to help explain the occurrence of social events.21  
 
While ideal types provide ‘thought-pictures’ against which a particular phenomenon 
may be compared that is not to say the particular phenomenon under investigation 
resembles the ideal type in every way. Weber understands social reality as more 
complex than any ideal type might be able to be used to investigate, meaning the ideal 
type can never totally resemble the object of investigation: “All knowledge of cultural 
reality ... is always knowledge from particular points of men?”22 An ideal type does 
not copy but instead ‘accentuates’ various features of a given social phenomenon for 
closer analysis.23  
 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 7. 
18 Ibid., 6. 
19 Max Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” in The Methodology of the 
Social Sciences, ed. and trans. E. A Shils and H. A. Finch (New York: The Free Press, 1949), 90. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Susan J. Hekman, “Weber’s Ideal Type: A Contemporary Reassessment,” Polity 16, no.1 (1983): 
121, doi:10.2307/3234525 
22 Weber, “‘Objectivity’” in Social Science and Social Policy,” 81. 
23 Ibid., 90-91.  
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The Weberian ‘ideal type’ is an extremely useful tool and makes the studying of 
social phenomena like intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’ a manageable 
task. However we must acknowledge the various limitations and implications 
associated with this approach. For example Weber highlights the role an individual’s 
prejudice plays in how he or she constructs the ideal type as well as the fact that all 
ideal types are necessarily ‘partial’ and ‘preliminary’. Weber writes   
Insofar as [an ideal type] traces a specific element of cultural life through the 
most diverse cultural contexts, it is making an historical interpretation from a 
specific point of view, and offering a partial picture, a preliminary 
contribution to a more complete historical knowledge of culture.24  
 
Following Weber, I appreciate the complexity of the social world and understand that 
we can only expect so much from the abstraction process. In this study that means I 
often only use a handful of key beliefs when it comes to identifying intellectuals as 
belonging to particular intellectual traditions. There are authors who provide long lists 
of different beliefs they believe characterise the neo-conservative, liberal and Marxist 
intellectual traditions. These lists can include many differences, however they also 
tend to feature a number of similar core beliefs and it is these that help form my ideal 
type. Compiling an extensive list of all these beliefs and then looking for traces for 
each of these in an intellectual’s representation of ‘Wahhabism’ is far too great a task. 
It is much more manageable and suitable to this kind of study to focus on or ‘abstract’ 
what are generally understood to be at this point in time the key beliefs for closer 
analysis. 
 
This process points to what Weber describes as the inevitable breakdown of every 
ideal type. While my ideal type may reflect the prevailing ideas at this point regarding 
what does and does constitute the core beliefs of the Marxist, liberal and neo-
conservative traditions, the evolving nature of things, the fuzzy nature of categories 
and a changing in context means these ideas are bound to change. Weber points out 
that every ideal type will eventually break down in the face of the infinite multitude 
that is social reality.25  
                                                 
24 Ibid., 66. 
25 Joshua Bennion Rust, “John Searle’s Ideal Type: Max Weber and the Construction of Social 
Reality,” (PhD dissertation, UC Riverside, 2005), 107, Proquest (UMI Number: 3168252). 
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The selecting of particular rhetorical techniques is also an act of abstraction that has 
its limitations. Intellectuals have a wide variety of rhetorical techniques available to 
them when representing ‘Wahhabism’. This can include everything from their 
ordering of words and sentences to framing and creating particular images for the 
reader. It is far too great a task to analyse all of these rhetorical techniques. To make 
this task more manageable we can focus on or ‘abstract’ a few of these. It is important 
to note that my selection of particular rhetorical techniques is a process influenced by 
my own prejudices and historical context, which we can call at this time an age of 
heightened anxiety created by the perceived threat of ‘Islamic terrorism’.   
 
My ‘moment of inquiry’ which involves using particular analytical techniques to 
deconstruct intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’ occurs within a specific 
research paradigm which carries with it its own epistemological assumptions. The 
paradigm I have chosen to use is a Critical Discourse Analysis. However before 
describing the analytical process it matters that we have an understanding of the 
assumptions and prejudices associated with this paradigm that is shaping or 
influencing my ‘moment of inquiry’. 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis: Language is Made in and Makes the World 
 
Like the scholars and intellectuals whose works I analyse, I necessarily make and rely 
on any number of epistemological assumptions when making sense of the social 
world. I am also cognisant of the fact that in order for my research to be both coherent 
and sound my assumptions about the theory of knowledge must align with my 
dialectical imagination. It is because of these reasons that I have chosen to draw on 
the Critical Discourse Analysis research paradigm. This kind of discursive approach 
goes beyond treating language as a mere mirror of a phenomenon existing ‘out there’ 
in the social world. Critical Discourse Analysis treats discourse as playing a major 
role in the constructing of ideas, social processes and phenomena that constitute the 
social world. 26 As James Paul Gee explains, this kind of approach recognises that 
“we fit our language to a situation or context that our language, in turn, helped to 
                                                 
26 Pirjo Nikander, “Constructionism and Discourse Analysis,” in Handbook of Constructionist 
Research, ed. James A. Hostein and Jaber F. Gubrium (New York: Guilford, 2008), 413. 
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create in the first place.”27 Put another way, Critical Discourse Analysis treats 
discourse as socially produced and socially constitutive.  
 
As Gee’s description suggests, this kind of approach perfectly aligns with a dialectical 
imagination. This is because a Critical Discourse Analysis paradigm appreciates the 
dialectical nature of language and because it treats language as a social practice. That 
is to say it appreciates that language is both made in and makes the world. Prominent 
discursive theorist Norman Fairclough also make this point, insisting that Critical 
Discourse Analysis understands discourse as having a dialectical relationship with 
social identities, social relationships and systems of knowledge and belief.28   
 
A Critical Discourse Analysis also provides the analytical framework necessary for 
exploring the relations between discursive practices which in this case is ‘text,’ events 
and social and cultural processes. This approach allows me to appreciate the role 
relations of power and struggles over the constructing of text i.e. it helps me to 
understand why different groups of intellectuals are assigning a different set of 
characteristics to the phenomenon ‘Wahhabism’ and why they are using the term 
‘Wahhabism’ in different ways. Critical Discourse Analysis appreciates the opaque 
nature of the relations between discourse and society and recognises these play 
integral roles in securing positions of influence and achieving hegemony. In 
describing these relations as ‘opaque’ I like Norman Fairclough am suggesting the 
links between discourse, ‘ideology’ and power are often unclear and that our social 
practices bounded to these relations are not always apparent. 29  
 
Like Fairclough I understand ‘ideology’ here to mean those “representations of 
aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintain relations of power, 
                                                 
27 James Paul Gee, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis (London: Routledge, 1999) , 1.1  
28 Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 64. 
29 See Norman Fairclough defines Critical Discourse Analysis as  
...discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of 
causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider 
social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, 
events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles 
over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and 
society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony.  
Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language  (Harlow: Longman, 
1995).,135. 
 89 
domination and exploitation.”30 In this sense we can understand intellectuals’ 
representations of ‘Wahhabism’ as sites of struggle between ‘Movement Intellectuals’ 
belonging to different intellectual traditions each of whom are trying to create and re-
create the social world in ways that often align and reflect their own interests. 
Representations of ‘Wahhabism’ can therefore be understood as a microcosm of a 
much bigger struggle between intellectuals with competing ‘ideologies’.  
 
My interest in how text is used by groups of people to promote particular 
‘ideological’ interests builds on a long tradition of scholarship that includes theorists 
like Said, Jørgensen, Phillips, Wodak and Meyer. Said for example, argues that 
discursive narratives help create ‘structures of feeling’ that support, elaborate and 
consolidate imperialistic interests. At the same he recognises that discursive narratives 
can also be used to challenge, resist and provide alternate ‘structures of feeling’.31 
Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips also highlight the ability of Critical 
Discourse Analysis to be used in the “struggle for radical social change.”32 Wodak 
agrees: 
For CDA, language is not powerful on its own – it gains power by the use 
powerful people make of it. This explains why CDA often chooses the 
perspective of those who suffer, and critically analyzes the language use of 
those in power, who are responsible for the existence of inequalities and who 
also have the means and the opportunity to improve conditions. In agreement 
with its Critical Theory predecessors, CDA emphasizes the need for 
interdisciplinary work in order to gain a proper understanding of how 
language functions in constituting and transmitting knowledge, in organizing 
social institutions or in exercising power.33  
 
An important point made by Wodak and Meyer is that we often fail to question or 
challenge the ideas endorsed by proponents of dominant ‘ideologies’. Rather than 
critiquing and challenging the representations of the social world these intellectuals 
                                                 
30 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse,218. 
31 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage, 1993), 14. 
32 Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, Discourse analysis as Theory and Method (London: Sage. 
2002), 64. 
33 Ruth Wodak, “Aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis,” http://userpages.uni-
koblenz.de/~diekmann/zfal/zfalarchiv/zfal36_1.pdf.  
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provide we often take them to be ‘common sense’.34 A Critical Discourse Analysis 
emphasises the importance of not taking these ideas at face value rather it advocates 
for a thorough critique and challenging of these dominant ideas which have the ability 
to influence things like public opinion and the policy and decision making processes.  
 
There is no one style of Critical Discourse Analysis approach that is applicable to all 
the kinds of research where ‘it’ might be applied. Rather it is best understood as a 
style of critical reading that allows for the use of many different kinds of techniques 
and approaches. Fairclough maintains that different kinds of approaches are 
acceptable as long as they satisfy three basic criteria.35 First there must be some kind 
of analysis of language. Second the researcher must explore the relation between the 
different ways in which language is used and the author’s belief system. Third the 
researcher must consider the relation between the author’s belief system and reality. 
My research questions have been designed with these conditions in mind. I shall now 
turn my attention to describing how I will go about meeting the first of these criteria.  
 
Abstracting Five Elements 
 
So many different elements can make up a representation of ‘Wahhabism’ and in a 
study like this it is impossible to consider all of these. The abstraction process makes 
this a manageable task as I am able to ‘abstract out’ particular elements for closer 
analysis. In this study I have chosen to focus on five different kinds of elements. They 
are the authors’ structuring of violent accounts and their use of metaphors, similes, 
neologisms and analogies. I shall now describe each of these in greater detail.  
 
Metaphors and similes are two of the most basic and fundamental elements I abstract 
from intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’ for closer analysis. Both are 
different kinds of analogies which play key roles in how we make sense of the world. 
This is a key point emphasised by Douglas Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sandel in 
Surfaces and Essences. Hofstadter and Sandel describe our ability to make analogies 
                                                 
34 Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, “Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and 
Methodology,” in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis ,2nd ed., eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael 
Meyer (London: Sage, 2009), 8. 
35 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse, 21-39. 
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as the “driving force behind all thought.”36 “Faced with a seething multitude of ill-
defined situations…our poor besieged brain is constantly grappling with this 
unpredictable chaos,” and our minds respond by constantly assimilating things we see 
and feel to mental categories constructed by long chains of previous analogies. 37 For 
example when we see a tree we recognise and identify it as a tree by ‘building a 
bridge’ of similarity between this new tree and the amassing of all trees we have seen 
before.  
 
Hofstadter and Sander show how “concepts designated by a single word are 
constantly having their boundaries extended by analogies.”38 They define a concept as 
“an abstract pattern in the brain that stands for some regular, recurrent aspect of the 
world and to which any number of words ... can be attached.”39 They use a boy’s 
(who they call ‘Tim’) understanding of ‘Mother’ as an example of how the boundaries 
of a concept can constantly change for an individual. They describe how Tim’s first 
understanding of this term is shaped by his own experiences with his mother. “But as 
new instances of the concept mommy are superimposed and start to blur in his 
memory, the mental mapping that Tim will automatically carry out…will start to be 
made…onto the nascent and growing concept of mommy.”40  
 
The important and pertinent point for this study Hofstadter and Sander are making is 
that our mind’s mental representing of a concept is always changing. Our 
understandings of the situations in which concepts are used are constantly blurring 
together and creating new mental structures, and it is analogies that are driving these 
changes. “It’s this idea of concepts extending themselves forever through a long series 
of spontaneous analogies.”41 This is important as we begin to consider how we make 
sense of the concept ‘Wahhabism’ and the role mediators like intellectuals play in this 
process.  
 
None of us can ever directly experience the concept ‘Wahhabism’. While we can grab 
and hold onto our Mothers like Tim does we cannot do the same for observer-
                                                 
36 Hofstadter and Sandel, Surfaces and Essences, 296. 
37 Ibid., 89. 
38 Ibid., 79. 
39 Ibid., 90. 
40 Ibid., 92.  
41 Ibid., 93 
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dependent phenomena like ‘Wahhabism’. We do however as Hofstadter and Sandel 
describe make sense of both things in our minds in the same way. What therefore 
becomes important are the messages our brains are receiving that are helping us to 
make sense of phenomena. When it comes to ‘Wahhabism’ many of those messages 
we are receiving are coming from intellectuals writing about it in places like 
magazines, in the blogosphere and in newspapers. As I describe earlier, and to again 
borrow ideas from authors like Gilles Deleuze and Thomas Osborne, we can 
understand these intellectuals as ‘mediators’ of ideas in todays ‘knowledge society’.42 
These intellectuals are also using particular rhetorical techniques with the aim of 
influencing our understanding of ‘Wahhabism’. This includes using analogies which 
as Hofstadter and Sandel point out play crucial roles in how we make sense of 
concepts.  
 
Again it is important to understand that intellectuals have a vast array of rhetorical 
techniques at their disposal. When it comes to using analogous language for example 
they can use things like exemplification, comparison and allegories when trying to 
influence our understanding of phenomena like ‘Wahhabism’. We can understand 
analogous language as a complex whole comprised of many different elements. Given 
the scope of this study analysing the entire whole is a daunting and unmanageable 
task. This task is however made possible by our ability to ‘abstract out’ particular 
elements for closer analysis. In this study I have chosen to focus on metaphors, 
similes and neologisms.  
 
A metaphor describes a subject by claiming it is the same as another unrelated object. 
The important roles they play in our cognition is emphasised by scholars like George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson.43 They describe how metaphors encourage us to 
understand one conceptual domain which they call the ‘target domain’ in terms of a 
dissimilar conceptual domain which they call the ‘source domain’. This activates a 
system of entailments that are understood as correspondences between selected 
elements of the two domains in metaphoric relation. The corresponding elements can 
                                                 
42 Deleuze, Negotiations; Thomas Osborne, “On mediators: intellectuals and the ideas trade in the 
knowledge society.” 
43 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors we live by. 
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be either entities or attributes that are common to the structure of both concepts and to 
the relational structure. We then use language to express these entailments.  
 
Here it is important to distinguish between the terms ‘metaphor’ and ‘metaphorical 
expression’ given I use the two terms throughout this study. Lakoff encourages us to 
use the term ‘metaphor’ to describe the cross-domain mapping that is happening in 
the conceptual system while ‘metaphorical expression’ is used to describe the surface 
realisation in the form linguistic expression of this cross-domain mapping.44 As we 
will see later liberal, Marxist and neo-conservative intellectuals draw on metaphors 
but they use metaphorical expressions in their writing.  
 
In her book The Myths We Live By Mary Midgley points out that metaphors play 
important roles in what she calls the ‘mythmaking process’.45 While the term is often 
understood as ‘a widely held false belief or idea,’ Midgley defines ‘myth’ as 
“…imaginative patterns, networks of powerful symbols that suggest particular ways 
of interpreting the world.” 46 ‘Myths’ help to both constitute our world and shape its 
meaning, and they play formative roles in the liberal, Marxist and neo-conservative 
traditions. This is because they provide them with the imaginative patterns they need 
to make sense of and impose order and meaning on the world.  
 
A good example is the myth held by many intellectuals in the Marxist tradition which 
holds that the purpose of mankind is to create a utopic society on earth that is 
Communist. There are a number of metaphors that are integral to this myth. As we 
will see there are many Marxist intellectuals that will draw on and use nature 
metaphors and metaphorical expressions to describe and represent the ‘natural 
processes’ of society moving towards the creation of a Communist state. A key 
element of this Communist myth is a society free from religion. Many Marxist 
intellectuals will therefore also draw on metaphors and use metaphorical expressions 
that represent the ‘unnaturalness’ of religion. I will describe these as well as some of 
the myths and metaphors integral to the liberal and neo-conservative traditions in 
more detail later.  
                                                 
44 Lakoff, “The Conceptual Metaphor,”185-238. 
45 Midgley, The Myths We Live By. 
46 Ibid.,1. 
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Similes are the second kind of analogous language I abstract from intellectuals’ 
representations of ‘Wahhabism’ for closer analysis. While metaphor asserts the 
identity of unlike things simile asserts the similarity of things.47 The standard view 
holds that simile is a figure of speech typically understood as an explicit comparison 
between things using the terms ‘like’ or ‘as’. 48 In contrast a metaphor makes implicit 
comparisons between things. The parallelism of simile means it is commonly 
understood as a paradigm of allegory.49 Allegory here is understood as an extended 
metaphor. Like metaphor, allegory has its origins in myths and it continues to play an 
integral role in mythmaking today.50  
 
Metaphors and similes use different sentence patterns, as Shibata and others explain 
“a metaphor is a ﬁgurative statement expressed by means of a copula sentence (An X 
is a Y) whereas a simile is a ﬁgurative statement using a hedge word such as ‘‘like’’ 
or ‘‘as’’ (An X is like a Y).”51 However the traditional view holds that they express 
almost the same figurative meaning and that a metaphor can be paraphrased as a 
simile.52 It was Aristotle who wrote “The Simile is also a metaphor, the difference is 
but slight.”53 This approach understands metaphors as abbreviated similes, for 
example “the ‘Wahhabi’ is a savage” is treated as an abbreviation of “the ‘Wahhabi’ 
is like a savage.” 
 
Recent psycholinguistic studies have however shown that similes and metaphors are 
much different than what we have traditionally thought. It has been pointed out that 
both promote different comprehension processes in the human brain suggesting that 
metaphors are not in fact abbreviated similes.54 Glucksberg and Keysar are 
proponents of this view, which has been called the ‘class-inclusion model,’ maintain 
                                                 
47 S.v.Simile, in The Cambridge Guide to Literature in English (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 1028, 
http://search.credoreference.com.ezproxy.lib.rmit.edu.au/content/entry/cupliteng/simile/0. 
48 George A. Miller, “Images and Models, Simile and Metaphors,” Metaphor and Thought, ed. 
Anthony Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
49 H. Smith Richmond and J.V. Brogan, “Simile”, in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
50 S.v.Allegory, The Cambridge Guide to Literature in English (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). 
51 Midori Shibata et al,, “Does simile comprehension differ from metaphor comprehension? A 
functional MRI study,” Brain and Language 121, no.3 (2012), 254, doi:10:1016/j.bandl.2012.03.006. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. W. R. Roberts (New York: Modern Library, 1954) cited in Midori Shibata 
“Does simile comprehension differ from metaphor comprehension?,” 254. 
54 Midori Shibata, “Does simile comprehension differ from metaphor comprehension?” 
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that simile is best understood as a process of comparison using explicit marks and 
metaphor is best understood as a categorisation process.55 They write 
In the sentence ‘‘My lawyer is like a shark’’, ‘‘shark’’ refers to the marine 
creature, whereas in the sentence ‘‘My lawyer is a shark’’, ‘‘shark’’does not 
refer to the literal creature. In the latter case, the lawyer is categorized as a 
predator, and the shark is used to represent predators. Thus, the class-inclusion 
model argues that the comprehension processes used in understanding 
metaphor and simile differ.56 
 
Further differences in how our brains make sense of metaphors and similes are also 
highlighted in studies conducted by Dan L. Chiappe and his colleagues.57 It is now 
widely accepted that the two play distinct roles in the rhetorical, mythmaking and 
cognitive processes. The implication for this study is that I should and am justified in 
adopting a more nuanced approach that treats the two as different elements and which 
recognises the important role both play in influencing how our brains make sense of 
all the information we are constantly bombarded with.  
  
While similes and metaphors are both different kinds of analogous language I focus 
on, I have also chosen to look at what is more broadly and commonly understood as 
analogy. I understand an analogy as a comparison between two objects or systems of 
objects that highlight respects in which they are thought to be similar.58 It follows that 
I understand an analogous argument as a logical argument where the user 
demonstrates how things are alike by pointing out shared characteristics with the aim 
of showing that if things are alike in some ways then they can be alike in other ways 
as well.  
 
                                                 
55 Sam Glucksberg, “The psycholinguistics of metaphor,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2003), 92-
96; Sam Glucksberg and Boaz Keysar, “Understanding metaphorical comparisons: 
Beyond similarity,” Psychological Review 97 (1990), 3–18. 
56 Ibid., 254 
57 See D. L. Chiappe and J. M. Kennedy, “Are metaphors elliptical similes?” Journal of 
Psycholinguistic Research 29, no.4 (2000), 371–398; D. L. Chiappe and J. M. Kennedy, Literal bases 
for metaphor and simile,” Metaphor and Symbol 16, no.3 (2001), 249–276; D. L. Chiappe, J. M. D. 
Kennedy and T. Smykowski, “Reversibility, aptness, and the conventionality of metaphors and 
similes,” Metaphor and Symbol 18, no.2, (2003), 85–105. 
58 Paul Bartha, “Analogy and Analogical Reasoning,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta (2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/reasoning-analogy/. 
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Neologisms are the final element in the intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’ 
I abstract for closer analysis. In Fifty Years Among the New Words, John Algeo writes  
A community is known by the language it keeps, and its words chronicle the 
times. Every aspect of the life of a people is reflected in the words they use to 
talk about themselves and the world around them. As their world changes - 
through invention, discovery, revolution, evolution or personal transformation 
- so does their language. Like the growth rings of a tree, our vocabulary bears 
witness to our past.59 
 
Algeo highlighted the way that vocabulary is a major indicator when tracking changes 
in culture and language and that new words or neologisms are useful tools for 
understanding how culture is evolving. He is commenting on our experiencing of 
great shifts in how we live and how we talk about the world. We are always 
introducing new words into our lexicon to describe new concepts and at the same time 
old words are continually falling out of use as we assign them less cultural 
significance.  
 
‘Neologism’ is the name we give these newly coined words, terms or phrases that are 
not yet prevalent in mainstream language. The word comes from the greek néo- 
meaning ‘new’ and logos meaning ‘speech or utterance’. David Crystal, John Ayto, 
John Algeo and Adele Algeo all offer similar descriptions regarding the formation of 
neologisms.60 These descriptions include the creating, borrowing, combining, 
shortening, blending and shifting of words. We can see some of these processes at 
work when we look at neologisms like ‘Islamofascism’ which is the combining of the 
words ‘Islam’ and ‘fascism,’ and the adding of an ‘o’. 
 
Neologisms like ‘Islamofascism’ encourage a new interpretation or understanding of 
something and are often attributable to a particular person, period or event. This term 
                                                 
59 John Algeo and Adele Algeo, Fifty Years Among the New Words: A Dictionary of neologisms 1941-
1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1.  
60 John Algeo, “Vocabulary,” in The Cambridge history of the English language, vol.4, ed. R. M. 
Hogg, S. Romaine, R. W. Burchfield & N. F. Blake (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); 
John Algeo, “Where do all the new words come from?” American Speech 55, no.4 (1980), 264-277; 
David Crystal, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the English language, 2nd ed. (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2003); John Ayto, Twentieth Century Words (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). 
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for example, which I will later describe in greater detail when analysing the neo-
conservative intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism,’ was first used in 1990 by 
Scottish writer Malise Ruthven in the Independent newspaper.61 He used it to describe 
the way in which traditional Arab dictatorship used religious appeals in order to stay 
in positions of power. Since then prominent intellectuals like Christopher Hitchens 
have used it when describing “fascism with an Islamic face.”62 As we will soon see 
neo-conservative intellectuals like Frank Gaffney Jnr. have recently used it when 
describing ‘Wahhabism’ with the aim of likening the twentieth century European 
fascist movements with this particular interpretation of Islam.63  
 
It should be acknowledged that different fields of study treat neologisms in different 
ways. What is particularly interesting is how the field of psychiatry for example has 
traditionally understood neologisms. If we refer to The American Heritage Medical 
Dictionary we can see that it has traditionally understood neologisms as newly coined 
words whose meaning may be known only to the patient using it. Because of this it 
has often been viewed as a symptom of psychosis.64 This is interesting as we start to 
consider that the using of neologisms when representing ‘Wahhabism’ is a practice 
largely confined to neo-conservative intellectuals. Remembering it is the neo-
conservatives especially those holding influential positions in the recent Bush 
Administration who are largely responsible for both constructing the largely 
phantasmic ‘radical Islamist’ threat and for initiating and supporting the Global War 
on Terror. There are many who would see these acts as related to psychopathic or 
psychotic disorders.65 This assessment is given further weight when we consider the 
religious and political beliefs held by many in the neo-conservative intellectual 
tradition. I will explore what can be best described as the ‘delusional’ aspects of this 
belief system in greater detail later on.  
                                                 
61 Christopher Hitchens, “Defending Islamofascism,” Slate, October 22 2007, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2007/10/defending_islamofascism.ht
ml. 
62 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
63 Gaffney, “Seeing the threat for what it is.”  
64 “Neologism,” The American Heritage Medical Dictionary (Boston: Houghton Miffin, 2007). 
65 As I explained in the literature review, Stephen Schwarz strongly adheres to Sufism and can 
therefore be understood as suffering from a religious delusion. Both Clifford May and Frank Gaffney 
Jnr are neo-conservative intellectuals intent on causing destruction and are also influenced by delusions 
beliefs (sometimes religious in nature) about how the world works. I will discuss this in greater detail 
in the chapters dedicated to analysing and making sense of the neo-conservative intellectuals’ 
representations of ‘Wahhabism’.  
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Finally Cerulo’s Deciphering Violence is a detailed study focusing on the different 
ways authors, reporters and artists depict violent acts and how audiences respond to 
these violent representations.66 She finds that these mediators initially interpret the 
violent act they plan to represent as either ‘normal,’ ‘deviant,’ or ‘ambiguous’. On the 
basis of this moral judgement the writers then choose from a number of possibilities 
when representing the violent act to their audience. These possibilities include things 
like assigning particular characteristics to the perpetrator i.e. ‘in’ vs. ‘out-group’ 
status, having ‘instrumental aims,’ and a ‘clear intention,’ representing the nature of 
the violent act i.e. representing physical or non-physical acts of violence, and 
assigning the victim of violence particular characteristics i.e. emphasising their 
gender.  
 
These different representations are aimed at arousing specific emotional reactions in 
the audience, encouraging them to make moral judgements about the violent 
perpetrator. Cerulo finds the audience typically reacts in one of two ways, either they 
interpret the violent act as justifiable, legitimate and warranted or they understand it 
as unjustifiable, illegitimate and unwarranted. For example an author’s representing a 
violent perpetrator as having ‘instrumental aims’ or a ‘clear presence of intention’ 
generally arouses negative emotions in the audience and they tend to see these violent 
acts as unjustifiable. On the other hand violent perpetrators represented as using 
violence ‘in the spirit of the community’ meaning to protect or ‘benefit others’ in the 
community is likely to be viewed by the audience as warranted and justified.  
 
Conclusion 
 
I have dedicated this chapter to describing some of the ways I make sense of the 
social world and have approached doing my research. Key here is my dialectical 
imagination which includes a philosophy of internal relations and the process of 
abstraction. These help make the study of intellectuals’ representations of 
‘Wahhabism’ a manageable task whilst also encouraging me to understand the 
different elements involved as processes and relations that are in a constant state of 
flux and which are continually affecting each other. I have also emphasised the key 
                                                 
66 Cerulo, Deciphering Violence.  
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role language plays in the making of reality. This is especially important when I 
consider that ‘Wahhabism’ is an ‘observer-dependent’ phenomenon whose meaning 
differs depending on the intellectual (who has his or her own political aims, interests 
and prejudices) representing it. A Critical Discourse Analysis helps capture the 
dialectical nature of language recognising that it both makes and is made in the social 
world. While an intellectuals’ representation of ‘Wahhabism’ is made of many 
elements I have chosen to focus on the five particular elements, the structuring of 
violent accounts, metaphors, similes, analogies and neologisms. Now that I have 
clearly outlined how I will go about deconstructing different intellectuals’ 
representations of ‘Wahhabism’ and the different prejudices influencing this process, 
I will now turn my attention to deconstructing how the first group of intellectuals, the 
political liberals, have chosen to represent ‘Wahhabism’. 
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Chapter Four 
Spreading the ‘Rule of Reason’: Liberal Imaginings of ‘Wahhabism’ 
 
…  total liberty for wolves is death to the lambs  … 
Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of the Ideal.  
 
Intellectuals writing about ‘Wahhabism’ in newspapers, magazines and online media 
are exposing their readers to a particular kind of interpretation or representation. As 
Bacchi’s work illustrates, these intellectuals are representing a ‘problem’ or a social 
phenomena in a particular way.1 There are some elements they choose to emphasise, 
others to de-emphasise and others they chose to ignore altogether. Many of us reading 
these representations are like novices gazing at Claude Monet’s famous painting Snow 
at Argentuil. We look at this picture and we see snow blanketing a town. What many 
of us with untrained eyes fail to see and appreciate are the green, yellow, red and dark 
blue strokes Monet has chosen for us. 
 
I am not suggesting that any of the intellectual’s representations of ‘Wahhabism’ I 
deconstruct are masterpieces constructed with the same brilliance. What I am 
suggesting is these representations are particular kinds of artistic constructions whose 
many elements may not be clear to see on first appearances. Sometimes these 
creations require closer analysis by a trained eye in order to help highlight and 
describe the many different elements for the audience. Like the critique d’art who 
makes his living providing tours of the gallery my job is to highlight and describe or 
‘abstract’ some of the many different elements that comprise an intellectual’s 
representation of ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
The first step on my tour is a representation of ‘Wahhabism’ provided by the liberal 
intellectual Maureen Dowd.2 She writes  
                                                 
1 Bacchi, What’s the Problem Represented to Be?  
2 Maureen Dowd, “Loosey Goosey Saudi,” New York Times, March 2, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/03/opinion/03dowd.html?_r=0 
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The word progressive, of course, is highly relative when it comes to Saudi 
Arabia. (Wahhabism, anyone?) But after spending 10 days here, I can confirm 
that, at their own galactically glacial pace, they are chipping away at gender 
apartheid and cultural repression [Emphasis added]. 
 
Dowd is making an important point that is pertinent to the ways in which many liberal 
intellectuals represent ‘Wahhabism’, namely that ‘Wahhabism’ which is understood 
to be the official doctrine of Saudi Arabia, violates the freedoms of men and women. 
Liberals like Dowd hold a particular view of freedom that they believe we are all 
entitled to. While we can understand Dowd as belonging to the liberal tradition, she is 
also an individual influenced by her own life experiences, interests and prejudices.  
Here she chooses to focus on two particular kinds of freedoms, those associated with 
women and culture, which she believes ‘Wahhabism’ as practiced in Saudi Arabia is 
responsible for violating.   
 
An intellectual of any persuasion can be presumed to be wanting to make claims that 
speaks to the way things are. Yet these claims cannot help but be made by relying on 
the conventional resources found in any language like metaphors, analogies and 
similes that are used to convince an audience about the ‘true’ nature of ‘Wahhabism’. 
Liberal intellectuals have the ability to choose from a wide variety of techniques when 
representing ‘Wahhabism’ to their audience and as I have said, I am focusing my 
attention on five particular elements. In this extract we can see Dowd’s use of two of 
these namely the use of metaphor and neologisms.  
 
When using the neologism ‘gender apartheid’ Dowd is referring to a particular 
political system using different kinds of practices i.e. physical and legal aimed at 
relegating women to subordinate positions (relative to men) in society. Throughout 
this study I will show many instances when liberal, neo-conservative and Marxist 
intellectuals use particular language devices that can serve to disclose the world as it 
is or that promote erroneous, duplicitous or delusional claims about reality. It is not 
my intent here to subject every account to some kind of truth testing. On this occasion 
we can note that Dowd is relying on any number of human rights organisations 
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reporting on the current situation in Saudi Arabia that draws attention to the plight of 
Saudi women to inform her reference to ‘gender apartheid’.3  
 
It is noteworthy that Dowd chooses to use the neologism ‘gender apartheid’ when 
describing the current situation. ‘Gender apartheid’ is a much more powerful phrase 
than for example ‘gender discrimination’ or ‘sexism’. Writers use neologisms to 
encourage us to view particular situations or events in certain ways. This neologism 
derives much of its power from its likening of the situation of Saudi women living 
according to ‘Wahhabi’ religious doctrine to South Africa’s racial apartheid which 
instituted a system of white supremacy subordinating the nation’s majority black 
population. The implication is that gender inequality in modern ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi 
Arabia is as horrible and worthy of the same condemnation as the institutionalised 
racism in South Africa throughout the mid to late twentieth century. 
 
The salience of this is arguably reinforced by investigations into the current Saudi 
laws regarding guardianship which according to a report by Amnesty International 
“subordinates women’s autonomy to the authority of male guardians” and the ‘rights’ 
or rather the lack thereof of women abused by their partners or male relatives.4 On the 
question of whether we can blame this phenomenon on what she calls ‘Wahhabism’, 
it may be more accurate to say that Saudi men are responsible for the ways in which 
they treat women and that ‘Wahhabism’ acts as a religious legitimation for these 
practices.  
 
Metaphorical expression is the second pertinent rhetorical technique that Dowd uses 
and which I highlight in the excerpt above. Dowd uses the metaphorical expressions 
“galactically glacial pace” and “chipping away” when representing the ‘progress’ 
currently taking place in ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia. Both can be understood as 
‘Progress is Movement’ metaphors used to represent the slow, incremental and 
‘positive’ changes taking place in ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabian society. This is a popular 
                                                 
3 “Saudi Arabia: Threats and cyber attack will not deter women from driving,” Amnesty International, 
October 23, 2013, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/saudi-arabia-threats-and-cyber-attack-will-not-
deter-women-driving-2013-10-25 
4 “Document – Saudi Arabia: Women Activists’ Sentences Confirmed,” Amnesty International, 
October, 4, 2013, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE23/031/2013/en/0b3210fd-bc5a-4e59-
b770-9a5c92b250d1/mde230312013en.html 
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metaphor amongst liberal intellectuals representing ‘Wahhabism’ that I will also 
explore in greater detail later.  
 
This metaphor considers ‘forwards movement’ to be indicative of social progress and 
treats ‘backwards movement’ as indicative of societal regression. The metaphorical 
expression “Galactically glacial pace” draws on the extreme slowness in which a 
glacier moves while ‘chipping away’ is often used when describing a process where 
smaller parts are gradually removed from a bigger and usually solid whole i.e. the 
woodchipper uses his axe to ‘chip away’ at the tree trunk. In both instances Dowd 
represents this slow and incremental change as a positive thing for Saudi society. 
Dowd is making the point ‘Wahhabism’ is a force that must and will be slowly 
overcome and that there are positive signs that things are ‘progressing/ ‘heading in the 
right direction’. This metaphor also has strong ‘nature’ elements, which as I will 
describe later is also a key feature of how liberals make sense of and represent 
‘Wahhabism’.  
 
At this point the reader may well ask, how do I know that Dowd is a liberal and what 
does it mean anyway to say that someone is a liberal? As I want to indicate initially 
there is no easy answer to these questions.  
 
Understanding Liberalism: Many freedoms?  
 
Jeffrey Lustig famously wrote “There are many rooms in the liberal mansion.”5 This 
is an apt metaphor when describing the many themes and approaches that make up the 
liberal tradition. ‘Liberalism’ is an umbrella term we use to describe a range of 
approaches and because it is a fuzzy category it has no clearly definable boundaries. 
Nonetheless for the purposes of this study we need some understanding of what we 
understand liberalism to be, that is to say we need an ‘ideal type’ that not only helps 
to identify a liberal intellectual who is representing ‘Wahhabism’ but which also helps 
us to ‘abstract’ particular elements from their representations for closer analysis. 
What can be said is that there are certain themes like a preoccupation with freedom or 
liberty that marks out the mansion with many rooms. Ideas about freedom are central 
                                                 
5 R. Jeffrey Lustig, Corporate Liberalism: The Origins of Modern American Political Theory, 1890-
1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 6. 
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to Dowd’s representing of ‘Wahhabism’ and they form a key part of ‘ideal type’ for 
the Liberal intellectual tradition can be traced back to the twentieth century to the 
liberal theorist Isaiah Berlin.  
 
Berlin was very interested in what we as individuals value and how we get along with 
others who hold different values. In his seminal essay Two Concepts of Liberty he 
writes that we as individuals can hold many values we consider to be genuine 
however many of these may be incompatible with each other producing an internal 
conflict. This conflict can also occur between groups of people with conflicting 
commitments to values. While he understands this conflict to be the great tragedy of 
human life, Berlin recognises this conflict is “an intrinsic, irremovable element in 
human life.”6 “These collisions of values” writes Berlin, “are of the essence of what 
they are and what we are.”7 A world where these conflicts are easily resolved writes 
Berlin is not one we know nor understand.8 
 
These ideas are a part of what we call the doctrine of value pluralism. Berlin is a key 
figure in the political liberal tradition and these ideas provide us with insight into 
some of the key ideas the modern liberal intellectual tradition is founded on and 
which continue to influence many liberals. That said it is also important to point out 
that the political liberal tradition to which I refer is a particular kind of tradition that is 
at odds with more idealist and rationalist kinds of liberalism. The important point 
Berlin is making is that the idea of the perfect whole or an ultimate solution is 
practically unattainable and conceptually incoherent, a position some who promote a 
more idealist and rationalist kind of liberalism would have trouble accepting.  
The notion of the perfect whole, the ultimate solution, in which all good things 
coexist, seems to me to be not merely unattainable that is a truism but 
conceptually incoherent; I do not know what is meant by a harmony of this 
kind.  Some among the Great Goods cannot live together.  That is a conceptual 
                                                 
6 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1958), https://www.wiso.uni-
hamburg.de/fileadmin/wiso_vwl/johannes/Ankuendigungen/Berlin_twoconceptsofliberty.pdf, 29. 
7 Cited in Joshua Cherniss and Henry Hard, “Isaiah Berlin,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2014), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/berlin/ 
8 Ibid. 
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truth.  We are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable 
loss.9 
 
Overcoming these internal and external conflicts between values demands a 
transformation tantamount to abandoning those same values. According to Berlin this 
is not something that will never happen in this world.  
 
Given we can never reconcile our internal conflict much less that between different 
groups of people who are also holders of different values, liberals are faced with 
important questions like ‘to which values do we give priority for the purposes of 
creating a functional society?’ Unable or unwilling to abandon our own values that we 
hold dear Berlin emphasises the inescapable need to choose between different kinds 
of values.10 Berlin’s value pluralism holds that in most cases there are no clearly right 
and wrong answers when making this decision.11 This is why Berlin and many liberal 
intellectuals inspired by his ideas emphasise the importance of liberty. Because this 
conflict between values which implies different ways of living is unavoidable, it is 
essential that the individual has the freedom to make his or her own decision within 
reason about whom they will be and what they choose to do with their time on this 
earth.  
 
This freedom to choose is a core part of the political liberal tradition and as we will 
see it plays a major role in influencing the ways in which liberal intellectuals 
represent ‘Wahhabism’. This focusing on freedom is certainly a commendable idea 
many would support. However there is a fundamental problem in the political liberal 
tradition that is unavoidable and which one can only assume modern liberal 
intellectuals are either ignorant of or deliberately choose to ignore so as to remain 
content in their delusion. The glaring problem I am referring to is the paradoxical 
belief that freedom of choice must take place within a specific kind of state.  
Liberals believe the modern secular liberal democratic state provides the best 
framework in which this choosing of values can take place. However if we are to truly 
enjoy and exercise our a priori liberty, our freedom to choose, then surely we should 
                                                 
9 Isaiah Berlin, “The Pursuit of the Ideal,” in The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the 
History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (New York: Knopf, 1991),13. 
10 Cherniss and Hard, “Isaiah Berlin.” 
11 Ibid. 
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be able to choose what kind of state we want to live in? This seemingly obvious 
internal contradiction which says ‘we will choose the kind of state in which we all 
will live in and you can within reason choose how you want to live’ has not deterred 
liberal intellectuals from promoting this ‘ideological’ (as Bernard Crick uses the term) 
belief system.  
 
This internal contradiction has wider implications meaning many liberals are left 
struggling with a variety of other issues pertinent to the governing of any modern 
secular liberal democratic state. While it is beyond the scope of this study to detail all 
these issues, I would like to quickly focus our attention on one of the major issues I 
believe is pertinent to modern liberal intellectuals representing ‘Wahhabism’ in an age 
of heightened anxiety due to the perceived threat of ‘radical Islam’. The problem is 
when totalitarian or fascist movements, groups or parties use the freedoms afforded to 
them by the modern liberal democratic state to then impose non-democratic systems 
of government.  
 
A recent example of this occurred during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ with the election 
of the Egyptian faction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Prior to their election, 
Egypt had what one could reasonably call a liberal democratic system of government. 
This system certainly afforded its people the right to elect representatives responsible 
for governing a country of just over 80 million people. In 2012 the Egyptian people 
elected Mohamed Morsi’s Brotherhood in spite of its long and demonstrated 
commitment to ‘Islamist’ ideals. In conjunction with other ‘ultra-conservative’ 
‘Islamist’ parties like the Salafist Nour, Morsi’s government then began implementing 
‘non-democratic’ reforms i.e. making changes to the constitution that gave him far-
reaching powers a la Hitler and Mussolini’s totalitarian and fascist regimes, aimed at 
strengthening and maintain its positions of power.12 The important point I am making 
is that this ‘Islamist’ political party with the support of other parties who valued a 
particular interpretation of Islam over key liberal democratic ideals, was able to use 
the political liberal state against itself. The events in Egypt since 2012 i.e. the military 
                                                 
12 For a basic understanding of some of the changes implemented by Morsi’s government, collusion 
between his party and other ‘ultra-conservative’ Islamist parties and some of the implications of these 
actions see “Profile: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” BBC News: Middle East, December 25, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12313405. 
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coup and summary executions of Muslim Brotherhood members, have been nothing 
short of disastrous.  
 
Another major problem worth mentioning is the relation between modern liberal 
democratic regimes and imperialism. John Gray is among those to point out that 
‘modern liberal’ regimes like the US have invaded sovereign nations using the 
justification they are ‘spreading democracy and freedoms’.13 While the US and its 
coalition of allies maintain their ‘interventions’ aim to replace oppressive regimes in 
places like Afghanistan and Iraq with ‘democratic regimes’ entrusted with the 
responsibility of safeguarding its people’s liberties, the reality is that we now have 
situations in Iraq and Afghanistan that are arguably much worse for their people than 
before “‘Western’ intervention.” 
 
 Gray claims the destruction in Iraq has signalled the death of the global liberal 
project and as forces belonging to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant continue to 
expand their influence throughout Iraq and neighbouring nations, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to argue that the alleged ‘spreading of freedom and democracy’ 
in the region has been a positive thing for the millions of people killed since their 
‘liberation’.14 Despite liberalism’s internal contradictions and the situations in places 
like Egypt, Iraq and Afghanistan, many liberal intellectuals continue to have faith in 
the intellectual tradition.  
 
I want now to turn to developing an ideal type as a prelude to examining a selection of 
these intellectuals whose liberal Weltanschauung has influenced they way they have 
made sense of and represented ‘Wahhabism’. To reiterate, I make use of the 
abstraction process that is the Weberian ‘ideal type’ when constructing my 
‘Liberalism’ fuzzy category.  
 
  
                                                 
13 Gray, Black Mass. 
14 Ibid. 
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Understanding Liberalism: Towards an ‘Ideal Type’.  
 
My ‘ideal type’ consists of four key elements. The first as I have already alluded to 
and which I will describe in more detail is the assumption that all people are entitled 
to freedom/liberty. Second and closely related to the concept of freedom is the belief 
in individualism. Third is a belief in secularism as a way of ordering society. Fourth is 
the liberal belief in progress. It matters that we have a basic understanding of each of 
these concepts given the major role they play in my deconstructing of liberal 
intellectual representations of ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
Maurice Cranston rightly points out that “By definition a liberal is a man who 
believes in liberty.”15 John Locke and John Stuart Mill join Berlin as prominent 
liberal thinkers who emphasise the integral role liberty plays in the liberal 
imagination. Locke writes that humans naturally exist in “a State of perfect Freedom 
to order their Actions…as they think fit…without asking leave, or depending on the 
Will of any other Man.”16 Mill also emphasises the man’s right to enjoy his freedom, 
arguing that  
the burden of proof is supposed to be with those who are against liberty; who 
contend for any restriction or prohibition…The a priori assumption is in 
favour of freedom…17 
 
Locke and Mill are referring to what is commonly called the Fundamental Liberal 
Principle. According to this principle liberty is essential to man and the responsibility 
of justifying the limiting of man’s freedom falls on those doing the limiting.18 Those 
for example who want political authority and who want to legislate laws must 
‘reasonably’ justify their need given both have the ability to limit liberty of citizens. 
Gaus and Courtland point out that this is especially the case when the limiting of 
freedoms involves the use of coercive measures. “Consequently a key question of 
                                                 
15 Maurice Cranston, ‘Liberalism', in Encyclopedia of Philosophy , vol.4., ed. Paul Edwards (New 
York: Collier-Macmillan, 1972), 458. 
16 John Locke cited in Karl Olivecrona, “Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of 
Property,” Journal of the History of Ideas 35, no.2 (1974), 217, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708759. 
17 John Stuart Mill, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. J.M. Robson (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1963), 262. 
18 Gerald Gaus and Shane D. Courtland, “Liberalism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (2011), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/liberalism/ 
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liberal political theory is whether political authority can be justified and if so, how.”19  
What counts as ‘reasonable justification’ is of course the focus of much debate as we 
have recently seen with the introduction of new ‘counter-terror’ legislation 
implemented in ‘liberal democracies’ like the US and Australia.  
 
Closely related to the Fundamental Liberal Principle is the liberal belief in 
individualism. Mill argues that individualism is one of the major bases for endorsing 
freedom.20 Individualism is the idea that the interests of the individual must take 
precedence over the interests of the state or any other kind of social group. According 
to this view the state or any kind of institutions in society i.e. religious bodies should 
not interfere with an individual’s interests. This is a point made by Locke who argues 
that an individual’s rights exist pre-politically and are therefore above the discretion 
of the state.21  
 
A ‘classical’ liberal view advocated by authors like Locke, and which informs my 
ideal type, views these rights in a more formal or legal way. Rights are understood as 
negative in the sense that the state should not interfere or impinge on those rights. 
This view also understands those rights as subject to the ‘no harm’ principle. Mill 
describes this principle as the right for individuals to do what they want as long as it 
does not harm other individuals.22 Mill maintains that man’s liberty can only be 
rightfully interfered with when his actions bring harm others. Mill distinguishes 
between ‘harm’ which he understands to be a physical kind of harm and ‘offense’ 
which he understands as actions that may offend the moral sensibilities of others.  
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Mill, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 267. 
21 Gaus and Courtland, “Liberalism.” 
22 Mill describes this principle in the first chapter of Liberty.  
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely 
the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the 
means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public 
opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled 
to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, 
because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right... The only part of the 
conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the 
part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, 
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. 
John Stuart Mill, Liberty (London: Everyman, J.M.Dent and Sons, 1910), 72-73. 
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Another aspect of this approach pertinent to this study is the relation between the 
liberal theory of individualism and their ideas about our development as human 
beings. Again we can refer to the work of Mill for a ‘classical liberal’ understanding 
of this relation. He writes  
Individuality is the same thing with development, and…it is only the 
cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed 
human beings…what more can be said of any condition of human affairs, than 
that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? or 
what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents this?23 
 
Mill’s point is that individualism is crucial to our development as human beings. Gaus 
and Courtland point out that this is not just a theory about politics rather it is a moral 
theory about the ‘good’. They write that according to this view the ‘right’ thing to do 
is to promote development or perfection, and that only a particular kind of 
government that secures extensive liberty for its people is able to accomplish this.24 
This kind of government is a modern secular liberal democratic regime.  
 
A belief in secular state forms the third key element of my ‘ideal type’ for liberal 
intellectuals. A conventional interpretation of liberal political theory holds that the 
liberal state must not espouse any specific kind of religion. Rather than aligning itself 
with any religious belief the liberal secular state should be committed to tolerating all 
religions. Paul Starr points out that “the logic of liberalism” is “exemplified” by 
religious toleration.25 He writes that the secular state should help cultivate many 
points of view while at the same time averting “internecine…conflicts.”26 According 
to Stanley Fish religion, which is considered to be “the most volatile and divisive of 
issues,” in a liberal state must be removed from political debate and confined to the 
private realm where it can be tolerated.27 What the state gets by excluding religion 
from the political debate is a religion that ‘fits’ with a modern secular liberal 
democracy. Fish describes this process.  
                                                 
23 Ibid., 179. 
24 Gaus and Courtland, “Liberalism.” 
25 Paul Starr cited in Stanley Fish, “Liberalism and Secularism: One and the Same,” New York Times 
Blogs, September 2, 2007, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/liberalism-and-secularism-
one-and-the-same/ 
26 Ibid. 
27 Fish, “Liberalism and Secularism.” 
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The liberal order does not extinguish religions; it just eviscerates them, unless 
they are the religions that display the same respect for the public-private 
distinction that liberalism depends on and enforces. A religion that accepts the 
partitioning of the secular and the sacred and puts at its center the private 
transaction between the individual and his God fits the liberal bill perfectly.28  
 
Starr writes that according to this view religions that do not ‘stay in their place’ and 
encroach on public life are understood as the homes of 
“extremists…fascists…enemies of the public good…authoritarian despots and so 
forth.”29 According to Fish this “harsh judgement” is inevitable if liberalism “is to be 
true to itself,” because liberalism opposes any measures or actions that seek to curtail 
the individualism and liberty of its people.30  
 
Fish points out that this idea has always been a key part of the liberal tradition and can 
be traced back to the works of John Milton and John Rawls. Milton tolerates all 
religion (except Catholicism which he claims undermines “civil supremacies”) so as 
long as they do not encroach upon the individuals right to free expression.31 Centuries 
later Rawls sought to construct a political framework that legitimated all “reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.”32 As Fish describes, the major issue at stake here that 
continues to remain a source of conjecture amongst liberal intellectuals, is what 
constitutes ‘reasonable’. The liberal values of pluralism and moderation help provide 
rough boundaries about what is and what is not considered ‘reasonable’ within the 
tradition, however ultimately ‘reasonableness’ is a subjective notion which is 
influenced by one’s prejudice. That is to say it, like liberalism and all other categories 
is ‘fuzzy,’ meaning it has no clearly definable boundaries and has what Zadeh calls 
‘grades of membership’.33  
 
The idea of ‘progress’ is the fourth element that makes up my ideal type. Liberal 
proponents of this idea maintain the human condition has improved over the course of 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Starr cited in Fish, “Liberalism and Secularism.” 
30 Fish, “Liberalism and Secularism.” 
31 John Milton cited in Fish, “Liberalism and Secularism.” 
32 John Rawls cited in Fish, “Liberalism and Secularism.”  
33 Zadeh, “Fuzzy Sets.” 
  112 
history and are motivated by the idea that it will continue improving.34 Doctrines of 
progress in general first appeared in Europe in the eighteenth century, these ideas then 
flourished throughout the nineteenth century before slightly retreating in the twentieth 
century after many horrific events like two World Wars, the Holocaust and the use of 
nuclear weapons.35 The liberal tradition traces its ideas of progress to key 
Enlightenment thinkers like Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, Marquis de Condercet and 
Immanuel Kant and more recently to thinkers like John Rawls and John Stuart Mill.36 
Modern liberal intellectuals typically believe that a modern Secular democratic state 
is the ideal society we should be aiming to create. Rawls states that this kind of 
society should be ‘well-ordered’ and ‘supportive of basic political and civil 
freedoms’.37 Like most liberal intellectuals, Rawls is optimistic about our abilities as 
humans to create such society and once attained he believes that it is capable of 
lasting  “in perpetuity.”38 Rawl’s ideas are also useful when understanding the 
different steps humans must take and stages societies must go through to create this 
kind of society. Pertinent to this study is Rawl’s description of how a state must deal 
with religion. While religion has no place in the affairs of the liberal state, Rawls 
claims that it does have a place in a liberal society and that people must eventually 
learn to respect and value freedom of religion.39 This ‘learning process’ is considered 
to be  ‘progress’. 
 
                                                 
34 Margaret Meek Lange, “Progress”, ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/progress/ 
35 Ibid. 
36 A. Turgot, “A Philosophical Review of the Successive Advances of the Human Mind,” in Turgot on 
Progress, Sociology and Economics, ed. R.L. Meek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); 
A. Turgot, “ On University History,” in Turgot on Progress, Sociology and Economics,  ed. R.L. Meek 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in Political Writings, trans. H.B. Tisbet, ed. H.Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991); M. Condorcet, Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human 
Mind (New York: H.M. Carey and P. Rice and Co., 1796); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996); John Stuart Mill, A system of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co.1843); “Utilitarianism” (1861) in On Liberty and other Essays, ed. 
John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); “On Liberty” (1859) In On Liberty and Other 
Essays, ed. J Gray. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991;1861a, “Considerations on Representative 
Government:, in On Liberty and other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).  
37 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 4. 
38 Ibid., 131. 
39 Fish, “Liberalism and Secularism.” 
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Rawls refers to Europe’s transition through the early modern period as the 
quintessential example of this ‘progress’.40 Rawls specifically refers to the conflict 
between Catholics and Protestants where both sides endorsed freedom of religion as a 
practical solution to their constant warring.41 Following this Europeans eventually 
came to realise that freedom of religion was in their self-interest. I have made a point 
of including Rawls referring to the situation between Catholics and Protestants 
because some liberal intellectuals make the same comparisons when representing 
‘Wahhabism’ in the modern Islamic world.  
 
‘Progress’ for the modern liberal intellectual also typically involves the creating, 
establishing and maintaining of ‘free institutions’. I have already pointed out the 
major roles ideas about freedom and individualism play in liberal political theory. 
Further to this, liberals tend to consider the establishing of institutions free from 
political interference as a key part of an ideal society. These institutions serve many 
important functions in a liberal state including helping to ensure no policies, measures 
or other forces that are impinging upon the liberties of the citizenry and providing 
spaces in which people can work to ‘better themselves’. This idea of humans working 
and living in the proper environment that allows them to ‘better themselves’ or 
‘progress’ is related to liberal ideas about individualism. According to these beliefs 
the individual’s commitment to ‘progressing’ or ‘developing’ him or herself is an 
important part to society’s overall ‘progression’ or ‘development’. A ‘standard’ 
reading of liberal political theory holds that it is individuals that make society.   
 
Key Enlightenment thinkers like Turgot and Condorcet are among those to emphasise 
the importance of ‘free institutions’ to our development as human beings.42 Making 
sense of Enlightenment views on progress which has influenced the modern liberal 
political tradition, Lange points out that both Turgot and Condorcet agreed that 
scientific discoveries and political freedoms reinforced each other and together helped 
further human wellbeing. Focusing on the relation between science, political freedom 
and ‘progress,’ Turgot was of the view that ‘free’ political institutions provided the 
necessary framework in which scientific genius can flourish, and that it is institutions 
                                                 
40 Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
41 John Rawls, “An Idea of Overlapping Consensus,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7, no.1 (1987), 
11-12.  
42 Lange, “Progress.” 
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and not the concentration of genius that is primarily responsible for differencing 
levels of scientific achievement and hence human advancement.  
 
They key point is that it is political institutions that either suppress or encourage these 
processes. Condorcet claimed that the spreading of scientific knowledge would help 
create a more ‘enlightened’ population allowing them to then escape the ‘shackles of 
religion’ and demand greater freedoms. Reiterating Rawls’ point, this gradual moving 
away from religion is considered to be ‘progress’. Again there is a specific reason 
why I have chosen to refer to these particular key thinkers in my ‘ideal type’. Turgot 
and Condorcet’s focusing on the relation between science, liberty and ‘progress’ helps 
highlight an important aspect of the liberal imagination in general and ideas of 
progress in particular. Liberal intellectuals tend to see their implementing of ideas as a 
‘scientific process’. Also pertinent are the ideas of Immanuel Kant. 
 
Kant played a formative role in developing the liberal conception of progress. He saw 
the ‘development of humans’ in the social world as similar to the development of 
animals in the natural world.43 Kant worked from the a priori assumption that all 
animals have natural faculties and that these faculties have the ability to be 
developed.44 Applying this idea to humans, he claimed that if we humans are to take 
advantage of this situation then we must commit to the developing of our human 
faculties over time.45 Our ‘progress’ as humans can be ‘measured’ by our 
development of human faculties. Echoing the sentiments of Turgot, Condorcet and 
Rawls, Kant maintained that we humans require a very particular kind of society if we 
are to ‘progress’ / fulfil our potential. According to Kant this ‘ideal society’ is one in 
which the rule of law values and guarantees freedom and equality for its citizens.46 
That is to say, a modern secular liberal democratic state is crucial to providing the 
framework necessary for our development as individuals.  
 
These four interrelated ideas about progress, individualism, secularism and freedom 
make up my ‘ideal type’. Again it should be reiterated that my ‘ideal type’ is an 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.”  
45 Ibid., 42-44 
46  Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” (1795) in Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. H. Reiss 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 98ff. 
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abstraction designed with very specific purposes in mind. Liberalism is a large and 
complex fuzzy category. Providing an exhaustive list of what we understand to be 
liberal beliefs and then using this list to help guide my deconstruction of liberal 
intellectual representations of ‘Wahhabism’ is an unmanageable task that is beyond 
the scope of this. My ‘ideal type’ combined with my focusing on five particular 
elements apparent in liberal representations of ‘Wahhabism’ (the intellectuals’ use of 
metaphors, neologisms, similes, analogies and constructing of violent accounts) 
makes my deconstruction process a much more manageable task. I shall now turn my 
attention to implementing these analytical processes.  
 
‘Wahhabism’ Restricts Freedoms 
 
Individual freedom is key to the liberal imagination. According to many liberal 
intellectuals a major problem with the ‘observer-dependant’ phenomena called 
‘Wahhabism’ is that it violates people’s liberties. Liberals tend to represent 
‘Wahhabism’ as fundamentally ‘Illiberal’ given its perceived restricting of thought 
and behaviour. While there are a variety of societies throughout the world that liberal 
intellectuals see as affected by ‘Wahhabism’ most tend to their focus on the situation 
in Saudi Arabia. Like many other scholars these intellectuals see Saudi Arabia as the 
‘home’ of ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
Liberal intellectuals differ in their representations of the freedoms they understand 
‘Wahhabism’ as violating. This is understandable given both the fuzzy nature of 
liberalism and the role prejudice plays in how each individual makes sense of the 
world. Maurice Cranston points out that ‘a liberal believes in liberty’. However our 
different prejudices which are related as Heidegger puts it, to ‘the time and place into 
which we are thrown’, means liberals will often differ with regards to the particular 
kinds of liberties they value. Some like Thomas Farr, echoing popular arguments 
made by key liberal thinkers like Rawls, value religious freedom and therefore focus 
on this when representing ‘Wahhabism’.47  
 
                                                 
47 Thomas Farr, “Obama administration sidelines religious freedom policy,” The Washington Post, 
June 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/24/AR2010062405069.html.  
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Adopting the role as a ‘movement intellectual’ for the political liberal tradition, Farr 
blames ‘Wahhabism’, as currently practiced in Saudi Arabia and enforced by the 
Saudi ruling regime, for depriving people of their freedom to choose whether to be 
religious and what religion they want to practice. Like many liberals, Farr believes the 
state should not align itself with a particular religion and that people should be free to 
practice religion privately so as long as it does not interfere with running state or 
encourage harm to others. According to Farr ‘Wahhabism’ as practiced and enforced 
in Saudi Arabia violates these key liberal principles. Farr goes as far to suggest that 
liberalism is responsible for stunting the personal growth or ‘progression’ of Saudi 
Arabians and for encouraging people to embrace a ‘radical’ version of Islam that 
encourages the harming of others, or as he puts it ‘Wahhabism’ encourages 
“religious-based terrorism.” 
The IRF Act [International Religious Freedom Act] was passed unanimously 
because millions are denied religious liberty. An exhaustive Pew Forum study 
revealed in December that 70 percent of the world's population lives in 
countries where religious freedom is severely restricted. A few recent 
examples:  
A senior Saudi cleric issued a fatwa mandating the death of anyone arguing 
that men and women could work together professionally. Such edicts emerge 
from Wahhabism, a malevolent political theology that nurtured Osama bin 
Laden and continues to be exported worldwide… 
These stories and thousands like them represent more than humanitarian 
tragedies. They signal a national security threat -- and a diplomatic 
opportunity -- for the United States. The absence of religious freedom is 
highly correlated with unstable democracy, low economic growth, low female 
literacy rates and religion-based terrorism. Religious liberty could help solve 
these problems… 
 
Pertinent here is Farr’s use of a particular rhetorical technique when persuading 
readers of the ‘Illiberal nature’ of ‘Wahhabism’. Farr uses the metaphorical 
expression “nurtured” to describe the process where ‘Wahhabi’ doctrine influences 
Osama Bin Laden’s personal development. ‘Nurture’ is commonly understood to be 
the act of caring for and protecting someone or something whilst they are growing or 
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getting older. A religious ‘ideology’ like ‘Wahhabism’ cannot literally be responsible 
for raising, caring and protecting a person, in most instances it is a person’s parents 
who are responsible for this task. However this is precisely what Farr is suggesting 
when using this metaphorical expression. Farr is claiming that it is ‘Wahhabism’ and 
not any other factors (like those ascribed to domain of nature—the ‘nature’ versus 
‘nurture’ debate is a common narrative) responsible for radicalising Osama Bin Laden 
and inspiring him to commit acts of terror.  
 
The metaphorical expression ‘nurtured’ is linked to what George Lakoff identifies as 
the Nurturant Parent Model.48 Lakoff claims this model is popular amongst ‘Leftists’ 
in America (who are referred to there as ‘liberals’) and provides a conceptual 
framework for how they make sense of the world. Lakoff writes  
The principal goal of nurturance is for children to be fulfilled and happy in 
their lives and to become nurturant themselves. A fulfilling life is assumed to 
be, in significant part, a nurturant life, one committed to family and 
community responsibility…what children need to learn most is empathy for 
others, the capacity for nurturance, cooperation, and the maintenance of social 
ties…when children are respected, nurtured, and communicated with from 
birth, they gradually enter into a lifetime relationship of mutual respect, 
communication…49 
 
Lakoff emphasises the relation between those who understand morality in terms of 
nurturance and the using of the conceptual metaphor ‘the Community is a Family’.50 
According to Lakoff these individuals tend to view “community members…as having 
a responsibility to see that people needing help in their community are helped.”51 
When considering the ‘Nature and Nurture’ debate, Lakoff maintains these 
individuals generally consider nurturance to be “an environmentally determined 
factor” leading them “to look almost exclusively at environmentally determined 
factors in social and political explanations.”52   
 
                                                 
48 Lakoff, Moral Politics,109. 
49 Ibid.,109-110. 
50 Ibid.,117. 
51 Ibid.,118. 
52 Ibid.,204. 
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This provides some insight into Farr’s use of the metaphorical expression “nurtured” 
when describing the influence ‘Wahhabism’ has had on Osama Bin Laden. Farr is 
assuming that the community is in part responsible for helping raise Saudi Arabians 
like Bin Laden, assuming that it plays a major role in helping instil in individuals 
what he sees as important values i.e. empathy, cooperation, communication and 
respect. According to Farr’s representation, this has not happened with Osama Bin 
Laden and Farr looks at environmental factors like religious, political and social 
forces to help explain why he has become a ‘violent’ individual. He blames 
“Wahhabism” suggesting it is the community’s embracing of this “malevolent 
political theology” that has failed to encourage the instilling of the values liberals 
believe are necessary to producing ‘good’ and ‘responsible’ members of society.  
 
The implication is that if Bin Laden and the society in which he lived enjoyed 
religious freedoms then it is possible he would not have committed “religious-based 
terrorism” nor would he have become another “humanitarian traged[y].” The 
important point is that religious liberty is a fundamental right of humans and that 
without this liberty humans will likely fail to reach their potential and will therefore 
be more likely to commit tragic acts like ‘Wahhabi’ inspired terrorism. 
 
Like Farr, Bandow is a Liberal intellectual who focuses on the civil liberties he 
believes Saudi-style ‘Wahhabism’ is responsible for violating.53 Bandow also 
presumes to treat the USA as a ‘liberal’ regime which should not have an “alliance” 
with an ‘illiberal’ regime like Saudi Arabia. While the US values things like a secular 
and democratic state which guarantees individualism and respects freedom of 
religion, religious regimes like ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia believe it is within their rights 
to “violate [the] privacy [of its people] whenever it chooses” and prevent its people 
from enjoying things like “freedom of expression and association.” Bandow writes   
For American administrations that loudly promote democracy, the alliance 
with Saudi Arabia has been a deep embarrassment. As the Human Rights 
Watch reported in 2001, “Freedom of expression and association were 
nonexistent rights, political parties and independent local media were not 
permitted, and even peaceful anti-government activities remained virtually 
                                                 
53 Doug Bandow, “Befriending Saudi Princes: A high price for a dubious alliance,” USA Today, July 
2002, 20-24. 
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unthinkable. Infringements on privacy, institutionalized gender discrimination, 
harsh restrictions on the exercise of religious freedom, and the use of capital 
and corporal punishment were also major features of the kingdom's human 
rights record”… 
Religious totalitarianism. Most ugly, however, is the religious totalitarianism 
enforced by Riyadh. Citizens and foreigners alike are prohibited from 
engaging in non-Muslim worship as well as proselytizing…[Emphasis added]. 
 
It should be acknowledged that the relationship between ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ 
regimes is a source of much debate in the political liberal tradition.54 While liberals 
are typically united in their beliefs with regards to things like individualism, 
secularism, progress and freedom, they can hold a range of beliefs when it comes to 
foreign policy decisions like whether or not liberal regimes should work with illiberal 
regimes and to what extent. Also at stake are key questions like what constitutes an 
illiberal regime? 
 
Bandow clearly belongs to the school of thought that liberal regimes should not work 
closely with illiberal regimes “enforce[ing] the extreme Wahhabi form of Islam at 
home.” His ideas resonate with Rawls’ argument that liberals must distinguish 
between ‘decent’ and ‘indecent’ states i.e. ‘outlaw states’ which he says have no right 
to ask liberal regimes for tolerance or support. 55 Rawls argues that ‘decent people’ 
should not tolerate outlaw states that ignore human rights.56 Bandow clearly 
categorises Saudi Arabia because of its ‘Wahhabism’ as one of these ‘outlaw states’.  
Accordingly he champions a ‘liberalising’ or ‘modernising’ project that would 
guarantee the freedoms of its people. However he does not see foreign 
interventionism as a way of achieving this nor does he think that the US should enjoy 
a close relationship with the Saudi Kingdom until it becomes, or at least takes major 
steps to becoming a modern liberal democratic state. 
 
In the excerpt above I highlight a pertinent rhetorical technique we can abstract from 
Bandow’s representation for closer analysis. Bandow uses the metaphorical 
                                                 
54 Gaus and Courtland, “Liberalism.” 
55 John Rawls, Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 59-61. 
56 Ibid., 81. 
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expression “ugly” to describe the ‘religious totalitarian’ ‘Wahhabi’ doctrine 
implemented by the Saudi government. This draws on the metaphor ‘(political) State 
as a Form of Attraction’. As humans we are naturally drawn to and appreciate 
beautiful things as they tend to arouse positive emotions in us. In contrast visually 
displeasing or ‘ugly’ things tend to arouse negative emotions in us and often leave us 
feeling disgusted and repulsed.   
 
In using this metaphor Bandow is clearly suggesting that particular kinds of political 
states specifically liberal democratic states can be understood as beautiful while 
‘Illiberal’ regimes like the ‘religious totalitarian’ ‘Wahhabi’ state in Saudi Arabia can 
be viewed as ugly. These states are ‘ugly’ because they do not have the same qualities 
that make a liberal state ‘beautiful’. According to Bandow these qualities are 
democratic freedoms particularly religious freedoms. Beautiful things are expressions 
of man’s greatest talents and Kant would argue that the development of ourselves, 
which best occurs within a liberal state that guarantees our individualism and 
freedom, would greatly increase our ability to create and produce beautiful things. 
Echoing Kant’s sentiments, liberals like Bandow believe the modern liberal 
democratic state is one of man’s greatest creations as it provides the framework 
necessary for man to realise his full potential as a human being. The implication is 
that regimes living according to ‘Wahhabi’ doctrine limit and stunt the development 
of its people. 
 
A belief in freedom is a key part of the liberal tradition. However each liberal 
influenced by their personal preferences/prejudices will focus on a particular freedom 
they believe to be most important. As we can see the relation between ‘Wahhabism’ 
and (the lack of) religious freedoms is of major importance to intellectuals like 
Bandow and Farr. Liberal intellectuals like Dowd, Zakaria and Ibrahim also blame 
‘Wahhabism’ for violating freedoms however they focus their attention on women’s 
freedom.  
 
Earlier I described how Dowd used the neologism “gender apartheid” and the 
metaphorical expressions “galactically glacial pace” and “chipping away” when 
describing the situation for women forced to live according to ‘Wahhabi’ religious 
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doctrine in Saudi Arabia.57 Zakaria and Ibrahim share these concerns. However they 
use different rhethorical techniques when representing this situation to their 
audiences. For example Zakaria writes  
…Every noxious version of Wahhabism has had free rein in Saudi Arabia, 
and yet all liberal ideas and debates have always been closed down… 
The tragedy is that Saudi Arabia has one of the largest groups of reform-
minded liberals in the Middle East. It's an odd combination: the most 
conservative society and a vast swath of modernists. But because of its oil 
money, the country has sent tens of thousands of young Saudis to the West 
(mostly America) over the past few decades. Unlike most other Arabs, these 
students did not return home espousing socialism, Arab nationalism and 
anticolonial rhetoric. For the most part, they liked the West, especially 
America, business and the modern world. They support the royal family, but 
want to see change. Many of them are greatly encouraged by Crown Prince 
Abdullah's reforms. They hope that Saudi Arabia will soon become a member 
of the World Trade Organization and that this will unleash even more 
economic reforms, that events like the Jidda Economic Forum will grow, that 
educational reform will flourish, that women will be moved out of the 
shadows of everyday life. 
 
I want to be hopeful-and there are some hopeful signs. But I fear that 
governments change when they have to. Saudi Arabia will probably weather 
this storm and beat back the terrorists. The oil money will buy off other critics 
for at least another decade or two. The royal system will muddle along. But 
without wrenching change, Saudi Arabia will not achieve the promise of 
genuine modernization that its liberals and reformers hope for. The young 
Saudi who lamented the lack of role models ended our conversation 
poignantly: “Perhaps history will call us the country that could have been” 
[Emphasis added].58 
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Pertinent is Zakaria’s use of the metaphorical expression “out of the shadows” when 
describing the situation for Saudi women forced to live according to 
“noxious…Wahhabism.” A shadow is the point between lightness and darkness and 
the general understanding is that it owes more to the latter than the former. Zakaria is 
suggesting there are many people (men) living their lives in ‘full view’ (in ‘lightness’) 
and there are many people (women) forced to live in places where they are largely 
unseen or unnoticeable (‘in the shadows’). This metaphorical expression can be 
interpreted in a number of ways.  
 
For example we in the ‘West’ will often associate light with good entities like God 
and angels. Conversely popular myths in the ‘West’ typically associate evil entities 
like monsters and vampires as living in darkness. According to this interpretation 
‘Wahhabism’ is represented as responsible for encouraging Saudi men for treating 
women as evil entities. The implication is the liberalisation or modernisation of Saudi 
Arabian society would create the necessary conditions that would allow Saudi women 
to ‘emerge from the shadows’ and be treated like human beings rather than as evil 
entities. 
 
Ibrahim also represents  ‘Wahhabism’ as responsible for denying women their 
freedoms.59 Like Farr, he believes the denying of freedoms is in part responsible for 
inspiring ‘Islamic radicalism’. However while Farr links the lack of religious freedom 
to “religious-based terrorism,” Ibrahim links the denying of women their freedoms to 
‘Islamic radicalism’. Ibrahim writes  
The U.S. has always been aware of Saudi Arabia's role in funding and 
spreading Wahhabism -- an extremist ideology which provides the ideological 
foundation for groups like Al Qaeda… the conservative cult of Wahhabism, 
advocates anti-Semitism, misogyny and inter-action with non-Muslims only in 
cases of necessity. It therefore provides the ideological justification for 
animosity and hatred of wider society thus providing the perfect foundation 
for radical preachers to then advocate violence as a religious duty [Emphasis 
added]. 
                                                 
59 Azeem Ibrahim, “Secretary Kerry Must Stop U.S. Support for Islamic Extremism,” Huffington Post, 
March 18, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/azeem-ibrahim/secretary-kerry-must-
stop_b_2806010.html. 
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Here I ‘abstract’ two elements for closer analysis. The first concerns Ibrahim’s use of 
the term “misogyny” and its relation to ‘Wahhabism’ and ‘radicalism’. According to 
Cerulo this technique is called the assigning of ‘gender characteristics to the victim’. 
Cerulo writes that the emphasising of the victim’s female gender is likely to result in 
the reader understanding and categorising the violent act as deviant, illegitimate and 
unjustifiable. In contrast focusing on the male gender of the victim is more likely to 
result in the reader understanding the violent act to be normal.60 
 
Ibrahim’s choosing to use the term ‘misogyny’ clearly identifies females rather than 
males as the subject of concern. The word ‘misogyny’ comes from the Greek term 
misogynes meaning ‘woman-hater’ and is today typically used when referring to the 
‘dislike of, contempt for, or ingrained prejudice against women’. Ibrahim’s point is 
‘Wahhabism’ promotes discrimination against women and that this is in part 
responsible for promoting ‘radicalism’. 
 
Also pertinent is Ibrahim’s use of the phrase “religious duty” involving what Cerulo 
calls the assigning of ‘instrumental aims’ to the perpetrators of violence, which in this 
instance is the ‘Wahhabi’ “radical preachers.”61 Ibrahim represents the “radical 
preachers” as promoting acts of violence with clear religious aims (they are said to 
have a “religious duty”). Using the phrase “religious duty” implies there are religious 
rewards for the perpetrators of the violence. Cerulo maintains readers are more likely 
to condemn violent acts if they believe the perpetrator will receive some kind of 
reward.62 In using this technique Ibrahim is making use of a common political 
narrative in modern ‘Western’ discourse and often promoted by ‘Islamic militants’ 
which says that Muslims committing violence as a way of defending their faith will 
be rewarded in the afterlife (often with seventy two virgins).  
 
‘Wahhabism’ as ‘Backward’ and an Obstacle to Progress 
 
There is a strong tendency among modern liberal intellectuals to represent 
‘Wahhabism’ as indicative of a society that is ‘backward,’ ‘anti-modern’ and 
                                                 
60 Cerulo, Deciphering Violence, 24-26. 
61 Ibid., 17-21. 
62 Ibid. 
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‘regressive’. Liberals often claim that backward societies need to rid themselves of 
‘Wahhabism’ in order for them to ‘progress’. ‘Progress’ is typically understood as the 
adopting of measures that lead to the creation of a modern liberal secular democratic 
state. Friedman, Dowd and Zakaria are among key liberal intellectuals who represent 
‘Wahhabism’ in these ways.  
 
Friedman blames ‘Wahhabism’ for the poor relationship between the ‘Western’ and 
‘Islamic’ ‘worlds’.63 He sees the prevalence of ‘Wahhabism’ in the ‘Islamic world’ as 
indicative of its ‘backwardness’ and he is extremely critical of its promotion by the 
Saudi Arabian ‘Wahhabi’ clerics. Friedman writes  
What's going on in Iran today is, without question, the most promising trend in 
the Muslim world. It is a combination of Martin Luther and Tiananmen Square 
-- a drive for an Islamic reformation combined with a spontaneous student-
led democracy movement. This movement faces a formidable opponent in 
Iran's conservative clerical leadership. It can't provide a quick fix to what ails 
relations between Islam and the West today. There is none. But it is still 
hugely important, because it reflects a deepening understanding by many 
Iranian Muslims that to thrive in the modern era they, and other Muslims, 
need an Islam different from the lifeless, anti-modern, anti-Western 
fundamentalism being imposed in Iran and propagated by the Saudi Wahhabi 
clerics [Emphasis added]. 
 
Pertinent are the terms “modern era” and “anti-modern” which we can look at more 
closely. Friedman is referring to the ‘Modern Period’ in ‘Western history’ (which 
includes the Early Modern Period roughly between 1500 and 1815) which is so 
important to many in the liberal intellectual tradition because this is when the 
Protestant Reformation and French Revolution took place. In both instances people 
began challenging the dominant role religion played in the governing of the state. In 
the Reformation it was the authority of the Catholic Church that was criticised and 
challenged and in the French Revolution saw the end of medieval Christianity and the 
welcoming of a ‘new secular phase’ in mankind’s development. The implication is 
that the ‘Islamic world’ in which ‘Wahhabism’ is pervasive is stuck in a period that is 
                                                 
63 Thomas. L. Friedman, “An Islamic Reformation,” New York Times, December 4, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/04/opinion/an-islamic-reformation.html. 
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roughly four to five centuries ‘behind’ the ‘West’ in terms of development. 
‘Wahhabism’ is part of responsible for this ‘backwardness’ because it champions the 
ruling of a society according to religious doctrine and opposes secularisation. In this 
sense Friedman represents ‘Wahhabism’ as a ‘brake on’ or an ‘obstacle’ to ‘progress’.  
 
Friedman is suggesting there is no way that nations in the liberal democratic ‘West’ 
can enjoy cordial relations with the ‘Islamic world’ as long as religions like 
‘Wahhabism’ continue to dominate the latter. The ‘Islamic world’ including 
‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia must ‘progress’ meaning it must have its own Reformation 
in order to free itself from the hold oppressive religions like ‘Wahhabism’ have on it. 
This can be understood as an ethnocentric point of view that relies on the historical 
development of the ‘West’ as a yardstick for progress.  
 
Zakaria makes similar comparisons when representing the current situation in the 
Middle East.64 He writes  
The Middle East is in the midst of a sectarian struggle, like those between 
Catholics and Protestants in Europe in the age of the Reformation. These 
tensions are rooted in history and politics and will not easily go away. 
 
Zakaria uses an analogy when suggesting the entire Middle East including ‘Wahhabi’ 
Saudi Arabia is ‘backward’ and ‘less developed’ when contrasted with the liberal 
democratic ‘West’. To reiterate, an analogy can be understood as a logical argument 
where the user demonstrates how things are alike by point out shared characteristics 
with the aim of showing that if things are alike is some ways then they can be alike in 
other ways as well. Again the implication is the ‘West’ has successfully moved past 
this point in time where religious ideas inspired violence and has ‘evolved’ into 
modern liberal secular democratic regimes. “The Middle East ” is still however “in 
the midst of a sectarian struggle” and is therefore further away from reaching this 
‘ideal society’. The suggestion is that this region must experience a transition to a 
modern liberal secular democratic government if it wants to bring an end to 
                                                 
64 Fareed Zakaria, “U.S. fuel to the Middle East fire,” The Washington Post, January 16, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fareed-zakaria-us-fuel-to-the-middle-east-
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religiously inspired violence.  
 
Like Zakaria and Friedman, Bandow also likens the situation in ‘Wahhabi’-affected 
nations like Saudi Arabia to a particular historical period in ‘Western’ history that 
nations in the ‘West’ have ‘progressed’ beyond.65 Bandow writes  
Repression and corruption. Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, an almost 
medieval theocracy…Political opposition and even criticism are forbidden. In 
practice, there are few procedural protections for anyone arrested or charged 
by the government … The government may invade homes and violate privacy 
whenever it chooses, and travel is limited. Women are covered, cloistered, and 
confined, much as they were in Afghanistan under the Taliban…[Emphasis 
added]. 
 
As is the case with the previous examples, Bandow uses analogy when describing the 
‘Wahhabi’ Saudi state as “an almost medieval theocracy.” Bandow is making the 
point that while ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia is technically understood as “an absolute 
monarchy” it shares many similar characteristics with “medival theocrac[ies] i.e. 
“Repression and corruption,” forbidding of political oppression, lack of “procedural 
protections,” the state’s violating of individuals’ privacy, travel restrictions and the 
discrimination against women. Bandow wants to convince his readers that modern 
states like Saudi Arabia ruled according to ‘Wahhabism’ are just like medieval forms 
of government that appeared in ‘Western’ history centuries ago.  
 
Bandow like Zakria and Friedman is a ‘Movement Intellectual’ for the political liberal 
tradition who is influenced by the idea that we can rank different kinds of 
governments on a linear scale from least developed/regressive/backward to most 
developed/progressive/modern. Bandow situates Saudi Arabia because of its 
adherence to ‘Wahhabism’ near the beginning of this spectrum akin to the Medieval 
period in ‘Western’ human history. The standard political liberal understanding is that 
the Medieval period in ‘Western’ human history was characterised by an irrational 
belief in religion that needed to be overcome in order for society to ‘progress’. The 
implication is that societies in which ‘Wahhabism’ plays a crucial role like Saudi 
                                                 
65 Bandow, “Befriending Saudi Princes.” 
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Arabia must go through this same process in order to ‘progress’ and ‘catch-up’ to the 
‘West’.  
 
Friedman provides another interesting example of how some liberal intellectuals 
represent the ‘backwardness’ of ‘Wahhabism’ when choosing to use the term 
“evolution” to describe the current situation in the Gulf States which includes 
‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia.66  Friedman claims ‘Wahhabi’-ruled Saudi Arabia like the 
other Gulf nations needs an “evolution” and not a “revolution” which is what he 
understands as currently occurring in other Middle Eastern nations (these are a part of 
what Friedman calls the “Arab Awakening”; the use of this term suggests that the 
Arab nations have ‘been asleep’ and are only now becoming consciously aware of 
what it is happening in their countries). Making sense of the recent turmoil in the 
Arab and Muslim world for his readers, Friedman writes  
There are the radical revolutions you’ve read about in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, 
Yemen and Libya, none of which yet have built stable, inclusive democracies. 
But then there are the radical evolutions that you’ve not read about, playing 
out in Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf monarchies [Emphasis added]. 
 
Friedman also writes 
I heard many of these stories during group conversations with young Saudis 
and Emeratis, who I found to be as impressive, connected and high-aspiring to 
reform their countries as any of their revolutionary cohorts in Egypt. But they 
want evolution not revolution. They’ve seen the footage from Cairo and 
Damascus. You can feel their energy — from the grass-roots movement to let 
women drive to the young Saudi who whispers that he’s so fed up with the 
puritanical Islam that dominates his country he’s become an atheist, and he is 
not alone. Saudi atheists? Who knew? [Emphasis added] 
 
Friedman’s choosing to use the term “evolution” says a lot about how he sees the 
world. ‘Evolution’ comes from the Latin evolution meaning the ‘unrolling (of a 
book)’. During the seventeenth century it was commonly used by scholars working in 
the fields of medicine, mathematics and literature to refer to the ‘growth to maturing 
and development of an individual thing’. Scottish geologist Charles Lyell gave the 
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term a sense of ‘progress’ when using to describe changes in nature.67 These 
connotations have stuck with the term and when writers like Friedman use it when 
describing the current political situation in places like ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia, we 
can see an underlying belief in the ‘natural progression’ or ‘maturing’ of a society.  
 
The implication is that societies like Saudi Arabia are currently ‘immature’, ‘infantile’ 
or ‘under-developed’ because of the influence religions like ‘Wahhabism’ continue to 
have on them. Friedman sees the Gulf nations like ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia as still in 
the early stages of the ‘maturing’ process. Friedman is clearly influenced by the 
Communitarian approach within the liberal tradition as well ideas about human 
perfection promoted by key liberal writers like J. S. Mill.68 Friedman understands 
states and societies as groups of people working towards an end goal of human 
perfection and the term “evolution” helps to describe this journey.  
 
Liberal ‘movement’ intellectuals Maureen Dowd and Thomas Farr represent the 
‘backwardness’ associated with ‘Wahhabism’ in slightly different ways. In describing 
the situation in ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia, Dowd writes  
The attempts at more tolerance are belated baby steps to the outside world but 
in this veiled, curtained and obscured fortress, they are '60s-style cataclysmic 
social changes. Last week, Sheik Abdul Rahman al-Barrak, a pugnacious 
cleric, shocked Saudis by issuing a fatwa against those who facilitate the 
mixing of men and women. Given that such a fatwa clearly would include the 
king, Prince Saud dismissed it. 
“I think the trend for reform is set, and there is no looking back,” he told me. 
“Clerics who every now and then come with statements in the opposite 
direction are releasing frustration rather than believing that they can stop the 
trend and turn back the clock” [Emphasis added]. 69 
 
Here we see the using of a variety of metaphorical expressions i.e. “no looking back”, 
“opposite direction” and “turn back the clock” that all draw on the ‘Progress is 
Movement’ metaphor. This metaphor considers forwards movement to be indicative 
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68 Mill, On Liberty. 
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of societal progress whilst backwards movement as indicative of societal regression. 
Like many liberal intellectuals, Dowd considers the modern Liberal democratic state 
to be the ideal form of government and she uses instances of democratic freedoms as 
a yardstick against which this progress is measured. Dowd represents democratic 
reform in ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia as a natural, incremental, progressive and positive 
process that cannot be undone, reversed or stopped. That is to say there is no ‘turning 
back of the clock’.  
 
I have also highlighted Dowd’s use of the phrase  “'60s-style cataclysmic social 
changes.” Again we see a liberal intellectual using the ‘West’ as a yardstick against 
which progress can be ‘measured’. In this instance the ideal kind of society to which 
Dowd refers is the U.S.A and the state that fails to measure up to this ‘progress’ is 
‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia. We know she is referring to the US because it was during 
the 1960s in which “cataclysmic social changes” were taking place in that country.70 
The implication is that the Liberal Democratic ‘West’ typified by the US state is far 
more advanced than a nation like Saudi Arabia which is held back by ‘Wahhabism’ 
and therefore still has a lot of ‘catching up’ to do.  
 
Like Dowd, Farr also draws on the metaphor ‘Progress is Movement’ when 
representing ‘Wahhabism’ as an obstacle to the development / ‘progress’ of a 
society.71 Farr joins Dowd in critiquing the role ‘Wahhabism’ plays in Saudi Arabia, 
however for Farr this is a part of a wider critique of the role Islam plays in the modern 
‘Muslim world’.  Farr writes  
A senior Saudi cleric issued a fatwa mandating the death of anyone arguing 
that men and women could work together professionally. Such edicts emerge 
from Wahhabism, a malevolent political theology that nurtured Osama bin 
Laden and continues to be exported worldwide… 
Among other things, Muslims need religious liberty to undermine Islamist 
extremism and to advance women's rights…[Emphasis added]. 
                                                 
70 This period in the US is well known for its counter-culture and revolutionary movements which 
included the US Civil Rights Movement and the ‘second-wave’ of the Feminist movement. The 
counter-culture movement played a major role in ‘liberating’ many aspects of US society including 
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We can abstract the metaphorical expression “advance” for closer analysis which Farr 
uses when describing the relation between religious liberty and women’s rights in 
Saudi Arabia. This draws on the metaphor ‘Movement is Progress’ which as the name 
clearly suggests sees ‘forwards movement’ as indicative of individual and societal 
progress. In drawing on this metaphor and using this particular metaphorical 
expression, Farr is suggesting that Saudi Arabian society does not currently provide 
women the liberty to which they are entitled and which forms key part of a ‘modern’ 
society.  
 
Farr’s choosing to use the term “advance” also provides valuable insight into the ways 
some liberals think about history. The liberal intellectual tradition typically promotes 
a linear understanding of human history where the purpose of mankind is to 
‘progress’ and ‘advance’ to the creating of a liberal democratic utopia. A woman’s 
ability to enjoy their liberty is an integral part of this ‘ideal society’. According to 
Farr this is the opposite of what is currently happening for women in Saudi Arabia 
who are forced to live according to ‘Wahhabism’. Farr represents ‘Wahhabism’ with 
its restricting of religious and women’s freedoms as an obstacle that needs to be 
overcome.   
 
 ‘Wahhabism’ is a Threat to a Secular Society 
 
What Farr is getting at here and what many liberals have intimated is the crucial role 
they believe secularism plays in the ordering of a modern democratic liberal society.  
A society like Saudi Arabia governed according to ‘Wahhabism’ violates many of the 
core principles typically valued by liberal intellectuals. Liberal intellectuals typically 
believe an ideal society to be secular meaning the state does not espouse or promote 
any particular kind of religion. Instead it should be committed to tolerating all 
religions so as long as they do not impinge upon the daily operations of the state, 
impinge upon individual freedoms or harm individuals in any way. For many liberals 
the problem with a state like Saudi Arabia which is organised according to 
‘Wahhabism,’ is that it violates these principles. Liberal intellectuals (rightly) do not 
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tend to see ‘Wahhabism’ as a religion that “accepts the partitioning of the secular and 
sacred.”72  
 
Fareed Zakaria is among those liberal intellectuals whose belief in secularism plays a 
major role in his account of  ‘Wahhabism’.73 Zakaria provides an assessment of the 
current religious and political situation in the Middle East claiming it “has become an 
even more violent place than usual.” Zakaria blames ‘Wahhabism’ for inspiring and 
motivating a lot of this violence. He writes  
The second factor at work has been the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism. 
Its causes are various - the rise of Saudi Arabia and its export of puritanical 
Wahhabi ideas the Iranian revolution and the discrediting of Westernization as 
the secular republics in the region morphed into military dictatorships 
[Emphasis added]. 
 
Apparent is the belief that secularisation is a way of countering Islamic extremism. 
The implication is that “secular republics” which is the ideal form of government 
championed by liberal intellectuals provides people with the liberty to which they are 
a priori entitled. In the absence of this freedom people are likely to become frustrated 
with oppressive forms of government like  “military dictatorships” that limit their 
freedom. They are then likely to turn to “Islamic fundamentalism” to help express 
their anger and frustration.   
 
Pertinent is Zakaria’s use of the metaphorical expression “rising tide” to describe the 
increased popularity in “Islamic fundamentalism” in the Middle East. “Rising tide” 
literally means the occurrence of incoming water between a low tide and following 
high tide. Rising tides are the result of gravitational forces exerted by the Moon and 
the Sun and the rotation of the Earth. Rising tides especially when accompanied by 
strong winds often result in severe flooding. Zakaria uses this metaphorical 
expression to help represent “Islamic fundamentalism” as a ‘natural’ relation of non-
secular governments that deny people their liberty and of Saudi Arabia’s global 
promotion of ‘Wahhabism’. His point is that where there is ‘Wahhabism’ and 
“military dictatorships” there will also be “Islamic fundamentalism.”  
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A belief in secularism also influences how Bilefsky makes sense of the current 
situation in Bosnia. 74 Bilefsky represents ‘Wahhabism’ as a threat to the modern and 
secular Bosnian nation that values separation of “mosque and state” and an 
individual’s right to practice religion privately. Bilefsky maintains that it is secularism 
and not its enemy ‘Wahhabism,’ that is the will of the majority of Bosnian people 
noting that  “…[a] recently conducted detailed survey of 600 Bosnian Muslims, said 
60 percent favored keeping religion a private matter.” Like many other intellectuals 
belonging to different intellectual traditions, Bilefksy also represents ‘Wahhabism’ / 
‘Salafism’ (he uses the terms interchangeably) for motivating and inspiring violence 
in Bosnia.  
 
Of most concern to Bilefsky is the influence that Islam in general and ‘Wahhabism’ in 
particular are having on the Bosnian secular education system especially in public 
kindergartens. Bilefsky communicates this concern to his readers by ‘giving voice to 
’/ citing the opinions of locals and “a prominent liberal Muslim intellectual” who is 
critical of Islam’s encroaching on civic life. Bilefsky writes  
Mustafa Effendi Spahic, a prominent liberal Muslim intellectual and professor 
at the Gazri Husrev-beg Madrasa in Sarajevo, went further, calling the 
introduction of religious education in kindergarten “a crime against children.” 
“The Prophet says to teach children to kneel as Muslims, only after the age of 
7,” said Professor Spahic, who was imprisoned under Communism for Islamic 
activism. “No one has any right to do that before then because it is an affront 
to freedom, the imagination and fun of the child's world.” 
 
This excerpt helps illustrate many of the beliefs that liberal intellectuals value i.e. 
individualism (which in this instance deals with children), the relation between 
freedom and the development of the self (which is evident in Bilefsky’s implying that 
religious education for children hinders their “imagination.” Remembering that key 
early modern liberal thinkers like Turgot and Condorcet treated imagination as a key 
part of individual genius and therefore a key part to the ‘progressing’ and 
‘developing’ of a society) and the separation of church and state (the introduction of 
                                                 
74 Dan Bilefsky, “An Islamic Revival in Bosnia Tests a Fragile Nation’s Secular Cast,” New York 
Times, December 27, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/27/world/europe/27islam.html 
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Islamic education which includes ‘Wahhabi’ education is described as “a crime 
against children).75 
 
Also pertinent is Bilefsky’s use of analogy when likening the current situation in 
Bosnia particularly its capital city Sarajevo both of which have experienced an 
increase in popularity of ‘Wahhabism,’ to the situation in Iran. Bilefsky writes 
Muharem Bazdulj, deputy editor of the daily Oslobodenje, the voice of liberal, 
secular Bosnia, said he feared the growth of Wahhabism, the conservative 
Sunni movement originating in Saudi Arabia that aims to strip away foreign 
and corrupting influences. 
Analysts say Saudi-financed organizations have invested about $700 million 
in Bosnia since the war, often in mosques. 
Wahhabism arrived via hundreds of warriors from the Arab world during the 
war and with Arab humanitarian and charity workers since, though 
sociologists here stress that most Bosnian Muslims still believe that Islam has 
no place in public life… 
Milorad Dodik, prime minister of Bosnia's Serb Republic, has referred to 
Sarajevo as the new Tehran, and talks of a “political Islam and a fight against 
people who don't share the same vision.” [Emphasis added]  
 
Understanding the context in which these remarks are made is crucial. Bilefsky’s 
article is relatively recent (published in December 2008) and appeared during a period 
of time when Iran was understood by many as an ‘Islamic superpower’ keen to spread 
to its version of Islam throughout the world. Iran is widely considered to be a 
relatively wealthy nation and many saw its global promoting of Islam in poor areas 
particularly those recently affected by war as a way of spreading their influence. In 
more recent times the supposed ‘threat’ of Iran has taken a backseat to the ‘threat’ 
posed by ISIS which now tends to dominate ‘Western’ media commentary.  
 
Bilefsky’s analogy makes the point that Saudi Arabia with its spreading of 
‘Wahhabism’ in Bosnia is acting in a similar way to Iran. Like the Islamic regime in 
Tehran, Saudi Arabia wants to encourage the implementing of a version of Islam (in 
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this instance ‘Wahhabism’) as a way of ordering civic society. While both nations 
adhere to different versions of Islam (Iran is predominantly Shia and Saudi Arabia is 
‘Wahhabi’ which can be understood as belonging to the Sunni branch of Islam), 
Bilefsky wants the reader to think of the two as the same, as both belonging to 
“political Islam.” Bilefsky represents ‘political Islam’ as a threat to many of the 
values like the separation of religion and state that liberals value.  
 
Like Bilefsky, Friedman is a liberal intellectual who wants to promote the triumph of 
secular Liberal democratic regimes throughout the world.76 Friedman focuses his 
attention on the Middle East, particularly Syria which currently finds itself in the 
midst of a civil war which now also involves international forces. Friedman provides 
his readers with an assessment of the aims and goals of the major players in the 
conflict and picks the groups he believes ‘Western’ nations understood as global 
promoters of liberalism should support.  
 
Friedman sees both Qatar and Saudi Arabia as key players in the Syrian conflict. He 
describes both as “Wahhabi fundamentalist monarchies” and as “the two main funders 
and arms suppliers of the Syrian uprising.” He blames their adherence to 
‘Wahhabism’ for their nations’ failure to embrace democracy and for the sectarian 
violence each are currently experiencing. According to Friedman their adherence to 
‘Wahhabism’ means it is impossible to accept that they will want to create a stable, 
secular, multisectarian, multiparty democracy in Syria, which of course is what 
‘Western’ Liberal democratic states want. Friedman also implies that there is a 
relationship between their non-democratic ‘Wahhabi’ beliefs and their supporting of 
violence. Friedman writes 
What are Qatar's and Saudi Arabia's goals? Are we to believe that these two 
archrival Wahhabi fundamentalist monarchies, the two main funders and arms 
suppliers of the Syrian uprising, are really both interested in creating a 
multisectarian, multiparty democracy in Syria, which they would not tolerate 
in their own countries? 
 
                                                 
76 Thomas L. Friedman, “Caution, Curves Ahead,” New York Times, March 27, 2013, 
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Friedman claims there are currently three rebel groups in Syria engaged in the conflict 
that could potentially emerge as rulers of a new post-Assad Syria. He writes 
Syria's rebels fall into three groups: those democrats who want to be free to be 
citizens in a country where everyone has the same rights; those who want to 
be free to be more Islamic; and those who want to be free to be more sectarian 
-- to see Syria's Sunni majority oust the ruling Alawite minority. 
 
He claims the ‘West’ should support the group that is more likely to get Syrians “to 
think and act like citizens than sects or tribes [Emphasis added].” Echoing the 
thoughts of many liberals, Friedman understands the term ‘citizen’ in liberal terms 
meaning someone who values things like a democratic secular government. Here we 
see a clear ranking of different kinds of people and societies. At the top are citizens 
and below them are those who belong to “sects or tribes.” The implication is that 
‘Wahhabism’ is incompatible with the liberal belief in a secular state because it 
encourages people to act in ways contrary to what liberalism values. We tend to 
associate the term ‘tribe’ with an earlier period in human history where society was 
organised according to a common ancestry. It also a biological term used to describe a 
taxonomic category placed between a subfamily and a genus or between a suborder 
and a family. These understandings support the claim that Friedman is categorising 
adherents of ‘Wahhabism’ as ‘behind’ or ‘below’ non-‘Wahhabi’ and non-religious 
people living in an ‘advanced’ liberal secular democratic state.  
 
This helps us to understand why Friedman believes the “secular-nationalist rebels” 
who are “those democrats who want to be free to be citizens in a country where 
everyone has the same rights” are the only potentially viable group the ‘West’ can 
support. According to Friedman, the ‘West’ must not support the Sunni groups who 
are themselves supported and armed by a “Wahhabi fundamentalist monarchy” 
because if they emerge victorious then it is likely they will create a state that rejects 
democracy, secularism and ‘stability’ in favour of a monarchy ruled according to 
‘Wahhabi’ religious doctrine. They will likely create a state that encourages treating 
its people as “sects or tribes” rather than as “citizens” who respect the freedom others 
including religious freedom. Friedman writes  
I'm dubious that just arming “nice” rebels will produce the Syria we want; it 
could, though, drag us in in ways we might not want. But if someone can 
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make the case that arming the secular-nationalist rebels increases the chances 
of forcing Assad and the Russians into a settlement, and defeating the 
Islamists rebels after Assad falls, I'm ready to listen. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many liberal intellectuals treat ‘Wahhabism’ as an affront to most of the values they 
hold dear. Liberals value freedom, a modern liberal democratic secular government 
and a political environment that provides its people with the best chance to develop 
their abilities. As we have seen, liberal intellectuals tend to see ‘Wahhabism’ as 
denying individual freedoms especially religious and gender freedoms, as rejecting 
secularism in favour of a state ruled according to ‘Wahhabi’ religious doctrine and as 
creating a political environment that hinders an individual’s development. I will now 
take a close look at some of the underlying themata and generative metaphors that are 
influencing how liberals make sense of the world in general and consider the 
implications this has for how they understand ‘Wahhabism’. 
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Chapter Five 
Making Sense of Liberal Representations of ‘Wahhabism’  
 
Most of the evil in this world is done by people with good intentions. 
  
 T.S. Eliot 
 
I have argued to date that liberal intellectuals representing ‘Wahhabism’ rely on 
particular notions about human nature, the relationship between persons conceived of 
as individuals and their society, the ideal ordering of a community and history. These 
notions add up in some way to a tradition that is recognisably ‘liberal’ even if in each 
instance there are important controversies and differences between those claiming to 
belong to a liberal tradition. I then set about showing how these beliefs that 
characterise and define how liberals make sense of the world and understand the aims 
and goals of human existence began to shape the way some liberal intellectuals 
represent ‘Wahhabism’. Hence the characterisation of societies in which 
‘Wahhabism’ is prevalent as relatively ‘backward,’ ‘un-evolved,’ ‘anti-modern’ and 
‘regressive’ when compared with states in the ‘West,’ and we saw many championing 
the introduction of measures with the aim of creating a modern secular liberal 
democratic state that guarantees and values the liberties of its people.  
 
Yet it seems there is still more to be understood about the ‘why’ of the liberal 
representation of ‘Wahhabism’. Here we confront the allure of various kinds of 
interpretative or even explanatory approaches. As I have noted there is certainly a rich 
tradition of the sociology of knowledge which offers a structural and determinist 
account of ideas couched in terms of class and gender. Other thinkers like Arendt in 
her Life of Rahel Varnhagen have offered a rich historical and phenomenological 
account of how  “personal preferences”/prejudice intersect with historical 
circumstance to play a major role in how individuals make sense of the world.1 For 
reasons already spelled out and without seeking to controvert the findings generated 
by these traditions, I have determined on the use of a more formal analysis couched in 
                                                 
1 Hannah Arendt 1958, Rahel Varnhagen: the life of a Jewess, trans. Richard and Clara Winston, ed. 
Liliane Weissberg (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
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terms of significant metaphoric and discursive features. Here I show how if we dig 
deeper we establish several important elements that play a major role in constituting 
these kinds of representations.  
 
These elements are what Gerald Holton calls ‘themata’ and what Kurt Danziger calls 
‘generative metaphors’.2 My ability to make sense of some of these liberal, Marxist 
and neo-conservative representations of ‘Wahhabism’ relies in part on my ability to 
abstract and describe the roles both of these processes play in how these intellectuals 
make sense of the world and the representing process. I dedicate the first part of this 
chapter to describing precisely what these two concepts are and how they work. I then 
identify and describe the some of the key thematas and generative metaphors liberals 
rely on and the implications these have for the ways in which liberals represent 
‘Wahhabism’.  
 
It should be noted from the outset that Holton and Danziger are historians seeking to 
make sense of the history respectively of European physics from Kepler to Einstein 
and the rise of modern psychology. They have set out to demonstrate the role by two 
kinds of discursive and generative factors at work in these rich and complex 
intellectual projects. On the premise that the proof of the pudding is in its eating, I 
propose to establish the value of drawing on these two discursive ‘devices’ by 
applying them to situations in the social world i.e. when looking at the different ways 
intellectuals represent ‘Wahhabism’. In adapting and using these theories in this way I 
am building on a tradition of scholarship in social science that includes authors like 
Robert Nisbet.3  
 
Themata : Holton and Nisbet  
 
Gerald Holton’s account of the origins of scientific thought established the value of 
studying what he called ‘themata’.4 Holton defines themata as those presuppositions 
that often exist for long periods of history and which are not derivable “from either 
                                                 
2 Holton, “The Role of Themata in Science,”; Kurt Danzigar, Metaphors in the History of Psychology, 
ed. David Leary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
3 Robert Nisbet, Sociology as an Art Form (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
4 Gerald Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1988) 
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observation or analytic ratiocination”.5 As such these presuppositions “… required a 
term of their own, and thus the author called them themata (singular, thema, from the 
Greek  θέμα: that which is laid down; proposition; primary word).”6 Holton sees 
themata as “often-hidden mechanisms[s]” that have and continue to play powerful and 
motivating roles in the advancing of science.7 Holton maintains they have been so 
influential that they have “repeatedly fashioned the foundations of sciences.”8 Holton 
also describes them as “motivating aids” inspiring and motivating researchers that 
also “tend to be suppressed or disappear from view.”9 Other authors have used 
alternative terms when referring to these same assumptions or presuppositions authors 
tend to take for granted when making sense of the world and which are often taken as 
literal truth. A popular term is “master-themes” which for example is used by Robert 
Nisbet in his study of the parallels between sociology and art.10 
 
Holton’s account of the thematic origins of scientific thought lead him to argue that 
there were a number of presuppositions each with their own discreet set of thematic 
elements pervading and silently shaping the work of modern scientists. These 
included themata like evolution/steadystate/devolution and 
mechanistic/materialistic/mathematical models which have proven to be fundamental 
frameworks that have shaped the development of scientific thought especially in 
terms of the process Popper insisted was the critical process of testing and refuting 
established theories. 11  
 
Holton’s studies have concentrated on themata that have influenced researchers in the 
physical sciences, however as he notes the same findings are applicable to the other 
sciences.12 Holton’s indexing of themata in the physical sciences helps highlight an 
important point that is pertinent to our considering of the themata used by liberal, 
Marxist and neo-conservative intellectuals. Namely that different groups of people 
                                                 
5 Holton, “The Role of Themata in Science,” 456 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 454.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid., 455. 
10 Nisbet, Sociology as an Art Form, 29. 
11 Holton, “The Role of Themata in Science,” 458; Stephen Thornton, “Karl Popper,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014), ed. Edward N. Zalta. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/popper. 
12 Holton, “The Role of Themata in Science,” 458. 
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tend to use different themata and that these absolutely fundamental beliefs tend to 
influence the ways in which these different groups of people make sense of the world 
before them. Holton finds that  
All these [themata] become visible most strikingly during a conflict between 
individuals or groups that are committed to opposing themata, or within the 
developing work of a scientist holding on to a thematic concept before the data 
have given sufficient confidence in its value.13 
 
Because they are not usually acknowledged or explicitly taught, Holton maintains that 
the influential role themata play are often ignored by historians of science wanting to 
understand things like what motivates and inspires scientists in their research, why 
they select particular conceptual tools and why researchers treat data in particular 
ways.14 Holton observes how some scientists, consciously or otherwise 
… use highly motivating and very general presuppositions or hypotheses that 
are not directly derivable from the phenomena and are not provable or 
falsifiable … these motivating aids-which the author has termed thematic 
presuppositions or thematic hypotheses – tend to be suppressed, and disappear 
from view.15  
 
Holton is very critical of those adopting what he calls a ‘two-dimensional approach’ 
that fails to appreciate the integral and influential role themata play in how 
researchers make sense of the world.  
 
Holton identifies four major problems with this kind of approach. One is that by 
consciously or unconsciously ignoring or overlooking these themata, researchers also 
tend to overlook the “positive, motivating and emancipatory potential of certain 
presuppositions, as well as the negative and enslaving role that sometimes has led 
promising scientists into disastrous error.”16 Two failing to recognise the influential 
role played by themata “does nothing to explain why at any given time the choice of 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 454-455. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 456. 
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problems or the reception of theories may be strikingly different among individuals or 
like-minded groups who face the same corpus of data.”17 Three 
…this limited view does not explain what a historian, looking at laboratory 
notebooks or drafts of a distinguished scientist, often sees with stark clarity: 
the willingness, particularly at the early stages, privately to cling, firmly, and 
sometimes at great risk, to what can only be called a suspension of disbelief 
about the possible falsification of their hypotheses, emerging from the data 
before them.18 
 
And four this kind of two-dimensional definition treats ‘science’  
…as if it were a cold and lifeless imposition of an authoritarian, dogmatic 
excess of rationalism, one that le[aves] no room for creative play of the 
intuition or personal preferences.19  
 
This last point is especially pertinent to this study and speaks to the point raised by 
others like Gadamer and Arendt about the effect of  “personal preferences” or what 
Gademer calls ‘prejudice’ on how individuals make sense of the world. Recognising 
the major role themata play and undertaking a ‘thematic analysis’ aimed at drawing 
some of these out for closer analysis is therefore crucial to our understanding of what 
motivates and inspires researchers in their creative processes. This becomes especially 
important when we consider many of these themata can “…persist for long periods in 
the individual case as well as throughout long periods of history.”20  
 
While Holton is concerned with research undertaken in the ‘physical sciences’ this 
approach can as he recommends be applied to other sciences to which we can also 
include the ‘social sciences’. Holton claims that “the role of ... themata is not so 
different from the guiding presuppositions and framing worldviews expressed in other 
creative activities, from the arts to politics.”21 In many instances “some themata in a 
particular science are exemplifications of the same fundamental themata in other 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 458 
18 Ibid., 456 
19 Ibid., 461. 
20 Ibid., 456. 
21 Ibid., 462. 
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sciences, or even in cultural productions far from that of the sciences.”22 Robert 
Nisbet is among those authors who have heeded Holton’s advice, using his ideas to 
study the parallels between sociology and art.   
 
As has been the case with ‘Western’ science, Nisbet finds that researchers working in 
the sociology and art fields have tended to draw on and interpret a set of ‘master-
themes’ when undertaking research. One of the dominant ‘master-themes’ identified 
by Nisbet and which is pertinent to how liberals make sense of the world is 
‘individualism’. Nisbet writes  
The rise of the modern conception of the individual, free and secular, 
liberated, as it were, from the religious community, is of course a hallmark of 
the painting of the Italian Renaissance, Individuality in its own right thus 
becomes a theme…In more recent times, roughly since the 1950s, the 
individual self, consciousness, reflexive awareness, have given a certain 
priority to subjectivism in literature and art. And no one acquainted with the 
history of sociology during the last decade or two will be unaware of the 
dominance of precisely these same styles and themes in this area.23 
 
Some of the representations provided by Liberal intellectuals in this study would 
suggest that this search for the self is best traced back to the Protestant Reformation 
rather than the Renaissance. Irrespective of this, individualism continues to be a key 
thematic element that has become a central imperative of contemporary thought 
including contemporary political liberal thought. As I point out in my ‘ideal type,’ 
freedom, secularism and progress are also key thematic elements central to 
contemporary liberal thinking.  
 
Nisbet points out that modern researchers in modern social science have also been 
preoccupied with and pursued other common themata including ideas dealing with 
‘community,’ ‘authority,’ ‘status,’ the ‘sacred’ and ‘alienation’. As we will soon see, 
the alienation ‘master theme’ has had a major influence on how Marxist intellectuals 
make sense of the world and more specifically how they make sense of ‘Wahhabism’. 
Nisbet maintains that these themata have helped form a “thematic palette” that has 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 461-462 
23 Nisbet, Sociology as an Art Form, 29. 
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been used by the founders of sociology when creating portraits of the “European 
social landscape.”24 We can also say that some of these same themata have also 
helped form a ‘thematic palette’ used by ‘Western’ intellectuals when creating 
portraits of the ‘Middle Eastern’ and ‘Islamic’ landscapes for ‘Western’ audiences in 
recent times. 
 
Nisbet also suggests there are three dominant metaphorical systems namely growth, 
genealogy and mechanism that have influenced and motivated scholars using these 
themata.  
Growth is change, yes, but when we declare some change a manifestation of 
growth in the social sphere we are speaking metaphorically. We are endowing 
an institution or social structure with a process drawn from the organic world. 
Few perspectives, few themes, have been more vital in Western thought than 
that of growth or development, which is a conceptual product of metaphor.25 
 
Generative Metaphors and Danizger  
 
While these specific metaphors are of varying relevance to this study, what is 
important is the relation between a researcher’s use of themata and the metaphors 
helping ‘constitute,’ ‘generate’ and support this kind of thinking. We can refer to the 
seminal work of Kurt Danziger for a deeper understanding of the generative role or 
‘theory–constitutive function’ metaphors play in this process.26 
 
Danziger’s analysis of metaphor takes us beyond the literal surface of discourse and 
into the realm of assumptions and preoccupations, an important point when we start to 
consider the ways in which liberal, Marxist and neo-conservatives make sense of the 
world. Danziger argues that individuals and groups of individuals who have 
contributed to the evolution of psychology tend to draw on similar metaphorical 
descriptions that have been used over long periods of time and which have come to be 
thought of “as expressing some kind of literal truth.”27 This makes the role played by 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 40. 
25 Ibid.,33 
26 Kurt Danziger, Metaphors in the History of Psychology, ed. David E. Leary (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
27Ibid., 332. 
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metaphors historically significant as it allow us to “improve our understanding of 
patterns of… thought…characteristic of a period, or a culture, or a particular 
intellectual community.”28 The study of generative metaphors can therefore be 
understood as pertinent to our making sense of the liberal, Marxist and neo-
conservative intellectual representations of ‘Wahhabism’ in the post 9/11 period 
characterised by a heightened anxiety about ‘Islamic radicalism’.   
 
Danziger provides an illuminating example of the ways in which psychologists Bain 
and McDougall used metaphors when writing about psychology. This account is 
illuminating in the sense that it can help us to understand the ways in which 
intellectuals in this study use metaphors and the ‘theory-constitutive function’ role 
metaphors can play. Danziger writes that Bain describes the learning process in terms 
of “tracks” and “turning off steam” and that McDougall describes an organism 
without instincts would be a “steam engine whose fires had been drawn.”29 Danziger 
writes that both Bain and McDougall are very deliberate in the language they choose 
to use and that their use of particular metaphors that help create particular images fit 
their psychological theories in fundamental ways. Danziger writes that Bain and 
McDougall’s use of metaphorical language has a ‘theory-constitutive function’ and 
that our studying of these can provide us with valuable “insight into some of the 
underlying assumptions and concerns that received expression in Bain’s and 
McDougall’s psychological theories.”30 
 
Danziger finds that both authors for example employ a similar image of ‘the mind as 
an energy system’ yet they emphasise different aspects of this image. This illuminates 
an important characteristic of fundamental psychological metaphors and metaphors in 
general including those used by intellectuals belonging to the same tradition providing 
representations of ‘Wahhabism’. Danziger writes 
They [basic metaphors] provide a basic common framework within which 
communication is possible, while at the same time providing scope for 
differences of emphasis. Basic metaphors, like that of psychological energy, 
provide a kind of rough schema that, when held in common, can constitute one 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 331-332 
29 Ibid., 332. 
30 Ibid.. 
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of the minimal conditions for effective human communication. But because 
metaphors link two domains (such as mind and energy) in rather undefined 
ways, these schemata leave open the issue of precisely which assumptions and 
questions are to be transferred from the one domain to the other. So 
metaphorical schemata not only provide a framework for shared discourse, but 
encourage differences of emphasis and therefore provide conditions 
favourable for theoretical development.31  
 
Similarly Nisbet finds that authors influenced by the ‘master-theme’ individualism are 
influenced by a number of common and basic metaphors namely those relating to 
growth, genealogy and mechanism. Nisbet for example emphasises the key role 
‘growth’ has played in the way ‘Western’ intellectuals have made sense of the world.  
Growth is change, yes, but when we declare some change a manifestation of 
growth in the social sphere we are speaking metaphorically. We are endowing 
an institution or social structure with a process drawn from the organic world. 
Few perspectives, few themes, have been more vital in Western thought than 
that of growth or development, which is a conceptual product of metaphor.32 
 
The key point is there are common metaphorical systems that provide a framework 
for a shared discourse for intellectuals belonging to a particular tradition. As Danziger 
puts it, “underlying metaphorical systems have generative properties that give a 
certain cast to surface discourse” and “the identification of such schemata is therefore 
important from the point of view of understanding the cognitive factors that provide 
some of the conditions of both coherence and novelty in the historical development 
of…discourse.”33 Identifying these metaphorical systems in addition to identifying 
the key thematic elements is therefore integral to making sense of liberal, Marxist and 
neo-conservative intellectuals representations of ‘Wahhabism’. 
 
It is also important to point out that metaphors are more than just cognitive 
constructions.  They have what Danziger calls a ‘programmatic aspect’. Reiterating 
the important point made by Donald Schön, Danziger writes that “When we define a 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Nisbet, Sociology as an Art Form, 33. 
33 Danziger, “Generative metaphor and the history of psychological discourse,” 333. 
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certain part of the world metaphorically, this is not just an invitation to think about it 
in a certain way, it is also an invitation to act in terms of certain implied 
assumptions.”34 Danziger points out that by using metaphors to define an object in a 
particular way encourages certain expectations, focuses our attention on particular 
features and highlights priorities for practical action.  
 
Making Sense of Some Key Liberal Themata and Generative Metaphors 
 
The idea of the individual’s right to freedom including the right to religious liberty 
has existed in American political culture and has been taken for granted by many 
American intellectuals at least since the founding of the American republic in 1783. 
Zhenghuan Zhou is among the authors to write about the prominent role this themata 
has played in the American political experience.  
While the republic was founded upon the values and beliefs that go to the 
heart of modern individualism, the absence of a historical tradition, the 
vastness of uncultivated and rich land, and ultimately a divinely ordained 
sense of mission, combined to foster a strong and unique form of individualist 
culture that is unparalleled in any other nation in the world…to read American 
history- from the Puritan settlers in pursuit of religious liberty to the 
revolutionary war that led to political independence, from the lonesome 
frontierman chasing his “manifest destiny” to the economically self-made 
capitalist- is to watch individualism grow. To observe the ordinary lives of 
ordinary men and women in America is to see individualism in action.”35 
 
Zhou is expressing an opinion commonly held by many sociologists studying the 
American political experience, that the US is the embodiment of individualism par 
excellence. This themata extends beyond the American experience and also plays a 
central role in the political liberal tradition, acting as a motivating aid for many 
modern liberal intellectuals making sense of and representing ‘Wahhabism’. 
 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 351 
35 Zhenghuan Zhou, Liberal Rights and Political Culture: Envisioning Democracy in China (New 
York: Routledge, 2005), 125. 
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While these authors do belong to the intellectual tradition we call political liberalism, 
it must also be pointed out that all of those liberal intellectuals whose representations 
of ‘Wahhabism’ I deconstruct in this study are Americans writing in some of the US’ 
most popular and widely circulated newspapers i.e. the New York Times and the Wall 
Street Journal primarily for American audiences. It is therefore no surprise that such 
an influential American themata like individualism that has dominated the modern 
American experience should play such an influential role in the American intellectual 
tradition. What is key for American liberal intellectuals is that this presupposition 
resonates with the similar ideas about individualism that have also played such an 
integral role in the modern political liberal thought.  
 
In my analysis we saw that there were some liberal intellectuals who refer to a very 
specific period in time in ‘Western’ history namely the Protestant Reformation when 
representing ‘Wahhabism’. For example Thomas L. Friedman describes the modern 
Islamic world in which ‘Wahhabism’ is pervasive as currently undergoing a much 
needed “Islamic reformation” that will help push it into the “modern era.”36 Fareed 
Zakaria likens the current sectarian struggle in the Middle East which involves 
‘Wahhabi’ forces as similar to the past struggles “between Catholics and Protestants 
in Europe in the age of the Reformation.”37 The liberal intellectuals’ use of the term 
‘reformation’ and their analogising of this period in time when making sense of the 
current situation in the Middle East is telling.  
 
Holton points out that themata often exist for long periods of time and this is certainly 
the case when we consider the prominent and long-term role individualism has played 
in the liberal intellectual tradition. This idea at the very least dates back to a time that 
intellectuals like Zakaria and Friedman are referring to, that is the Protestant 
Reformation that took place during the eighteenth century. Neither Zakaria nor 
Friedman nor any other liberal intellectual explicitly refer to the importance or lessons 
of this period, however as Holton describes this lack of explicit acknowledgement is a 
key aspect of themata. Despite this lack of explicit acknowledgement about the 
importance of this era we can see that some of the key ideas associated with this 
period namely the concept of individualism are clearly acting as ‘motivating aids’ for 
                                                 
36 Friedman, “An Islamic Reformation.” 
37 Zakaria, “U.S. fuel to the Middle East fire.”  
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some liberal intellectuals when making sense of ‘Wahhabism’ in the modern political 
environment.  
 
A cursory review of the Liberal tradition tells us that the Reformation played a 
prominent role in laying the foundation for emergence of the ‘master-theme’ 
individualism and the ideas typically associated with it i.e. freedom of religion and 
secularism. This themata has been so prominent that liberal intellectuals have since 
taken it as expressing a kind of literal truth about the ‘modern’ existence of mankind. 
What authors like Zakaria and Freedman do not explicitly acknowledge is that the 
Reformation marked an important transition in the ‘Western’ world namely a moving 
away from the idea that the church and state (which were interlinked) controlled the 
individual and an embracing of the idea of an individual’s freedom to make his and 
her own decision free from the coercion and interference from state and faith 
institutions. This was a transition from the church and state’s control of the individual 
to an individual freedom free from the interference and coercion from state and faith 
institutions.  
 
In the religious age immediately prior to the Reformation it was generally accepted 
that it was the key function of the (religious) state in the ‘West’ to define and 
articulate a specific (religious) conception of the good for its citizens. The events 
taking place during the Reformation period helped to challenge and usher in a new 
understanding regarding the function of the state. Influenced by the writings of key 
Protestant intellectuals like Martin Luther and John Calvin, and by key (liberal) 
thinkers like John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant, a conception of 
Individualism emerged that continues to pervade liberal thinking. In the new post-
religious and secular age people began to value an individual freedom that allowed 
them to think and act as they pleased so as long as they did not harm or impinge on 
the freedom of others and which occurred within a state that valued and guaranteed its 
people’s liberty. That is to say people were free to develop and pursue their own 
conception of the good.  
 
Closely related with this way of thinking and which has also influenced the ways in 
which liberals represent ‘Wahhabism’ is the themata regarding ‘progress’. We saw 
how many Liberal intellectuals described ‘Wahhabism’ and societies in which this 
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religion was enforced or practiced as ‘backward’ and ‘anti-modern’. Doug Bandow 
for example uses the phrase “medieval theocracy” to describe a state like Saudi 
Arabia that is ruled according to ‘Wahhabi’ doctrine and therefore does not value or 
grant their people this individual freedom to make their own choices.38 Thomas 
Friedman describes ‘Wahhabism’ as “anti-modern” and suggests that changes must be 
made in Middle Eastern nations in order for them to “thrive in the modern era.”39   
 
What these authors are getting at but are often not explicitly stating is that they are 
motivated and inspired by the idea/assume that people and the societies they make up 
have the ability to become ‘better’, ‘progress’ or rather ‘realise their full potential’. 
The implications associated with this kind of thinking is that we can measure 
‘progress’ or the lack thereof of individuals and societies on some kind of continuum 
and that there exists a ‘bad’ and ‘good’ or rather ‘worse’ and ‘better’ ways of living.  
This themata has a long tradition in ‘Western’ ‘scientific’ thinking in general and 
liberal political theory in particular and this ‘master-theme’ can at the very least be 
traced back to the work of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Herbert Spencer, and John Stuart 
Mill.  
 
It was Lasmarck who provided the first modern attempt to account for the diversity of 
life on the planet without relying on the ideas of divine creation.40 Inspired by 
Lasmarck’s ideas, it was Spencer who then used materials from the biological 
sciences to construct a framework aimed at describing the ‘development’ of the 
human race. Spencer promoted the idea that the human race like the animal kingdom 
is constantly evolving/progressing and that this evolution/progression was just one 
element of a universe also in constant state of evolution/progression. Spencer’s 
evolutionary theory also holds that there exists a hierarchy according to human 
development, that we can ‘rank’ humans according to ‘race’ and ‘mental ability’ and 
that ‘progress’ can be understood as “an advance from homogeneity of structure to 
heterogeneity of structure.”41 
 
                                                 
38 Bandow, “Befriending Saudi Princes.” 
39 Friedman, “An Islamic Reformation.”  
40 Lange, “Progress.”  
41 Herbert Spencer, “Progress: Its Law and Cause,” in Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative: 
Volume I (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1857), 18. 
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These ideas resonate with modern European Literature about progress, in which 
authors typically claim that European science, culture and institutions are the most 
superior in the world. “In other words, the paradigmatic progress narrative shows 
Europeans setting the standards and then the rest of the world catching up until 
everyone is a full participant in an enlightened order.”42 As Margaret Meek Lange 
points out, this introducing of scientific theories about biological evolution into 
writings about the progress of mankind helped to create a new kind of Eurocentrism 
that was based on biologically racist ideas. Inspired by this evolutionary theory, 
Spencer argued that different races of human beings exist and form a clear hierarchy: 
“The civilized man departs more widely from the general type of the placental 
mammalia than do the lower human races.”43  
 
This kind of thinking inspired many prominent liberal theorists like Mill who 
combined it with other key ideas like those associated with individualism. Mill for 
example argued that the ‘development’ of man could be best achieved within a liberal 
democracy given the individual freedoms it values and guarantees. According to Mill 
it was liberal secular regimes that provide the necessary conditions for a conflict 
between ‘ideologies’ which he saw as a powerful driver of ‘ideological’ 
development.44 Like many of the modern liberal intellectuals representing 
‘Wahhabism,’ this kind of thinking would mean that Mill would also have major 
problems with ‘Wahhabi’ nations like Saudi Arabia that do not allow for a conflict of 
ideas within a liberal democratic state which is necessary for the learning and 
development of a society. It is also important to note that unlike many Marxists who 
consider the human and societal progress to be an inevitable process, Mill believed 
progress was possible and desirable but not assured.   
 
We can understand many of the modern liberal intellectuals representing 
‘Wahhabism’ as influenced by a similar themata about progress. Friedman for 
example shows signs of the same racist beliefs associated with progress that are 
espoused by thinkers like Spencer, arguing that “young Saudis” forced to live 
according to ‘Wahhabi’ doctrine in Saudi Arabia want “evolution” and not 
                                                 
42 ‘Lange, “Progress.” 
43 Spencer, “Progress: Its Law and Cause,” 18. 
44 Mill, On Liberty, 14-15. 
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“revolution.”45 Friedman also ‘ranks’ the different societies in the Middle East 
categorising non-‘Wahhabi’ societies like Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Libya as 
‘above’ or ‘more enlightened’ than the ‘Wahhabi’ societies in Saudi Arabia and the 
other Arab Gulf states. He writes 
There are the radical revolutions you’ve read about in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Syria, Yemen and Libya, none of which yet have built stable, inclusive 
democracies. But then there are the radical evolutions that you’ve not 
read about, playing out in Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf 
monarchies [Emphasis added].46 
 
It is people and not animals that tend to experience ‘revolutions’ whilst we tend to use 
the term ‘evolution’ generally when we are talking about biological theories that deal 
with animals. The implication is that ‘Wahhabism’ does not provide the individualism 
or freedom that is provided by the modern liberal democratic state and which is 
needed for humans and societies to ‘progress’.  
 
There are also important (what Danziger calls) ‘generative metaphors’ that help 
constitute this ‘master-theme’. Danziger points out that metaphors commonly used by 
authors belonging to particular traditions often take them “as expressing some kind of 
literal truth” and that we must identify and analyse these metaphors if we are serious 
about “improve[ing] our understanding of patterns of…though characteristic of a 
period, or a culture, or a particular intellectual community.”47 Abstracting the 
“underlying metaphorical systems” that “have generative properties” and “that give a 
certain cast to a surface discourse” is therefore of major importance when making 
sense of Liberal representations of ‘Wahhabism’.48  
 
An important metaphorical system I identify in my deconstruction of Liberal 
representations of ‘Wahhabism’ and which fits perfectly with the Liberal themata 
about progress is the metaphor ‘Progress is Directional Movement’. In one example 
Maureen Dowd describes ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia as making “galactically glacial” 
                                                 
45 Thomas L. Friedman, “The Other Arab Awakening,” New York Times, November 30, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/opinion/sunday/friedman-the-other-arab-awakening.html 
46 Ibid. 
47 Danziger, Metaphors in the History of Psychology, 331-332. 
48 Ibid.,333. 
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‘progress’ with regards to gender and cultural freedoms. In another example she 
maintains there is “no looking back,” that ‘Wahhabi’ clerics are “looking in the 
opposite direction” and “that they [the ‘Wahhabi’ clerics] can[not] stop the trend and 
turn back the clock.”49 The “trend” she is talking about is the granting of new 
freedoms to Saudi Arabians forced to live according to ‘Wahhabi’ doctrine. Thomas 
Farr draws on the same metaphorical system when representing ‘Wahhabism’ as an 
obstacle to the development/ ‘progress’ of a society. He describes the need to 
“advance women’s rights” so as to create a modern liberal secular democratic state.50  
 
As we can see these liberals literally believe that there is a purpose, endpoint or a 
highest state of evolution for mankind and that we as individuals and a society must 
always be working to ‘move forwards’/ ‘progressing’ until we reach this goal. For 
many liberal intellectuals it is taken as granted that this end goal is a world full of 
modern liberal democratic states that value and guarantee its citizens freedom. 
However not all people think in this way. Not all people have a linear conception of 
human progress and believe that we can rank or order people and societies. There are 
some people for example who have a cyclical understanding of the universe and 
human nature while others believe life is chaotic and there is no rhyme or reason. This 
was pointed out by David Hume in 1757 and more recently by Terry Eagleton. Hume 
writes  
We are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, where the true springs and 
causes of every event, are entirely unknown to us; nor have we either 
sufficient wisdom to foresee, or power to prevent those ills, with which we are 
continually threatened. We hang in perpetual suspense betwixt life and death, 
health and sickness, plenty and want; which are distributed amongst the 
human species by secret and unknown causes, whose operation is oft 
unexpected, and always accountable.51  
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Dowd, “Loosey Goosey Saudi.”  
50Farr, “How Obama is sidelining religious freedom.”  
51David Hume. The Natural History of Religion (1757) 
http://social.stoa.usp.br/articles/0016/2535/The_Natural_History_of_Religion_-_David_Hume.pdf. § 
III6. 
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While Eagleton writes  
The cosmos is something of the whirling, spiralling, self-involved quality of 
traditional Celtic art. Like such art, it exists purely for its own self delight, not 
to accomplish some mighty goal. Like [James] Joyce’s fiction, the world is not 
designed to get anywhere in particular. For [John Scottus] Eriugena, as for 
modern physics, Nature is a dynamic process which varies according to the 
observer’s shifting vantage point. It is an infinity of partial perspectives, an 
endless sport of multiple viewpoints…52 
 
In this sense the linear thinking held by many liberals can be understood as a coping 
mechanism designed to impose a sense of order and purpose on a world and universe 
that for many lacks both. The inability of many liberal intellectuals to accept the 
whirling nature of the universe and their desire to believe that we as a society are 
heading towards an end goal can be understood as a refusal to accept the seemingly 
inherent meaningless and emptiness of our own existence. In this sense, developing 
and subscribing to a particular linear conception of history that places themselves and 
the societies to which they belong ‘ahead’ of other people and societies that for 
example live according to ‘Wahhabi’ religious doctrine can be understood as an 
egoistic attempt to instil meaning in their lives by showing they are somehow ‘better’, 
‘more advanced’ or ‘more evolved’ than those ‘Wahhabi’ Muslims.  
 
Alasdair McIntyre is among those to highlight the important role teleology plays for 
intellectual traditions.53 ‘Teleology’ comes from the Greek telos meaning ‘end’ and 
logos meaning ‘reason’. McIntyre writes that a teleology can be any philosophical 
account that holds final causes exist in nature meaning nature inherently tends toward 
definite ends. Without a religious belief in God and an eternal afterlife filled with 
rewards, the liberal teleology helps to provide the sole standard by which to judge the 
quality of a life. Put another way it helps provide meaning where there is otherwise 
none.  The liberal’s representing of ‘Wahhabism’ can therefore be understood as an 
exercise designed to imbue the liberal intellectual’s life with meaning and purpose, as 
they are able to point to it and say ‘huh, we are better them and we can show them 
how to create a heaven on earth’. 
                                                 
52 Terry Eagleton, On Evil, (New Haven  Yale University Press, 2010): 47. 
53 Alasdair McIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). 
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Chapter Six 
‘Wahhabism’ is the Enemy of Us: Neo-conservative Representations 
of ‘Wahhabism’ 
 
Both read the Bible day and night, 
But thou read'st black where I read white.  
 
William Blake, The Everlasting Gospel  
 
On September 20, 2001 President George W. Bush delivered an influential speech to 
a Joint Session of the US Congress. In that speech he declared: 
The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab 
friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that 
supports them …Every nation, every region, now has a decision to make. Either 
you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.1 
 
Many see this as the precise moment in time in which the Bush Administration 
divided the nations of the world into one of two groups. Either they were friends of 
the US who supported their ‘Global War on Terror’ or they were enemies who sided 
with the terrorists.  
 
This speech is pertinent for a number of reasons. Not only does it highlight the Bush 
Administration’s simplistic and stark binary central to what became known as the 
Bush Doctrine (‘either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’) but it also 
revealed a number of key beliefs that have come to characterise what is referred to as 
a neo-conservative worldview.   
 
While President Bush gave this speech, it has been generally understood that it was 
testimony to the influence that a group of neo-conservative intellectuals now had in 
                                                 
1 George W. Bush, “Address to a joint session of Congress and the nation,” 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html. 
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shaping US foreign policy in the first decade of the twenty first century.2 Shapiro is 
among the many scholars who argue that the Bush Administration in partnership with 
its neo-conservative allies constructed a coherent worldview that attempted to account 
for why the recent terrorists attacks on the US had occurred—‘they hate us because 
we’re free’ and the policies that needed to be adopted so as to prevent these kinds of 
attacks from happening again—‘go on the offensive to spread democracy in the 
Middle East’.3  
 
In this chapter I begin as I did in my treatment of the liberal tradition, by outlining a 
Weberian ‘ideal type’ to help with my deconstructing of neo-conservative 
intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’. I then characterise some of the ways 
neo-conservatives represent ‘Wahhabism’. In the last part of this chapter I then turn to 
making sense of these representations by paying attention to the central role religious 
themata, specifically those concerning the Jewish state of Israel and the coming of the 
Saviour play in neo-conservative thinking. Second and closely related to this, I 
describe the important role the themata ‘good versus evil’ plays in how neo-
conservatives understand the world and the implications this has for how they 
represent ‘Wahhabism’. Finally I describe the influential role two generative 
metaphors namely the neo-conservative intellectuals’ understanding of the ‘Wahhabi’ 
Other as ‘animals’ and ‘savages’ has played in neo-conservative representations of 
‘Wahhabism’.  
 
Introducing the Neo-Conservatives 
 
The neo-conservative movement to which I refer and which had wielded significant if 
not hegemonic influence on the making of US foreign policy by the Bush 
Administration (2001-2008) is a US political movement widely understood as 
originating in the 1960s. Its sponsors include prominent intellectuals like Samuel 
Huntington who is well-known for his ‘Clash of Civilisations’ theory, Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Gertrude Himmelfarb and Irving Kristol. Among the 
prominent second-generation intellectuals are Carl Gersham, Penn Kemble, Charles 
                                                 
2 Grondin, “Mistaking hegemony for empire,” 227-241; George, “Leo Strauss,” 174-202. 
3 Ian Shapiro, Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy Against Global Terror (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), xii.  
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Krauthammer and Joshua Muravchik. As to the sources of the neo-conservative 
movement there has been a tendency to pick out the controversial figure of Leo 
Strauss if only because many of the intellectuals who were believed to be part of this 
neo-conservative movement were either students of, or else claimed to be influenced 
by Strauss. This connection has led some commentators to understand him as chiefly 
responsible for inspiring and shaping the modern neo-conservative movement though 
this is also hotly contested.4   
 
While its roots are often traced back to the works of intellectuals in the 1960s, it 
appears that the term ‘neo-conservative’ itself was popularised early in the 1970s 
when Michael Harrington used it to describe a group of American intellectuals who 
had moved away from the anti-Stalinist Socialist left and embraced American 
conservatism. Harrington who was himself part of the Socialist left used the term to 
refer to intellectuals like Bell, Moynihan and Kristol.5 The term then came to be used 
as a self-identifying label by Irving Kristol in 1979. He describes neo-conservatism as 
a ‘persuasion’ and a particular way of thinking about the world and politics.6 
Expressing his distaste for the American liberal tradition which he and many neo-
conservatives held responsible for what they perceived to be a cultural and moral 
breakdown in US society, it was Kristol who famously declared a neo-conservative to 
be a “liberal mugged by reality.”7 
 
The term ‘neo-conservatism’ again became extremely popular during the Presidency 
of George W. Bush with commentators often using it when referring to a group of 
intellectuals who were very influential in the Bush administration especially with 
regards to their US foreign policy.8 Commentators also often point to the Bush 
                                                 
4 Shadia Drury is a key proponent of this interpretation. See Shadia Drury, Leo Strauss and the 
American Right (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999) and Shadia Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo 
Strauss (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). This point was also made in BBC Documentary ‘The 
Power of Nightmares’ which equated Strauss with Islamic political theologian Sayyid Qutb, claiming 
Strauss was to neo-conservatives what Qutb was to al-Qaeda. See British Broadcasting Commission, 
‘The power of nightmares”, written and produced by Adam Curtis, first broadcast October-November 
2004. 
5 Michael Harrington, “The Welfare State and Its Neoconservative Critics,” Dissent 20, no.4 (1973).  
6 Irving Kristol, “Confessions of a True, Self-Confessed -Perhaps the Only -'Neo-conservative,” in 
Reflections of a Neoconservative, ed. Irving Kristol (New York: Basic books, 1983): 73-77. 
7 Irving Kristol, Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1978). 
8 Charles Hagel, Our Next Chapter: Tough Questions, Straight Answers (New York: Ecco, 2008) 50; 
Grondin, “Mistaking hegemony for empire,”, 227-228. 
  157 
Doctrine, a term coined by prominent neo-conservative intellectual Charles 
Krauthammer, as the quintessential expression of a neo-conservative foreign policy.9 
 
Like so many ‘fuzzy categories’ getting some clarity about the core beliefs that define 
neo-conservatism, understanding its key influences and writers and its reach and 
application have been the occasion of much scholarly debate. Both its critics and 
proponents emphasise different aspects they believe to be its defining characteristics. 
There are authors like Mearsheimer who understand it primarily as a modern form of 
Wilson Idealism, while others like George emphasise its inherently conflictual nature, 
just as other writers like Benin highlight unwavering support for Israel as a key 
defining feature of American neo-conservatism.10  
 
Despite the fuzzy nature of neo-conservatism I require an understanding of the core 
beliefs of neo-conservatism for the purposes of this study. As was the case with my 
treatment of the liberal tradition I start with a Weberian ‘ideal type’ to help with my 
deconstructing of neo-conservative intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’.  
There are some disagreements within the neo-conservative tradition. However these 
disagreements appear to be not so formidable or complex as traditions like Marxism 
and liberalism, which are older and so have had more time to develop different 
internal traditions and controversies. In light of this it is likely to be a slightly easier 
task to develop an ‘ideal type’ characterising the neo-conservative approach 
especially as it relates to US foreign policy. 
 
  
                                                 
9 George, “Leo Strauss176; Piki Ish-Shalom, “‘The Civilization of Clashes’”: Misapplying the 
Democratic Peace in the Middle East,” Political Science Quarterly 122, no.4 (2007/2008): 533. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/208279848?accountid=13552. 
10 John Mearsheimer, “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: realism versus neo-conservatism,” Open 
Democracy (2005), https://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/morgenthau_2522.jsp  
Susan George, Hijacking America: How the Religious and Secular Right Changed what Americans 
Think (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008): 25-31; Joel Benin, “The Israelization of American Middle East 
Policy Discourse,” Social Text 21, no.2 (2003): 125-139. 
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Towards an Ideal Type 
 
My ideal type is made up of three key elements. One element is a belief in the global 
promotion of democracy.11  Prominent neo-conservative intellectuals who have 
advocated that the US take forceful steps to spread democracy around the world and 
especially in the Middle East, include Muravchick, Bennett and Wolfowitz.12 This 
foreign policy initiative is motivated and inspired by the idea that a safe world is one 
made up of democratic states.13 For many neo-conservatives a less autocratic world 
means less anti-Americanism which in turn means a reduced threat to US national 
security and its interests abroad.14 According to Goldsmith neo-conservatives see 
“democracy promotion” as both “a normative prerogative and a pragmatic means to 
bolster the United States’ security and further its geopolitical preeminence.”15 
 
Neo-conservatives tend to equate democracy with freedom, believing a democratic 
state to be the most ‘free’ kind of state. To quote George W. Bush “every step toward 
freedom in the world makes our country safer.”16 In his 2006 State of the Union 
address, Bush argued that ending tyranny around the world by replacing it with 
democracy was one of the nation’s “defining moral commitments.”17  Bush claimed 
that this was not only “the right thing to do” but that it was also in the best interests of 
                                                 
11 Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny (Washington, D.C.: AEI 
Press, 1991); William J. Bennet, “Morality, Character and American Foreign Policy,” in Present 
Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and 
William Kristol (New York: Encounter Books, 2000); Paul Wolfowitz, “Statesmanship in the New 
Century,” in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. 
Robert Kagan and William Kristol (New York: Encounter Books, 2000).  
For a scholarly critique of this phenomenon including the relation between it and US foreign policy see 
Ish-Shalom, “‘The Civilization of Clashes’” 533–554; Fred Kaplan, Daydream Believers: How a Few 
Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power (New York: Wiley, 2008); Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They 
Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (New York: Doubleday, 2008); Francis Fukuyama, America at 
the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2006). 
12 Muravchik, Exporting Democracy; Bennet, “Morality, Character and American Foreign Policy,” in 
Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy.”; Wolfowitz, 
“Statesmanship in the New Century.”.  
13 Mearsheimer, “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War.” 
14 Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Making the World Safe for Partial Democracy? Questioning the Premises of 
Democracy Promotion,” International Security 33, no.2 (2008): 3, 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.rmit.edu.au/stable/40207134 
15 Ibid.,1. 
16 George W. Bush, “President Bush Delivers State of the Union Address” (Washington, D.C.:White 
House, January 31, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060131- 
10.html. 
17 Ibid. 
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America: “Democracies replace resentment with hope, respect the rights of their 
citizens and their neighbors, and join the fight against terror.”18 
 
Closely related to this is the idea that nation-states are either friends or enemies, 
invoking what Mearsheimer describes as a ‘black hats’-‘white hats’ view of the 
world.19 This ‘black and white’ view of the world and of foreign policy forms the 
second key element of my ideal type. This idea was famously expressed by President 
Bush when he declared “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”20 Neo-
conservatives typically consider democratic nations as holders of benign motives and 
as having a natural inclination to act peacefully towards other states especially the 
US.21 They generally believe that these states “only act in a bellicose fashion when 
the black hats, invariably non-democratic states, leave them no choice.”22 This can be 
understood as an expression of ‘Democratic Peace Theory’ which maintains that 
democratic states rarely engage in conflict with other democratic states.23 This is why 
neo-conservatives tend to promote the global spread of democracy because they 
believe it helps transform ‘enemies’ into ‘friends’. One time prominent neo-
conservative intellectual Fukuyama describes this global democratising project of 
turning ‘black hats’ into ‘white hats’ as ‘the end of history’.24 A motivating idea here 
which I will describe in greater detail later is the idea that ‘good’ will eventually 
emerge triumphant over ‘evil’.  
 
Unwavering support for the state of Israel is the third key element of my ideal type.  
Heilbrunn is among many authors who have pointed to the influence this commitment 
has had on the neo-conservative movement. Heilbrunn goes so far as to describe it as 
a uniquely Jewish phenomenon insisting that “Indeed, as much as they may deny it, 
neo-conservatism is in a decisive respect a Jewish phenomenon, reflecting a subset of 
Jewish concerns.”25 He says that this commitment involves promoting a US foreign 
policy that prioritises the aims and goals of Israel ahead of the US and/or which aligns 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Mearsheimer, “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War.” 
20 Bush, “President Bush Delivers State of the Union Address.” 
21 Mearsheimer, “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War.” 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin Books, 2012). 
25 Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, 11. 
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with policies promoted by ‘right-wing’ and ‘Zionist’ Israeli political parties whose 
ideas claim Biblical authority.26 Neo-conservatives appear to support Israel’s ongoing 
occupation of the Palestinian Territories and will often support Israel’s acquiring 
more Palestinian land in pursuit of promoting Israeli security. They also tend to 
defend what many others would understand as indefensible acts by the state of Israel. 
A good example of this approach is provided by prominent neo-conservative Frank 
Gaffney who justifies Israel’s Occupation on the grounds that any withdrawal would 
result in the creating of a ‘terrorist state’ which he calls “Palestan.”27 
 
It is generally acknowledged that the movement’s unwavering support for Israel is 
related to the influence wielded by prominent American Jewish intellectuals whose 
ideas have been shaped by their experiences of persistent anti-Jewish discrimination 
and shattering events like the Holocaust.28 It should however be noted that not all 
neo-conservatives are Jewish nor does identifying as Jewish necessarily entail 
unconditional and unwavering support for policies adopted by the state of Israel, as 
the role played by prominent left and liberal Jewish intellectuals in criticising Israeli 
policy suggests. 
 
While there are other beliefs and commitments that could be used to ‘define’ the neo-
conservative movement, I have chosen to abstract these three elements, a belief in the 
                                                 
26 Joel Benin, Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer are among those to point out the similarities in 
foreign policy between ‘right-wing’ political and religious elements in Israel i.e. the Likud Party and 
US foreign policy promoted by neo-conservatives. These authors have also highlighted numerous 
instances when neo-conservatives have promoted foreign policies that prioritise the interests of the 
state of Israel to the detriment of US interests. Benin, Walt and Mearsheimer identify the US’ 
involvement in Iraq as an example. Walt and Mearsheimer write that “Within the United States, the 
main driving force behind the Iraq war was a small band of neoconservatives, many with close ties to 
Israel’s Likud Party.”  See John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign 
Policy,” (2006): 54, http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/IsraelLobby.pdf.; Benin, “The Israelization 
of American Middle East Policy Discourse.” 
27 Gaffney, “Seeing the threat for what it is.”  
28 Ted Boettner traces the movement’s modern pro-Israeli stance back to the formative role played by 
intellectuals like Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Abram Shulsky and Elliot Abrams. 
According to Boettner many of these neo-conservative intellectuals were strongly influenced by their 
Jewish religious beliefs and had been personally affected by events like the Holocaust and anti-Jewish 
discriminatory practices in the US. See Ted Boettner, “Neo-Conservatism and Foreign Policy,” (MA 
Thesis, University of New Hampshire, 2002).  
Brandon High emphasises the influential roles played by Jewish Marxist intellectuals in the formation 
of the neo-conservative movement in the 1960s and 1970s. See Brandon High, “The Recent 
Historiography Of American Neoconservatism,” The Historical Journal 52, no.5 (2009): 475-491, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X09007560 
Jacob Heilbrunn claims that this modern ‘pro-Israeli’ political posture is related to Jewish neo-
conservative intellectuals’ experiences with anti-Semitism in the US, the Holocaust and the treatment 
of Jews by totalitarian regimes like Stalinist Russia. See Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right.. 
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global promotion of democracy, the categorising of nations and groups as either 
friends or enemies of the US and an unwavering support for Israel, to make up my 
‘ideal type’ and guide my analysis. With this ideal type in mind, I now turn my 
attention to newspaper and magazine articles written by neo-conservative intellectuals 
which often appear in prominent neo-conservative publications and most widely 
circulated American newspapers, with the intention of describing how some of them 
represent ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
The ‘Wahhabi’ is a Savage 
 
Gerecht joins other neo-conservatives like Stephens and Pryce-Jones who represent 
followers of ‘Wahhabism’ as inferior human beings when compared with those living 
in the ‘West’. Like Gerecht, Gaffney and Stephens, Pryce-Jones combines these 
representations when representing those groups of people and states that adhere to 
‘Wahhabism’ as enemies of the US and the wider ‘democratic’ world.  
Stephens attempts to make sense of the recent political situation in Indonesia and like 
many neo-conservatives wants to distinguish the friends of the US from its enemies.29 
Stephens identifies two ‘black hats’ he believes pose substantial threats to US 
international security, its stated aim of promoting democracy in the region and to 
Indonesian society. These are the ‘Wahhabi’-influenced groups operating in Indonesia 
(like the Front for the Defense of Islam), and the Saudi state which sponsors and 
promotes ‘Wahhabist radicals’. Like Gaffney and Gerecht, Stephens identifies Saudi 
Arabia as the source of modern ‘Islamic radicalism’.  
 
A key part of Stephens’ representation of ‘Wahhabism’ and of the states and groups 
that promote it like Saudi Arabia as enemies of the US, involves using analogies 
aimed at representing them as ‘less-evolved’ humans and ‘savages’. For example 
Stephens writes that  
The headquarters of the Front for the Defense of Islam is reached by a narrow 
alley just off a one-lane street in a residential neighbourhood near downtown 
Jakarta. But step inside the carpeted reception area, decorated by a mural of a 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
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desert mosque and partially open to the sky, and it's as if you've arrived in a 
Bedouin kingdom. 
Your host is Habib Mohammad Rizieq Shihab, 41. He is dressed entirely in 
white, a religious conceit far from typical of most Indonesian ulama, or 
experts in Islamic theology. To the question, “Where are you from?” Mr. 
Rizieq is quick to explain that he is descended from the Quraishi tribe, from 
what is now Yemen. Just how he knows this isn't clear, but it's the symbolism 
that counts: The Prophet Mohammad was a Quraishi, and the tribe is 
entrusted with the responsibility for protecting God's House, the Qe'eba, in 
Mecca. Mr. Rizieq, in fact, is a native of Jakarta [Emphasis added]. 
 
Pertinent are the phrases “Bedouin kingdom” and “tribe” both of which evoke the 
idea of ‘noble savage’. Stephens repeatedly uses the word “tribe” when describing the 
leader of the ‘Wahhabi’-influenced Front for the Defense of Islam. When viewed 
historically or developmentally a ‘tribe’ is typically understood as a social group 
existing prior to the development of or existing outside of the modern nation state. 
The nation-state is a nineteenth century European creation that accompanied a change 
in views with regards to our understanding of Indigenous people.30 ‘Tribes’ are 
therefore generally understood as reflecting a particular way of predating the modern 
era. 
 
In addition to having links with colonialism the term also has racial implications. It is 
often used to favour one ethnic group based on racial superiority. The implications are 
that the ‘Wahhabi’ influenced ‘tribe’ to which Stephens refers exists ‘outside’ the 
‘modern’ world inhabited by us in the ‘democratic West’ and to which many 
including those in Indonesia aspire to live in. The suggestion is that ‘Wahhabism’ is a 
religion for the ‘backward’ and the ‘regressive’ and that these areas where 
‘Wahhabism’ is present need democratic advancements in order to help them to 
‘progress’ and become more ‘enlightened’ human beings. 
 
                                                 
30 J.M. Blaut, The Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric 
History (New York: Guilford Press, 2000). J.M. Blaut, Eight Eurocentric Historians (New York: 
Guilford Press, 2000).  
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These ideas align with Stephen’s reference to a “Bedouin kingdom” when describing 
the residence of the Front for the Defense of Islam: “But step inside the carpeted 
reception area, decorated by a mural of a desert mosque and partially open to the sky, 
and it's as if you've arrived in a Bedouin kingdom.” The term ‘Bedouin’ comes from 
the Arabic term badw or badawiyyīn/badawiyyūn and is typically used when referring 
to a desert-dwelling Arabian ethnic group divided into ‘tribes’. The ‘Bedouin’ are 
originally from a region in the Arabian Peninsula which incorporates modern Saudi 
Arabia. It is here we begin to see Stephens’ link between the ‘Wahhabism’ of Saudi 
Arabia and the ‘radical Islam’ he believes has corrupted Indonesia ‘radical Islamist’ 
groups. Stephen identifies Saudi Arabia as an enemy of the US, blaming it for its 
global propagation of ‘Wahhabism’ which has now spread to another ‘tribe’ on the 
other side of the world. The implication is this security threat is emanating from Saudi 
Arabia and that anti-terror and pro-democratic efforts and policies must therefore 
focus on Saudi Arabia because it is the source of modern ‘Islamic radicalism’ around 
the world including Indonesia.   
 
Pryce-Jones adopts a similar approach when representing the “terrorist-sponsoring” 
and ‘radical Islamist’ ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabian regime as an enemy of the US and as 
a key obstacle to its stated goal of promoting democracy in the Middle East.31 Pryce-
Jones writes “the Arab world is having to come to terms with the U.S. campaign in 
Iraq, and President Bush's insistence on democracy and freedom for everyone. 
Everyone, Mr. Bush made clear, includes Saudi Arabia.” 
 
Pryce-Jones blames Saudi Arabia’s adherence to ‘Wahhabi’ religious doctrine for its 
failure to accept democratic changes and for making the Saudi regime not only “a 
danger to itself” but also to “the rest of the world.” Part of Pryce-Jones’ representation 
of ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia as an enemy of the US and its goals of promoting 
democracy in the region involve representing them as ‘savages’ and ‘Wahhabism’ as 
a religion of ‘backward people’. For example Pryce-Jones writes 
Everyone, Mr. Bush made clear, includes Saudi Arabia. There, 5,000 or more 
princes control all power and resources, sharing out ministries and 
governorships and oil revenues as they see fit. Their idea of democracy is to 
                                                 
31 David Pryce-Jones, “The Saudi Revolution,” The Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2003. 
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appoint an advisory council and religious leaders carefully vetted to provide a 
facade of legitimacy. 
Immemorial tribal custom and the local Wahhabi brand of Islam are 
defended and perpetuated to create the impression that this is the natural 
order of things. The Shiite minority forms about 20% of the population, but 
on the grounds that they are not Wahhabis they are arrested without trial, 
tortured and often disappear. Rights and the rule of law are only what the 
ruling family says they are. The Saudi family of course has a large and 
privileged security and police apparatus at its service. No blueprint exists in 
any of the textbooks for successfully modernizing a society like this one 
[Emphasis added]. 
 
Pertinent here is Pryce-Jones’ use of the phrase “immemorial tribal custom” when 
describing the Saudi people who embrace ‘Wahhabism’ and oppose democracy and 
other  “modernizing” trends. The word ‘immemorial’ means ‘originating in the distant 
past or very old’ and it originates from the French term immémorial meaning ‘old 
beyond memory’. Like Stephens, Jones represents ‘Wahhabism’ as a religion for the 
‘backward,’ ‘regressive’ and ‘anti-modern’ and does not exist in a modern democratic 
world.  
 
Jones reinforces this idea by likening the current ‘internal instability’ in ‘Wahhabi’ 
Saudi Arabia to the situation in eighteenth century France. Jones writes  
“Is it a revolt?” Louis XVI asked in 1789. “No, sire, it is a revolution,” 
answered one of his courtiers. In Saudi Arabia the ruling family has long been 
presiding over a denial of reality to match that of the Bourbon monarchy. The 
bombing this weekend in Riyadh, which killed 17 people and wounded over 
100, suggests that the thousands of princes who control the wealth of that 
country have trouble in store. 
 
Pryce-Jones is drawing parallels between the current political situation in Saudi 
Arabia and the Bourbon Monarchy in eighteenth century France. The abolition of the 
French monarchy during the French revolution ushered in the modern Western era 
defined by ‘reason’ and ‘science’. The implication is that ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia is 
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centuries behind the ‘West’ in terms of progress and it is assumed that it like nations 
in Europe will eventually succumb to ‘progress,’ experience its Enlightenment and 
therefore shun ‘Wahhabism’ in favour of valuing ‘science’ and ‘reason’. Pryce-Jones 
is a well-known neo-conservative and his likening of the situation in ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi 
to that of pre-Enlightenment France is a technique we have also seen used by liberal 
intellectuals. This helps illustrate the porous nature of categories and highlights some 
of the challenges associated with drawing boundaries around the neo-conservative 
and liberal traditions.  
 
Detailing brutal acts of violence is another rhetorical technique used by neo-
conservative intellectuals when representing ‘Wahhabism’ as a religion for savages 
who are enemies of the US. Cerulo’s cognitive approach to deconstructing reports of 
violence suggests that there are certain ways of structuring reports of physical, 
violence that encourages readers to condemn the perpetrators and to interpret their 
acts of violence as illegitimate, unjustified and deviant.32 The implication associated 
with this technique is that ‘savages’ living in a ‘pre-modern’ age commit brutal 
violent acts while ‘normal’ human beings living in the ‘modern’ world do not. 
Gerecht uses this technique when representing the violent acts committed by 
‘Wahhabi’-inspired terrorists. Gerecht writes 
There’s not a soul in Washington or New York or London who would defend 
the sybaritic Saudi royals and their head-and-hand-chopping Wahhabi clergy 
were it not for the cash. Without oil, Saudis would have the same appeal as the 
Afghan Taliban [Emphasis added].33 
 
Gerecht’s use of phrase “head-and-hand-chopping” when describing the actions of the 
“Wahhabi clergy” highlights the physical, even brutal nature of Saudi law. Such 
brutal acts of violence are conventionally associated with earlier periods in Western 
civilization and the implication is that ‘we’ in the ‘West’ unlike the ‘Wahhabis’ in 
Saudi Arabia have progressed beyond this ‘uncivilised’ behaviour. ‘Wahhabism’ 
according to Gerecht is responsible for inspiring and motivating these unjustified and 
deviant violent acts. Gerecht’s representation also invites his readers to ask the 
                                                 
32 Cerulo, Deciphering Violence, 16. 
33 Reuel Marc Gerecht, “Radioactive Regime,” The Weekly Standard 18, no.34 May 20, 2013, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/radioactive-regime_722050.html 
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question “If the ‘Wahhabi’ Clergy is able to act in this way against its own people, 
what are they willing to do to non-believers?” 
 
It is true that many human rights organisations have reported on the various forms of 
physical punishments the Saudi state uses when dealing with those found guilty of 
particular crimes.34 What is more contentious is the way neo-conservatives stress the 
motivating role ‘Wahhabism’ plays in Saudi law. Gerecht claims ‘Wahhabism’ is 
responsible for inspiring this “head-and-hand chopping”. An argument could equally 
be made that this is more of a cultural rather than a religious practice, and that the 
history of these practices does not follow some simple, synchronised timetable.  
Public hangings and beheadings were still common in parts of Europe into the early to 
middle-twentieth century.  
 
‘Wahhabism’ as an Enemy of Israel  
 
Neo-conservatives are typically unwavering and unconditional in their support for the 
state of Israel. This often motivates and inspires neo-conservatives to concentrate on 
any group, movement or state that they believe pose some kind of threat to Israel. At 
times this sensitivity can lead neo-conservative intellectuals to embellish or even 
create outlandish even phantasmagoric threats with the aim of furthering the aims and 
interests of the state of Israel. This happens when neo-conservatives associate 
‘Wahhabism’ with pro-Palestinian groups and organisations with the aim of 
supporting and legitimating Israeli actions in the Occupied Territories. There are 
some neo-conservatives that also use representations of ‘Wahhabism’ to help discredit 
the Palestinian-Israeli two-state peace initiatives proposed by the Saudi Kingdom.  
 
Gaffney is among those who use representations of ‘Wahhabism’ to discredit the 
Saudi-initiated peace plans aimed at establishing a two-state solution. 35 Gaffney 
                                                 
34 Amnesty International reports  “Most executions [in Saudi Arabia] are by beheading. Many take 
place in public. In some cases, decapitated bodies are left hanging in public squares as a “deterrent.” 
See  “Saudi Arabia: Scheduled beheading reflects authorities’ callous disregard to human rights,” 
Amnesty International, August 22, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/saudi-arabia-scheduled-
beheading-reflects-authorities-callous-disregard-human-rights-2014-08-22.  
See also “Saudi Arabia: Surge in Executions,” Human Rights Watch, August 21, 2014 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/21/saudi-arabia-surge-executions 
35 Frank Gaffney Jnr,  “Saudi friends and foes: Duplicitous desert kingdom could turn U.S. weapons on 
us,” The Washington Times, November 2, 2010. 
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opposes the creating of a Palestinian state believing it would pose a security threat to 
the Jewish Israeli state. Gaffney claims Saudi Arabia’s peace plan is unacceptable on 
the grounds of Saudi Arabia’s promoting of ‘Wahhabism’ which he understands as 
responsible for inspiring and motivating ‘Islamic terrorism’. According to Gaffney 
Saudi Arabia is a ‘black hat’ that cannot be trusted especially when it comes to 
dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Gaffney writes  
…the Saudi’s episodic help with countering terrorism is lauded, while their 
vast material and ideological contribution to its spread is largely overlooked. 
Their contribution to instability in the Middle East is discounted, and their 
“peace plan” for ending the Israel-Palestinian conflict on terms that assuredly 
would endanger the Jewish state is enthusiastically embraced.  
 
Gaffney also uses representations of ‘Wahhabism’ to discredit the ongoing Israeli-
Palestinian peace process in another of his articles.36 Gaffney claims the US-based 
“‘‘Wahhabi’ lobby’ has had an “undesirable influence” on the Bush administration’s 
peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Gaffney suggests the creation of a 
Palestinian state is in the best interests of the ‘radical’ ‘Wahhabi’ lobby’ and not the 
US or Israel. He writes  
The question occurs: Could the President's recent decision to pursue a “road 
map” for Mideast peace that is, in important respects (notably with respect to 
the need for a new Palestinian leadership “untainted by terror,” the 
dismantling of Palestinian terrorist infrastructure and an end to Palestinian 
incitement as preconditions to U.S. recognition of a state of Palestine) at odds 
with the “vision” he enunciated last June also be a product of the undesirable 
influence of the Wahhabi Lobby? The far-reaching changes were reportedly 
the subject of major internal fights between top administration officials 
[Emphasis added]. 
 
Gaffney wants to discredit the peace process by linking the “‘Wahhabi’ lobby” to pro-
Palestinian enemy ‘terrorist organisations’ like Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad. 
Gaffney writes 
                                                 
36 Frank Gaffney Jnr, “Undesirable influence,” Washington Times, June 17, 2003. 
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Even as President Bush stresses his opposition to such terrorist organizations 
as Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, their advocates and/or apologists in 
this country with ties to Saudi Arabia's radical Wahhabi sect (dubbed the 
“Wahhabi Lobby”) are routinely turned to when the administration seeks to 
reach out to Muslims. Worse yet, such “outreach” usually excludes those 
representing the majority of Muslims who are not Islamist sympathizers. That 
is undesirable influence [Emphasis added]. 
 
Pertinent is Gaffney’s repeated use of the neologism “Wahhabi lobby.” In using this 
term Gaffney wants to convince his audience that the ‘Wahhabi’ movement in the US 
is coordinated, influential and taking its cues from the enemy radical ‘Wahhabi’ 
Islamists in Saudi Arabia. Influenced by his unwavering support for Israel, Gaffney’s 
using of this neologism can be understood as a technique aimed at deflecting attention 
from the dominant and well-known ‘Pro-Israeli’ lobby that exerts huge influence in 
the US and which is the focus of widespread criticism.37 By linking pro-Palestinian 
‘terrorist groups’ like Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad to the “‘Wahhabi’ lobby” 
neo-conservatives like Gaffney are representing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a 
part of the wider Global War on Terror. This challenges a competing narrative which 
says that the Palestinians are primarily engaged in a struggle for self-determination 
against an Israeli colonising force.  
 
This unwavering support for Israel is also evident in another of Gaffney’s articles in 
which he uses representations of ‘Wahhabism’ to help justify and legitimate Israeli 
occupation of Palestinian territory.38 Working from the same assumption that 
‘Wahhabism’ is the state-sanctioned religion promoted by Saudi Arabia and 
responsible for motivating and inspiring modern ‘Islamic terrorism,’ Gaffney claims 
Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would result in it 
becoming a haven for “Islamofascist entities.” These “Islamofascist entities” include 
Saudi sponsored ‘Wahhabi’ terrorist groups. Gaffney writes 
In a superb analysis and withering critique of the convergence plan 
(http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/ Olmerts_Convergence_Plan.pdf), my 
                                                 
37 For an understanding of the influence the Israeli Lobby has had on US foreign policy see John 
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.”  
38 Gaffney, “Seeing the threat for what it is.” 
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colleague, Caroline Glick, makes clear that Israel's earlier abandonment of the 
Gaza Strip has turned it into an area not only governed by the terrorist 
organization, Hamas, but a training and operational base for allied 
Islamofacscist entities like al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Iranian intelligence. The 
threat posed by such activities is already real, not only for Israel but the United 
States and the rest of the Free World. It will become infinitely greater if the 
West Bank also is allowed to become a safe haven for such forces. Call it 
Palestan [Emphasis added]. 
 
Gaffney clearly distinguishes the ‘black hats,’ i.e., the Palestinian organisation 
Hamas, the pro-Palestinian group Hezbollah and Iran as belonging to a group of 
enemies that includes ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia and the ‘Wahhabi’-inspired al-Qaeda. 
According to Gaffney these ‘blacks’ are enemies of both the US and Israel as well as 
the rest of the “Free World.” Gaffney also asks 
So why do ostensibly friendly governments not recognize the threat posed by 
Islamofascism for what it is: a viral ideology that threatens non-Islamist 
Muslims as much as the rest of us, one that cannot be appeased and must be 
rooted out and destroyed? [Emphasis added] 
Pertinent is Gaffney’s use of the neologisms “Islamofascism” and “Islamofascist.” 
These terms analogise the ‘ideological’ characteristics of ‘radical Islamist’ groups like 
‘Wahhabi’ inspired Palestinian terrorist groups with a range of twentieth century 
European fascist movements. In using these terms Gaffney wants his audience to 
think of the ‘radical Islamists’ specifically the ‘Wahhabi’-inspired Palestinian 
‘terrorists’ organisations like the fascists i.e. as hostile to modernity (except with 
regards to weapons), nostalgic for past empires, obsessed with humiliating their 
enemies and vehemently anti-Jewish.39 Many nations in the ‘West’ joined forces to 
defeat the threat posed by Fascist regimes and Gaffney wants the same thing to 
happen with regards to the threat posed by ‘radical Islamists’.  
 
May is another neo-conservative intellectual whose unwavering support for Israel 
influences his representing of ‘Wahhabism’.40 May uses ‘Wahhabism’ to help frame 
                                                 
39 For an understanding of this analogy see Hitchens, “Defending Islamofascism.”  
40 Clifford May, “No Peace While World War Rages,” Moment Magazine. March 10, 2010, 
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/no-peace-while-world-war-rages/#sthash.Xgj8Qw1P.pdf 
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Palestinians as the aggressors in their conflict with Israel. May claims the US, Israel 
and the ‘West’ or the ‘white hats’ are fighting a ‘world war’ against the ‘radical 
Islamists’ which includes the ‘Wahhabi’-inspired terrorists and pro-Palestinian 
terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah or the ‘black hats’. May frames the 
Palestinian-Israel conflict as a microcosm of this global war initiated by the ‘black 
hats’ who are inspired and motivated by ‘radical Islamic’ movements like 
‘Wahhabism’. May writes  
Israel’s American supporters spend a lot of energy trying to convince people 
that Israelis want peace, are working for peace and are prepared to sacrifice 
for peace. All that’s true but it misses this point: Militant jihadis are waging a 
war against the “infidel” West. They see Israel as a frontline state. There is no 
way they will permit a separate peace for Israel…  
 
Today, we confront ideologies that are similarly violent and supremacist-e.g. 
Khomeinism, bin Ladenism, Wahhabism-and no less intent on the conquest 
and destruction of free nations. Too many Americans do not grasp this and are 
not prepared for the tough measures necessary to limit, contain and eventually 
defeat these enemies…  
The beliefs and goals of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Iran's mullahs, Hezbollah, 
Hamas and a long list of other Islamist groups are not identical, but much 
more unites them than divides them. All embrace a militant understanding of 
Islam. All justify their aggression and their terrorism theologically. All 
believe that a final, decisive and divinely ordained jihad-holy war is now 
under way [Emphasis added]. 
 
May claims the enemies of the ‘free world’ which includes those inspired by the 
“violent and supremacist” ‘Wahhabism’ believe they are waging a “divinely ordained 
jihad-holy war” in which “their aggression and their terrorism” has ‘theological’ 
justifications. May also uses the (religious) term “infidel” when describing the 
“Militant Jihadi’s” view of the ‘West’. This term is commonly used in Islam when 
describing those with no religious beliefs or who reject the central tenets of one’s own 
religion. In using these religious descriptions, May is representing these enemies as 
motivated and inspired by what Cerulo calls ‘instrumental aims’ and a clear ‘presence 
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of intention’.41 As these names suggest, the perpetrators are seen as calculating and 
motivated by the idea that they will receive spiritual and religious rewards. Cerulo 
notes that ascribing these kinds of social characteristics to perpetrators of violence 
encourages the audience to understand their violent acts as illegitimate, unjustified 
and deviant.42 For May this is an important rhetorical technique used to help clearly 
distinguish the enemies of the US, Israel and the ‘Free world’.  
 
May uses the same technique later in the article when providing a more detailed 
description of the religious beliefs motivating and inspiring the ‘radical Islamist 
enemy’. 
On one side is the dar al-Islam, literally the “realm of submission”, the parts of 
the world governed by Sharia, Islamic law as they [the Militant Jihadis] 
interpret it. On the other side is the dar al-Harb, literally “the realm of war,” 
those countries ruled by Christians, Jews, Hindus and moderate Muslims who 
oppose them and therefore are “enemies of God”.  
 
Ledeen is another neo-conservative intellectual who represents ‘Wahhabism’ in quite 
negative ways when describing the conflict between Israel and Palestine.43 Like all of 
the neo-conservatives whose works I have analysed here, Ledeen blames Saudi 
Arabia and its ‘Wahhabi’ beliefs for sponsoring and promoting ‘Islamic terrorism’ 
around the world. This includes their supporting of “the many Palestinian terrorist 
organizations that keep their offices in Damascus.” Like many neo-conservatives 
Ledeen clearly distinguishes the ‘black hats’ and advocates for the promoting of 
democracy in the Middle East. Ledeen writes 
Our primary enemies are states, which provide the jihadis with much of the 
wherewithal for their operations: intelligence, weapons and other 
technology… false documents, safe havens and training facilities… 
Until the fall of Saddam, there were four pre-eminent supporters of terrorist 
groups: Iraq, Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Now there are three…The Iranians 
                                                 
41 Cerulo, Deciperhing Violence. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Michael Ledeen, “The Wider War,” the Wall Street Journal,  March 3, 2007 accessed December 14, 
2013 from http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/india-pakistan-
afghanistan/the-wider-war/ 
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created Hezbollah, probably the most lethal terrorist organization in the world, 
as well as Islamic Jihad… 
The Saudis provide money for terrorist groups and support a global network of 
radical Wahhabi mosques and schools that indoctrinate young Muslims in the 
ways of jihad. 
Without the active support of those three countries, it would be a lot easier to 
defeat the terrorists on the battlefields… 
Al Qaeda would be similarly weakened, and the many Palestinian terrorist 
organizations that keep their offices in Damascus would find it very difficult 
to relocate and maintain their effectiveness. All would be weakened by the 
loss of Saudi funding, and moderate Muslims everywhere, including in the 
U.S, would breathe a sigh of relief if the Wahhabi mosques were closed. 
 
It doesn't require more boots on the ground or bombing raids. It requires a 
traditional American policy: support for democratic revolution against our 
tyrannical enemies. 
 
Like May and Gaffney, Ledeen sees the ‘Free World’s’ war against ‘radical Islam’ as 
including Israel’s fight against ‘Palestinian terrorism’.  
The terror war now extends to four continents -- running from Thailand and 
Indonesia to India and Pakistan, down the Horn of Africa to Somalia and 
Yemen and back up to Afghanistan, on to Iraq, Palestine/Israel… 
 
Ledeen goes on to say  
A free Iran would deliver a devastating global blow to the terrorists, and 
would no doubt change the calculus -- and perhaps the regime -- of Syria. 
Under those happy circumstances, we might muster the will to insist that the 
Saudis shut down the Wahhabi schools and mosques, which constitute an 
assembly line of fanatics all over the world [Emphasis added]. 
 
Pertinent is Ledeen’s use of the metaphorical expression “assembly line of fanatics” 
when describing the relation between “Wahhabi’ schools and mosques” and modern 
  173 
‘Islamic terrorism’. Up to this point I have shown how many neo-conservatives rely 
on certain metaphors to characterise the ‘Wahhabi’ enemy. Ledeen’s metaphorical 
expression is similar in that it also dehumanises the ‘Wahhabi’ enemy, though he 
relies on a metaphor that is mechanistic rather than animal in nature.  
 
An ‘assembly line’ is a series of workers and machines in a factory dedicated to 
making items that are generally identical in nature. In using this metaphorical 
expression, Ledeen encourages his audience to think of “Wahhabi schools and 
mosques” as factories dedicated to producing a very specific product, the “‘Wahhabi’ 
fanatic.” Not only does this help dehumanise the ‘Wahhabi’ enemy but it also 
persuades the reader to ignore the possibility there may be other factors i.e. Israel’s 
ongoing occupation of Palestine, that may be responsible for ‘radicalising’ the 
Islamist enemy.  
 
Coupled with the animalistic metaphors used by other neo-conservative intellectuals, 
we can understand Ledeen’s representation as a part of the wider effort by neo-
conservatives to dehumanise the ‘Wahhabi’ enemy. This has the potential effect of 
making any deaths that take place in the context of military or security operations 
more palatable as it is less confronting to kill animals or destroy machines than it is 
people. I now want to extend the analysis by turning to the role played by certain 
themata and generative metaphors  
 
Key Themata: The Holy Land, welcoming the Saviour and the Palestinian 
‘terrorists’  
 
Neo-conservative intellectuals have offered unwavering support for Israel. What has 
perhaps not been as well appreciated as it might be is the way certain religious 
themata have underpinned, inspired and motivated these representations. We get a 
glimpse of this for example when abstracting and deconstructing Gerecht’s 
metaphorical expression “There is scant evidence to suggest that the Wahhabi 
establishment has changed its spots.” This phrase comes the Book of Jeremiah (in the 
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Hebrew and Christian ‘Bible’).44 However other religious themata which are acting as 
‘motivating aids’ for these neo-conservatives have tended “to be suppressed or 
disappear from view.”45 This is unfortunate as the themata are there for those with 
eyes to see them.  
 
There are two key ‘themata’ sustaining the ways in which neo-conservatives make 
sense of Israel and the part played by ‘Wahhabism’. One is Israel’s ‘theological right’, 
understood as a God-given Covenant which God entered in with His people when he 
conferred on the Jewish people certain land conventionally referred to as the Holy 
Land. The other is Israel’s having to control this land so as to welcome the Saviour. 
 
Currently we have a situation in the Palestinian territories where the State of Israel 
supported by the US government has been occupying and continually appropriating 
Palestinian land. This process is not a new phenomenon and has been occurring at 
least since 1967 when Israel appropriated large swathes of Palestinian land including 
the West Bank, which incorporates the holy city of East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. 
Despite many writers who trace the appropriation of Palestinian land back to 1948 
when the state of Israel was first created, the first time the United Nations Security 
Council used the description ‘territories occupied’ was in Resolution 242 following 
the conclusion of the Six-Day War in 1967.46 
 
As we have seen, neo-conservatives make a range of claims about ‘Wahhabism’ and 
its alleged support for Palestinian terrorists and the true nature of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. More specifically we can see here two kinds of religious themata 
namely the idea of a special Covenant between the Jewish people and the Holy Land  
authorised by God and the claim that the land in question must be under Israeli 
control so as to welcome the next coming of the Saviour. 
                                                 
44Reuel Marc Gerecht, “What Hath Ju-Ju Wrought!” The Weekly Standard, March 14 (2005), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/325hudmg.asp 
45 Holton, “The Role of Themata in Science,” 455. 
46 Many commentators argue the occupation began in 1947 when a ‘land without people’ was created 
for ‘a people without land’. Many Zionists used this slogan at end of the 19th century and the beginning 
of the 20th century in an attempt to justify Israeli claim to Palestinian land. Edward Said writes this 
slogan exemplifies the kind of thinking that aims to “cancel and transcend an actual reality—a group of 
resident Arabs—by means of a future wish – that the land be empty for development by a more 
deserving power.” See Edward Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Vintage, 1979), 9. 
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The themata of the Covenant has its roots in the Bible particularly the Book of 
Genesis. There we find texts supporting the idea that God entered into a Covenant to 
give certain lands to the people of Abraham. The relevant text says:  
And I will establish My covenant between Me and you and your descendants 
after you throughout their generations for an everlasting covenant, to be God to 
you and to your descendants after you. And I will give to you and to your 
descendants after you, the land of your sojourning, all the land of Canaan, for an 
everlasting possession; and I will be their God (Genesis 17:7) 
The text also records a specific agreement between Abraham and God: 
Then God said, “Yes, but your wife Sarah will bear you a son, and you will call 
him Isaac. I will establish my covenant with him as an everlasting covenant for 
his descendants after him”. (Genesis 17:9) 
 
These two passages are taken from the book of Genesis which is the first Book of the 
Pentateuch and of the Christian Old Testament. A basic and typical understanding of 
the narrative in Genesis is that God first created the world and made the first man 
(Adam) his regent. That man disobeyed God and was ejected from the Garden of 
Eden. Later God expressed his displeasure at the way his people were behaving and 
punished them by flooding the world, saving only Noah and his family. The new 
human order created in the wake of the Flood proved equally corrupt. This time God 
decided not to destroy the world but instead gave one man the responsibility of 
securing a righteous order. That man was Abraham and it is his story and relationship 
with God especially centering on the Covenant that has had major implications for 
many ‘believers’ in the world including those intellectuals who are part of the neo-
conservative movement.  
 
The conventional interpretation of this religious text that is taken as expressing a 
literal truth by many Jews and Christians, is that God promised the land which is now 
modern Israel, including what is now the Palestinian territories, to the offspring of 
Abraham’s son, Isaac. Isaac was born to Abraham’s (Jews typically refer to Abraham 
as Avraham Avinu which roughly translates to ‘our father Abraham’) first wife Sarah 
and it is through them that Jews claim to trace their lineage.  
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Understanding history and the future of mankind in this way has major implications 
for the modern political situation and conflict between Israel and Palestine. For 
example according to this biblical interpretation the land acquired by Israel in the 
1967 war, which biblically is referred to as ‘Judea’ and ‘Samaria,’ is not seen as 
Palestinian land but rather Israel’s birthright as authorised by God. Many neo-
conservatives use these biblical terms when referring to this land.47 This ‘master-
theme’ helps us to understand why neo-conservatives like Gaffney, Gerecht, May and 
Ledeen oppose Israel’s withdrawal from these areas because this is land God gave to 
his people.  
  
A closely related religious themata  involves  a standard Judaic interpretation of the 
‘End Times’ also holds that Israel must be in possession of this Promised Land 
especially Jerusalem which contains the Temple Mount (which is Judaism’s holiest 
site) so as to successfully welcome the Saviour/Messiah and thereby fulfill Biblical 
prophecy. Jeremiah 46: 27-28 in the Hebrew Bible is often understood by believers as 
an example of God’s promising of Israel to the Jews and his protecting and ensuring 
their safe return to the land.  
 
27 “But fear not, O Jacob my servant, 
    nor be dismayed, O Israel, 
for behold, I will save you from far away, 
    and your offspring from the land of their captivity. 
Jacob shall return and have quiet and ease, 
    and none shall make him afraid. 
28 Fear not, O Jacob my servant, 
declares the LORD, 
    for I am with you. 
I will make a full end of all the nations 
    to which I have driven you, 
    but of you I will not make a full end. 
I will discipline you in just measure, 
                                                 
47 Many neo-conservatives use the Biblical terms Judea and Samaria when referring to what others 
typically refer to as the ‘West Bank’ region. See for example Fred Barnes, “In Defense of Settlers,” 
The Weekly Standard, August 27, 2010, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/defense-settlers. Rachel 
Abrams, “Cut Off Israeli Nose to Spite your Palestinian Face,” The Weekly Standard, January 5, 2010, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/cut-your-israeli-nose-spite-your-palestinian-face.  
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    and I will by no means leave you unpunished.” 
 
Isaiah 11:1-12.6 is typically understood as prophesising the restoring of Jewish Israel 
in future Messianic times.  
12  He will raise a signal for the nations 
    and will assemble the banished of Israel, 
and gather the dispersed of Judah 
    from the four corners of the earth. 
 
These are just a few examples of some of the core tenets of Jewish eschatology that 
are elaborated in the Books of Isaiah, Jeremiah and Zekiel and amongst other things 
detail the ending of the world, God’s redeeming of Israel, God’s returning the Jewish 
people to Israel, God’s restoring of the Temple in Jerusalem and the House of David, 
and all people’s recognition of God of Israel as the only God. Appreciating the 
influence these themata have had on the way neo-conservative intellectuals make 
sense of the world also helps us to understand their use of generative metaphors that 
sustain the idea that Israel and the US are engaged in a religious war with the ‘radical 
(‘Wahhabi’) Islamists’.  
 
It is worth recalling Schön’s illuminating description of the different ways of 
understanding ‘slum housing’.48 Schön claims that if the underlying metaphor frames 
the ‘slum housing’ as a ‘blight’ or ‘disease’ then we are encouraged to think about 
medical remedies to help cure or remove the blight. Alternatively if the underlying 
metaphor describes the slum as a ‘natural community’ then we are encouraged to 
adopt measures that help enhance the life of that community. These two generative 
metaphors promote very different perceptions and approaches and have very different 
implications when it comes to dealing with issues associated with slum housing.  
 
The point of this is that the problem does not exist in any simple or real way but is 
‘generated’ or ‘constituted’ in the way the metaphor works. This is relevant when we 
consider the typical approach adopted by neo-conservatives when representing the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These intellectuals ‘generating’ or ‘constitute’ the conflict 
                                                 
48 Donald Schön, “Generative metaphor: A perspective on problem-setting in social policy.”  
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as a religious war fought between the ‘Wahhabi’ inspired pro-Palestinian ‘radical 
Islamists’ and Israel, supported by the US and the ‘West’. As we have seen this 
conflict is represented as theological in nature.49 In representing this conflict as 
essentially theological in nature, these neo-conservative intellectuals can also de-
emphasise or ignore the possibility that there are alternative interpretations of what is 
going on, like the idea that Palestinians simply want self-determination and a 
Palestinian state.  
 
Danziger writes that the ‘generating’ or ‘constituting’ of the world in particular ways 
not only invites readers to think about it in a certain way but also to act in terms of 
certain implied assumptions.50 Not only are these neo-conservatives wanting their 
audience to think of the Palestinian struggle against Israel as primarily religious in 
nature, but they also want their audience to support ‘counter-terror’ measures aimed at 
securing the safety of the state of Israel. According to intellectuals like Gaffney this 
includes Israel having an ongoing presence in the Palestinian territories so as to 
prevent the establishing of a ‘terrorist state’.51 
 
‘Good’ versus ‘Evil’  
 
A closely related religious themata that neo-conservatives have used to great effect is 
the presumption that the world God created is fated to an endless conflict between 
‘Good’ and ‘Evil’. According to this ‘master-theme’ conflict between ‘Good’ and 
‘Evil’ is a condition of the natural order created by God. Wink is among the scholars 
to identify the pervasiveness of this ‘motivating aid’ in Western thinking which he 
calls the myth of ‘redemptive violence’.52  
 
According to Wink the modern (often religious) man typically works from the 
assumption that both ‘good’ and ‘evil’ exist in a world created by God and it is 
assumed that God will favour the  ‘good’ and defeat ‘the Other’ who is  ‘evil’.53 Wink 
claims that this kind of thinking can be traced back at least to the creation myth of 
                                                 
49 May, “No Peace While World War Rages.”; Gaffney, “Seeing the threat for what it is.” 
50 Danziger, Metaphors in the History of Psychology, 351. 
51 Gaffney, “Seeing the threat for what it is.” 
52 Walter Wink, “Facing the Myth of Redemptive Violence,” November 16, 2007, 
http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/content/cpt/article_060823wink.shtml 
53 Ibid. 
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Babylon around 1250 BC and, more importantly, to the Book of Genesis.54 This is 
telling when we consider that this part of the Hebrew Bible provides the narrative 
about God’s creating of the world, his Covenant with Abraham and crucially his 
promise regarding the land of Israel, all of which inform Jewish religious thought in 
general and neo-conservative thinking in particular especially with regards to the 
Jewish people’s claim to what many others understand as Palestinian land.  
 
This ‘often-hidden mechanism’ has continued to play a powerful and motivating role 
in modern thought in general and in neo-conservative thinking in particular.55 This 
‘evil versus good’ themata has been prevalent since the beginning of the neo-
conservative movement in the twentieth century, when the movement was founded by 
a group of intellectuals united by their fierce anti-Communism and angered by what 
they saw as the failure of liberal intellectuals to fully appreciate the ‘evil’ nature of  
global communism. The neo-conservative movement was in fact founded by former 
socialists/‘Trotskyists’ like Kristol, Lipset, Lasky, Burnham, and Himmelfarb, whose 
fierce ‘anti-Communism’ encouraged them to “blaze a wide political trail leading 
from left to right.”56  
This ‘evil versus good’ themata continues to inform modern neo-conservative 
thinking with many intellectuals seeing ‘radical Islam’ as the modern manifestation of 
this ‘evil’ once posed by Communism. ‘Good’ triumphed over ‘evil’ during the Cold 
War and now many neo-conservatives are motivated by the idea that the forces of 
‘Good’ must and will now confront and defeat the most reincarnation of this evil, 
                                                 
54 Wink writes  
The Bible portrays a good God who creates a good creation. Chaos does not resist order. Good is prior 
to evil. Neither evil nor violence is part of the creation, but enter later, as a result of the first couple’s 
sin and the connivance of the serpent (Genesis 3). A basically good reality is thus corrupted by free 
decisions reached by creatures. In this far more complex and subtle explanation of the origins of things, 
violence emerges for the first time as a problem requiring solution. 
Ibid. 
55 Commenting on the pervasive and motivating role this ‘good versus evil’ worldview plays in modern 
society, Wink writes: “We have already seen how the myth of redemptive violence is played out in the 
structure of children’s cartoon shows (and is found as well in comics, video and computer games, and 
movies). But we also encounter it in the media, in sports, in nationalism, in militarism, in foreign 
policy, in televangelism, in the religious right, and in self-styled militia groups. What appears so 
innocuous in cartoons is, in fact, the mythic underpinnings of our violent society.” 
Ibid. 
56Quote taken from “Irving Kristol (1920-2009),” IRC Right Web, September 28, 2009, 
http://www.rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/kristol_irving.  
Also see Tom Barry, “The Neocons and Political Aid- The New Crusade of the Democratic 
Globalists,”IRCRightWeb, 2005, 
http://rightweb.irc.online.org/articles/display/TheNewCrusadeoftheDemocraticGlobalists 
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‘radical Islam’ which according to many neo-conservative intellectuals includes 
‘Wahhabism’. This idea is what motivates prominent neo-conservative intellectuals 
like  Frum and Perle when they write  
Like communism, this [militant Islamic] ideology perverts the language of 
justice and equality to justify oppression and murder. Like Nazism, it exploits 
the injured pride of once-mighty nations. Like both communism and Nazism, 
militant Islam is opportunistic -- it works willingly with all manner of unlikely 
allies, as the communists and Nazis worked with each other against the 
democratic West.57 
 
This analogy is basic to neo-conservative thinking and highlights the movement’s two 
key threats since its inception, Communism and ‘radical Islam’. Frum and Pearle are 
proposing a war of broad similarity given what they see as the commonality of the 
enemy in both eras.58 They also go on to say “The war against extremist Islam is as 
much an ideological war as the cold war ever was.”59  
 
Neo-conservatives typically consider ‘Radical Islam’ to be the new evil threat that 
must be defeated. For many ‘Wahhabism,’ which is often promoted by the ‘enemy’ 
Saudi state and by pro-Palestinian ‘terrorist’ organisations, is a key part of this ‘evil’. 
We can therefore understand their representations as motivated and inspired by the 
religious ideas that they are engaged in a religious or ‘cosmic struggle’ in which they 
represent ‘good’ and have ‘God’ on their side and ‘Wahhabism’ is the ‘evil’ enemy 
that like Communism must and will be defeated. Let me turn now to certain 
generative metaphors.  
 
Animal Metaphors and The Noble Savage 
 
The human as animal metaphor is one of the key generative metaphors motivating 
many neo-conservative intellectuals. It serves to both dehumanise and encourage us to 
think of the ‘Wahhabi’ Other as an inferior being compared to those of ‘us’ who live 
                                                 
57 David Frum and Richard Perle, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror (New York: Random 
House, 2003), 43. 
58 Timothy J. Lynch, “Kristol Balls: Neoconservative Visions of Islam and the Middle East,” 
International Politics 45, no.2 (2008): 45-46, 
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.lib.rmit.edu.au/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800227 
59 Frum and Perle, An End to Evil, 147. 
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in the ‘modern’ ‘Judeo-Christian’ ‘democratic’ ‘Western’ world’.60  
 
This ‘carrying over of frames or perspectives from one domain to another’ as Schön 
argues and which is characteristic of generative metaphors, arguably has its roots in 
‘Western’ Imperialist thinking and is also commonly seen in representations of 
genocidal conflicts.61 For example drawing an analogy between humans and animals 
dominates colonial representations of Africans.62 Intellectuals rendering Africans as 
similar to dogs, pigs, rats, parasites and insects has been a key part of the colonial 
project as it helps to justify and legitimise the oppression and subjugation of the 
indigenous people. These kinds of representations also frequently occur in connection 
with genocidal conflicts which talk about the ‘superior race’ and the ‘inferior’ or 
‘subhuman’ people devices used to represent Jews in the Holocaust, Bosnians in the 
Balkan wars and Tutsis in Rwanda.63 In these instances the Other was dehumanised in 
order to help justify and legitimise violence against them.  
 
Neo-conservatives tend to unequivocally represent ‘Wahhabism’ as responsible for 
inspiring and promoting modern ‘Islamic terrorism’. They also tend to see it and those 
groups and states who adhere and promote it i.e. Saudi Arabia and various pro-
Palestinian ‘terrorist groups’ as ‘black hats’ and enemies of the US, Israel and 
sometimes the wider ‘Western’ world. The neo-conservative intellectuals’ desire to 
represent this religion and its followers as ‘enemies’ often involves them using 
rhetorical techniques aimed at representing followers of ‘Wahhabism’ as ‘animals’. 
This dehumanising of the ‘Wahhabi’ Other encourages readers both to think of 
‘Wahhabism’ as a religion fit for animals and to also treat these people as animals.  
 
Gaffney’s representation of ‘Wahhabism’ provides a perfect example of this 
approach.64 Gaffney is extremely critical of reports by some American officials that 
suggest Saudi Arabia, which is understood as the home and chief promoter of 
‘Wahhabism,’ is a friend or ally of the US. Gaffney describes Saudi Arabia as “the 
wellspring of Shariah, the supremacist totalitarian doctrine [‘Wahhabism’] that is the 
                                                 
60 Danziger, Metaphors in the History of Psychology, 351. 
61 Schön, “Generative metaphor: A perspective on problem-setting in social policy,” 137. 
62 Nick Haslem, “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 
10, no.3 (2006), 252. 
63 Ibid., 253. 
64 Gaffney,,“Saudi friends and foes,”. 
  182 
law of the land in Saudi Arabia and that animates and enables Jihadists worldwide.” 
According to him this “puritanical strain of Islam fostered by the state, sometimes 
called Wahhabism, was breeding extremists who were willing to kill even Muslims 
for their cause [emphasis added].” Gaffney’s message is clear, ‘Wahhabism’ is 
responsible for inspiring and motivating ‘Islamic terrorism’ and therefore must be 
thought of and treated as an enemy.  
 
Pertinent here is Gaffney’s use of the metaphorical expression “breeding” which we 
can abstract for closer analysis. ‘Breeding’ is a term ordinarily used when describing 
the reproductive process of animals. This contrasts with ‘giving birth to’ which is the 
phrase we typically use when describing the same process in humans. As we can see, 
Gaffney chooses to use the term “breeding” in attempt to dehumanise followers of 
‘Wahhabism’ and to encourage his audience to think of them as animals and not 
humans.  
 
There are also other important implications associated with this term that we must 
consider. For example when ‘breeding’ gets out of control i.e. in the case of wild 
animals like rabbits, they can create problems for humans who then typically respond 
by trapping, killing and/or culling these pests. In this sense Gaffney’s description of 
adherents of ‘Wahhabism’ in this way encourages the adopting of foreign policies 
aimed at limiting or preventing the “breeding” of these wild animals/pests.  
Gerecht uses a similar technique when describing “the Wahhabi establishment” in 
Saudi Arabia.65 Gerecht asks  
HAVE THE IRAQI ELECTIONS PRODUCED a democratic earthquake that 
has changed forever the fundamental political dynamics in the Muslim Middle 
East? Only the culturally deaf, dumb, and blind--for example, Michigan’s 
Democratic senator Carl Levin--can't see what George W. Bush’s war against 
Saddam Hussein has wrought. The issue is not whether the basic 
understanding of contemporary Muslim political legitimacy has been 
overturned--it has--but how forcefully the regimes in place will resist the 
growing Muslim democratic ethic. 
                                                 
65 Gerecht, “What Hath Ju-Ju Wrought!” 
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And the crucial question for the United States is whether the Bush 
administration will realize that the most consequential regimes in place--Hosni 
Mubarak’s in Egypt, the Saudi dynasty in Arabia, the military junta in Algeria, 
and the theocracy in Iran--probably won't evolve without some internal 
violence. The Bush administration ought to be prepared to encourage or 
coerce these regimes into changing sooner, not later [Emphasis added]. 
 
This excerpt highlights Gerecht’s belief in the global promotion of democracy 
especially in the Middle East which is typical of neo-conservatives. We are invited to 
support President Bush’s attempts to democratise Iraq as well other nations in the 
region including Saudi Arabia. Gerecht is especially critical of Saudi Arabia, blaming 
adherence to ‘Wahhabism’ for its apparent ‘anti-modern’ views including its 
resistance to democracy. According to Gerecht ‘Wahhabism’ and nations like Saudi 
Arabia that adhere to and promote it are enemies of the global democratic project 
advanced by the Bush Administration. They are also ‘animals’. Gerecht writes 
Saudi Arabia--Continue to push the democratic agenda publicly in the Arabian 
peninsula. The rather pathetic Saudi attempt to defuse democratic ferment at 
home and the Bush administration's growing anti-Saudi attitude by holding 
highly restricted municipal elections is likely to do the opposite of what the 
royal family intended. The Shiites of the Eastern Province--where most of 
Saudi Arabia's oil is located--may, as the Arab Shiites of Iraq continue to 
advance democratically, become more inclined to protest. The turnout for the 
municipal elections clearly showed that the Shiites in the Eastern Province 
didn't consider the exercise a joke (as was the case among many Sunnis). 
The Wahhabi clerical establishment, the religious backbone of Saudi power, 
may become more inclined to use older, violent means to oppress the Shiites. 
Washington should rhetorically pre-empt the issue, by declaring loudly and 
often that it favors modern democracy in Saudi Arabia, where minority rights 
are protected. We would be wise not to assume that the Saudi royal family is 
more “modern” than the people of the country. It may well be more 
“modern” than the average Wahhabi in the Najd region, the heartland of 
Wahhabi power. But Saudi Arabia is much larger than the Najd. 
…we know for certain that Saudi Arabia was the cradle of bin Ladenism. 
There is scant evidence to suggest that the Wahhabi establishment has 
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changed its spots (philosophically it can’t). The Wahhabis should have to 
compete for their flock. Inside the country and out, the United States should 
be relentlessly pushing for democracy. As in Egypt, we should increasingly tie 
government-to-government relations and joint programs directly to Saudi 
progress with real national elections [Emphasis added]. 
 
I have highlighted a few phrases and terms that we can abstract for closer analysis. 
Gerecht’s claim that ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia will not “evolve,” his description of 
those ‘Wahhabis’ from the Najd region as less “modern” than the Saudi royal family, 
his claims that the “Wahhabi establishment has [not] changed it spots” and that they 
“should have to complete for their flock,” suggests that Gerecht wants his audience to 
understand adherents of ‘Wahhabism’ as ‘lesser humans’ and as ‘animals’.  
 
As was the case with some of the liberal representations of ‘Wahhabism,’ the 
metaphorical term ‘evolve’ carries certain connotations. For example it signifies 
‘evolution’ which is a study of the ‘progressing’ of animals typically undertaken in 
the biological sciences. Describing the more hardcore adherents of ‘Wahhabism’ as 
less ‘modern’ relative to the less strict followers of ‘Wahhabism’ also suggests that 
we can have a ranking system for mankind and societies and that societies in which 
‘Wahhabism’ is present are situated somewhere at the beginning of this spectrum. 
These societies are far behind the more ‘evolved’ ‘Western’ societies that embrace 
and practice democracy. As we can see, Gerecht like many neo-conservatives values 
the promoting democracy for other nations and he relies on this as a key performance 
indicator of ‘progress’.  
 
Also pertinent and worthy of closer analysis is Gerecht’s use of the metaphorical 
expressions “changed it spots” and “flock.” This metaphorical expression has its roots 
in the well-known phrase ‘a leopard cannot change its spots’ which implies that things 
have an innate nature than cannot be altered. The phrase has Biblical origins which is 
telling when we consider the prominent role Judaism and evangelical Christianity 
plays in the neo-conservative movement. The phrase appears in the Book of Jeremiah 
which is the second of the Later Prophets in the Hebrew Bible. Jeremiah 13:23 reads 
“Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do 
good, that are accustomed to do evil.” In addition to highlighting the potential role 
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Judaism plays in Gerecht’s thinking, this metaphorical expression also helps 
dehumanise the ‘Wahhabi’ Other. The suggestion is the “Wahhabi establishment” are 
animals who are inherently evil. Because they cannot become ‘good’ we must treat 
them as enemies.  
 
Sticking with this dehumanising the ‘Wahhabi’ Other, Gerecht also writes “the 
Wahhabis should have to compete for their flock.” When used as a noun the term 
‘flock’ describes a group of animals typically birds or sheep that often group or are 
hearded together. Gerecht is suggesting that ‘Wahhabi’ adherents are unthinking 
animals following the directions of their herders/leaders. The term ‘flock’ can also 
refer to sheep and to ‘follow like a sheep’ is to uncritically accept or follow the 
instructions of a leader.  Gerecht’s use of the term ‘compete’ also resonates with the 
typical neo-conservative ontological view of the world as an anarchic place where 
states and groups must ‘compete’ against each other to satisfy their aims and goals.  
 
Stephens also dehumanises the ‘Wahhabi’ Other when describing Saudi Arabia as the 
source of modern ‘Islamic radicalism’ and claiming “the radicals are all drinking 
from the same breast… the ideological inspiration and financial support provided by 
Saudi Arabia [Emphasis added].”66 There are many different kinds of animals for 
example dogs, pigs, cats and cows where the mothers breastfeed their young. While 
humans also breastfeed Stephens’ description of many people “drinking from the 
same breast” suggests he is referring to animals and not humans because of the 
former’s propensity to have numerous babies at the same time. In using this 
metaphorical expression, Stephens is suggesting that ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia is like 
the mother or ‘bitch’ providing the ‘Islamic radicals’ / baby animals with the nutrients 
or sustenance they require in order to survive. Thinking of the Other not as humans 
but as animals who for example need ‘breeding out’ or ‘herding’ helps as Danziger 
would say “give a certain cast to [this neo-conservative] surface discourse.”67  
 
Closely associated with this idea is the likening of the ‘Wahhabi’ Other to ‘Savages’. 
We saw how Stephens use the terms “Bedouin kingdom” and “tribes,” and how 
                                                 
66 Bret Stephens, “The Arab Invasion,” The Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2007, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117677971027672274 
67 Danziger, Metaphors in the History of Psychology, 333. 
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Pryce-Jones uses the term “immemorial tribal custom” when describing ‘Wahhabism’ 
and ‘Wahhabi-influenced’ groups.68 Gerecht also suggests that the ‘Wahhabi’ from 
Najd are ‘anti-modern, that ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia needs violence to ‘evolve’ and he 
uses the metaphorical expression “head-and-hand-chopping” when describing 
‘Wahhabism’ and ‘Wahhabi-influenced’ groups.69 These techniques encourage the 
audience to think of the ‘Wahhabi’ Other as a ‘less-evolved’ and ‘inferior’ human, as 
a ‘Noble Savage’.  
 
These neo-conservative representations of the ‘Wahhabi’ Other resonate with how 
ethnic, racial and religious Others have been represented in ‘Western’ popular culture 
and scholarship. Gustav Jahoda’s ‘historical catalogue’ highlights the tendency in 
‘Western’ thought to think of these racial, ethnic and religious Others as barbarians 
lacking in culture, self-restraint, moral sensibility and cognitive capacity.70 Excesses 
have tended to accompany these deficiencies i.e. the Savage has a brutish appetite for 
violence, is prone to criminality and can tolerate unusual amounts of pain.71 This 
brutish appetite for violence for example resonates with Gerecht’s describing the 
“head-and-hand-chopping” practices adopted by the “Wahhabi-clergy.”72  
 
Understanding the origins of the popular ‘Noble Savage’ myth also provides us with 
valuable insight into neo-conservative thinking, as it helps us to understand the 
generative metaphors underpinning and shaping the neo-conservative discourse. 
British anthropologists created the ‘Noble Savage’ myth for propaganda purposes 
specifically to use it as a device to encourage slavery and genocide.73 The myth was a 
vital tool that enabled them to promote the centrality of race as a scientific ‘ideology’ 
while advocating violently racist modes of ordering society.74  
 
Order is an important idea to many neo-conservatives. Neo-conservatives work from 
the ontological assumption that people are naturally evil, violent and conflictual and 
                                                 
68 Stephens, “The Arab Invasion.”; Pryce-Jones, “The Saudi Revolution.” 
69 Gerecht, “Radioactive Regime.”; Gerecht, “What Hath Ju-Ju Wrought!” 
70 Gustav Jahoda, Images of Savages: Ancient Roots of Modern Prejudice 
in Western Culture (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1999). 
71 Haslem, “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review,” 252. 
72 Gerecht, “Radioactive Regime.” 
73 Ter Ellingson, The Myth of the Noble Savage (Oakland: University of California Press, 2001), 291-
297, 343-345.  
74 Ibid., 239. 
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therefore need ‘order’ to prevent themselves from giving in to their natural 
inclinations.75 This sense of order is often seen as lacking in Indigenous or ‘Savage’ 
societies which is why according to neo-conservative logic they often give in to their 
‘violent tendencies’. We also know that the global promotion of democracy is a key 
part of neo-conservative foreign policy. Thinking and representing the ‘Wahhabi’ 
Other as a ‘Savage’ can therefore encourage and justify policies and actions aimed at 
recreating or ‘ordering’ these societies in ways that align with neo-conservative 
beliefs about the world.  
 
Inspired by Democratic Peace Theory, most neo-conservatives want all the world’s 
nations outside of the US particularly Middle Eastern regimes to be democracies. 
Using ‘Wahhabism’ to represent these societies and the people belonging to them as 
‘Savages’ encourages and justifies the adopting of policies and actions that aim to 
‘democratise’ and ‘civilise’ these people. We have seen this in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and according to these representations there are many neo-conservatives who would 
also like the US to ‘promote’ the spreading of democracy in ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Modern neo-conservative intellectuals are very clear in the messages they are 
communicating to their readers. According to them ‘Wahhabism’ is responsible for 
inspiring and motivating modern ‘Islamic terrorism,’ Saudi Arabia is responsible for 
promoting ‘Wahhabism,’ and anything associated with Saudi Arabia or ‘Wahhabism’ 
must be thought of and treated as an enemy of the US, Israel and the rest of the ‘free’ 
and ‘democratic’ world. Not only does ‘Wahhabism’ provide a theological 
justification for the destruction of the US and Israel but it is also understood to be a 
major obstacle to the US stated aim of promoting democracy in the Middle East.  
 
Many neo-conservatives been influenced by specific themata and generative 
metaphors when understanding and representing ‘Wahhabism’. These include 
religious themata like God’s promising of land (what is modern Israel and Palestine) 
                                                 
75 These ideas are commonly traced back to the works of Thomas Hobbes. For an understanding of this 
approach see Sharon A. Lloyd and Susanne Sreedhar, “Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy,” The 
Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2014). 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/hobbes-moral/  
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to the Jewish state of Israel, that this land must be controlled by Israel so as to 
welcome the Saviour and the ‘good versus evil’ themata which also has theological 
roots. Motivated and inspired by these ‘master-themes’, neo-conservative intellectuals 
understand ‘Wahhabism’ as an ‘evil’ force that must be defeated. We can also 
understand the neo-conservative intellectuals’ decision to associate these ‘evil’ and 
‘enemy’ ‘Wahhabi’ forces with Palestine and pro-Palestinian groups as a deliberate 
attempt to encourage their audience to see the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a 
conflict between ‘good and evil,’ between the ‘free world’ and the ‘radical Islamists’.  
 
Thinking and writing about the ‘Wahhabi’ Other in these ways not only encourages 
their audience to think of them as inferior beings but it also encourages actions that 
are normally befitting of animals and savages i.e. neutering, herding, acquiring land, 
helping them ‘evolve’ or ‘progress’.  Problematising the ‘Wahhabi’ Other in these 
ways helps support both the neo-conservative worldview that they are enemies and 
their foreign policy aims like the promoting democracy in the Middle East. 
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Chapter Seven 
An ‘Unnatural’ and ‘Nonsensical’ Belief System for an Alienated 
People: Marxist imaginings of ‘Wahhabism’  
 
Be thine own palace, or the world's thy jail. 
John Donne, To Sir Henry Wotton 
 
Karl Marx was a brilliant young doctoral graduate in 1843 struggling like 
other young German intellectuals of his time with weighty philosophical 
and political issues. He was particularly exercised to push back against 
Hegel’s large and powerful system while retaining the dialectical method. 
Like other Young Hegelians he was thinking hard about the role played by 
religion. He came to certain conclusions that have powerfully affected what 
became an astonishingly large and politically influential system of political 
theory and practice called Marxism. As Marx saw it 
…Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is, 
indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either 
not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But 
man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the 
world of man – state, society. This state and this society produce 
religion…1 
 
Marx understands religion to be a man-made phenomenon, devoid of any 
element of the supernatural and designed for those who fail to realise and 
appreciate their authentic selves and capabilities.2 He insisted that there 
was an authentic basis for what he called ‘religious distress’: it just needed 
to be decoded properly.  
Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress 
and also the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the 
                                                 
1 Karl Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” in Deutsch-Französische 
Jahrbücher, trans. Andy Blunden, February 1844, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm.  
2 Ollman, Alienation, 221-226. 
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oppressed creature, the hearts of a heartless world just as it is the 
spirit of spiritless conditions… 
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the 
demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their 
illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a 
condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, 
therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which 
religion is the halo….3 
 
For Marx the struggle against religion was an important one yet it could not 
be separated from the struggle against political and social oppression. 
“Religion is the general theory of that world, its encyclopedic compendium, 
its logic in a popular form, its spiritualistic point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, 
its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its universal source of 
consolation and justification.”4 Later after he had turned his attention to the 
workings of modern industrial societies Marx began to argue that religion 
and man’s need for religious belief would fade away when bourgeois 
society was replaced by a Communist society in which man experienced 
the closest thing possible to unalienation.5  
 
Marx’s views including those about religion inspired and motivated a large 
body of work that we now call Marxism. Frustrated by philosophers who 
chose to separate themselves from society rather than turn their philosophy 
into action, Marx stresses the importance of turning philosophical critique 
into practical change: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in 
various ways. The point, however, is to change it.”6 Marx emphasises the 
potential we humans possess, describing us as our own Gods who have the 
ability to create the kind of world we want to live in. While his theories are 
a subjective interpretation of relations he saw in the European world during 
the period 1844-67, his ideas continue to inspire and motivate a large body 
                                                 
3 Karl Marx, “The Introduction to Contribution To The Critique of Hegel’s Philsophy of Right,” 1843-
1844. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/df-jahrbucher/law-abs.htm  
4 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, On Religion (Moscow: Progress, 1957), 38. 
5 Ollman, Alienation, 221-226. 
6 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader 2nd  ed., ed. Robert Tucker (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1978), 145. 
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of Marxist scholars who adapt and apply his ideas when making sense of 
modern political situations. As we are about to see this includes ‘Western’ 
(as in residing in the ‘West’) Marxist intellectuals making sense of the 
current situation in the Middle East particularly in Saudi Arabia.  
 
As in the previous three chapters, I start by outlining what I think is a 
workable ideal type of Marxism. I then use that to outline some of the ways 
Marxists represent Wahhabism. 
 
Towards an ‘Ideal Type’. 
 
The term ‘Marxism’ itself has been devised to refer to those inspired and 
motivated by Karl Marx’s writings and it is often used as a self-identifying 
label by those believing they have adopted Marx’s ideas. Even after so 
many decades it is surprising that there continues to be so many different 
interpretations of Marx and Marxism.7 New interpretations are also 
continuing to emerge. This array of diverse interpretations not only 
between Marxist schools of thought but also within them, is indicative of 
the continued interest and passion people have for Marx’s ideas.  
 
As is the case with all fuzzy categories getting clarity about Marxism, one 
of the most influential, yet most criticised and misunderstood social 
theories continues to vex many scholars. The scope of Marxism is 
responsible for a lot of this trouble as it stretches across different fields of 
study including philosophy, economics, sociology, history, politics and 
cultural studies. Yet Marx and many of those inspired by his ideas refuse to 
limit themselves to such categorisations claiming that Marxism is not just a 
theory to be applied in these different areas but is also a way of 
understanding the world and acting in it. Marxism aims to gain an 
understanding of the totality of social life and aims to link this 
understanding to practical action to help remedy any problems. The 
                                                 
7 Among the most notable schools of thought are British Marxism, Analytical Marxism, Structuralism 
and Western Marxism.   
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continuing evolution of the Marxist tradition so long after Marx first 
posited his ideas truly is a testament to the power of Marxist thinking.  
 
Given that, I need to develop a Weberian ‘ideal type’ in order to help show 
some of the rhetorical techniques Marxist intellectuals use when 
representing ‘Wahhabism’. As was the case with my analysis of the neo-
conservative and liberal representations of ‘Wahhabism,’ this provides us 
with valuable insight into how some Marxists make sense of this ‘observer-
dependent’ phenomenon. While there is a plethora of interpretations in 
addition to many volumes of Marx’s own work, I have decided to rely in 
part on Ollman’s interpretation of Marx’s writings when developing my 
ideal type. There are a number of reasons for this.  
 
First and foremost Ollman gives lot of attention to Marx’s writings about 
religion. This makes sense given my focus is on how Marxist intellectuals 
represent and make sense of ‘Wahhabism’. Second it is beyond my ability 
to provide a thorough critique of Marx’s entire works. That task would 
require a thesis in itself. I sometimes refer to Marx’s more popular and 
prominent works however in these instances my understanding is buttressed 
by Ollman’s interpretation. Thirdly I used Ollman’s interpretation because 
he considers Marx’s approach to religion in the context of Marx’s 
philosophy of internal relations, abstraction and dialectics. These 
philosophical approaches are key to understanding Marx’s works as well as 
aligning with my own philosophical approach.  
 
The first element of my ideal type deals with the typical Marxist approach 
to and understanding the existence of religion. Marxists tend to see religion 
as an ‘unnatural’ phenomenon that exists to help fill a personal void created 
by Capitalism. In more formal terms Bertell Ollman describes religion as a 
value-Relation of man’s alienation in a capitalist system.8 This 
understanding of religion can be traced back to Marx who writes “The 
religious world is but the reflex of the real world,” meaning the former has 
                                                 
8 Ollman, Alienation, 221-226. 
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been created by man to deal with the subjugation and oppression he 
experiences in the latter.9 Ollman writes that the alienated individual 
creates and turns to religion in an attempt to make cosmic sense of his 
hostile and overpowering surroundings.10  
 
Making sense of the nineteenth century Christian Europe, Marx writes that 
Christianity with its belief in man’s abstract equality before God is the most 
suitable religion for a commodity-based society where men ‘reduce their 
individual private labour to the stand of homogenous human labour’.11 
Commodity-based societies appear all around the modern world and 
modern Marxist intellectuals have expanded on this view when making 
sense of the current political situation. Now many Marxists also see 
religions like Islam which includes ‘Wahhabism’ as it appears in the 
Middle East especially Saudi Arabia with its belief in man’s abstract 
equality before God, as a suitable technique for man dealing with the issues 
associated with a modern capitalist society.   
 
For Marx and many modern Marxists religion does not in any meaningful 
way help human beings make sense of their lives, rather it is understood as 
the destruction of all sense except the nonsense it itself creates.12 Marx 
writes that it is only people who are estranged from their nature and their 
fellow man (meaning it is only those who experience alienation as a result 
of Capitalism) that could construct “fixed mental shapes or ghosts dwelling 
outside nature and man.”13 Once in existence these “productions of the 
human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and enter 
into relations both with one another and the human race.”14 
 
                                                 
9 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (1884). 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-
1844.pdf, 103. 
10 Ollman, Alienation, 221. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 168. 
14 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. I (Moscow: Progress, 1887), 47. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf.  
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The implication for my deconstructing of Marxist intellectuals of 
representations of ‘Wahhabism’ is that these intellectuals will tend not to 
attach any kind of importance to religion nor treat ‘Wahhabism’ with the 
level of respect one would reasonably expect from a religious or religiously 
tolerant intellectual. Marxists instead tend to see ‘Wahhabism’ as an 
‘unnatural’ phenomenon created by man to help him deal with his suffering 
created and perpetuated by the Capitalist system. Marxists do not see 
‘Wahhabism’ as providing the answers to their hostile and overpowering 
surroundings, rather they see Capitalism as the chief problem. They will 
therefore tend to advocate for the adopting of measures and policies that 
would see the collapsing of the Capitalist system and the creating of a 
Communist state.  
 
Like Marx, many modern Marxist intellectuals believe that man can only 
experience unalienation or rather the closest thing to a state of unalienation 
in a Communist society. In this kind of society man exists in near-perfect 
harmony with his fellow man, work, products and his species-being and 
therefore has no need for religion. Marx writes that religion or atheism do 
not exist in a Communist society because there is nothing to deny.15 In a 
communist society people will strive for happiness now and not delay this 
for some imaginary afterlife. It follows that many of the Marxist 
intellectuals representing ‘Wahhabism’ want its adherents to experience 
happiness now and the path to this happiness involves getting rid of the 
commodity-based system which currently acts as its lynchpin and 
establishing a Communist society.  
 
The second key element of my ideal type deals with the typical Marxist 
understanding of man’s relation to ‘God’, ‘God-objects’ and ‘Agents of 
God’. Marxists understand that religious activity lends itself to creating of a 
‘God’ or ‘Gods’ and ‘God-objects’. God or Gods here are understood as 
external and eternal beings or as Marx says “fixed mental forms dwelling 
outside nature and man,” ‘God-objects’ refer to things like religious 
                                                 
15 Ollman, Alienation, 221. 
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figures, relics, symbols and holy places and ‘Agents of God’ are those 
people who have been empowered with some kind of religious authority.16 
Pertinent to this study are religious sites like Mecca, Medina and Haram al-
Sharif, religious texts like the Koran and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
interpretations, the ‘Wahhabi’ Ullama in Saudi Arabia, mosques and 
madrassas.  
 
Marxists typically understand these things as existing independent of as 
well as hostile and alien to man.17 According to Marxists the power man 
places in these things turns against him and the ‘Agents of God’ are able to 
use that power to decide what man can and cannot do. As with other 
products of man’s alienated activity, man’s subservience to God and ‘God-
objects’ is reflected in his relations to those who control both of these.18 
Marx writes 
Every self-estrangement of man from himself and from nature 
appears in the relation in which he places himself and nature to men 
other than and differentiated from himself. For this reason religious 
self-estrangement necessarily appears in the relations of the layman 
to the priest, or again, to a mediator, since we are here dealing with 
the intellectual world.19  
 
Man willingly gives his power over to the ‘Agents of God’ who, claiming 
to speak in God’s name, control God like the capitalist controls 
commodities and rulers control the organs of government.20 “In this 
instance, the priest uses the qualities transferred to god by the believers 
themselves to overawe and threaten them.”21 These ‘Agents of God’ will do 
whatever they can i.e. use sin, prayer, heaven, hell and guilt, to ensure to 
maintain the status quo and ensure he remains in a position of influence and 
the believers in positions of subservience.  
                                                 
16 Citation from Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 168. 
Understanding of ‘God-objects’ and ‘Agents of God’ comes from Ollman, Alienation, 221-226. 
17 Ollman, Alienation, 224. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 79. 
20 Ollman, Alienation, 225. 
21 Ibid. 
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It follows that Marxist intellectuals representing ‘Wahhabism’ will tend to 
see God, ‘God-objects’ and especially ‘Agents of God’ not as spiritually 
significant things but rather as creations of man helping maintain the status 
quo and keeping the people mired in religious delusion. All of these things 
i.e. praying to God, revering ‘God-objects’ and following the instructions 
of the ‘Agents of God’ help distract the people from identifying the real 
source of their oppression and subjugation, which is the capitalist system 
and those who are a part of the ruling class / Bourgeois who have a stake in 
maintaining it.  
 
This leads me to the third key element of my ‘Weberian’ ‘ideal type’ which 
is the way Marxists talk about class. As Ollman points out, ‘class’ refers to 
the social units based on a people’s relationship to the mode of production, 
similar economic conditions and interests, a consciousness of these 
interests, the existence of a group-wide political organisation, cultural 
affinity and a common antagonism for opposing groups.22 This the way 
some Marxists have distinguished two classes in any society namely a  
ruling class and a labouring class. (The names of these classes will alter 
according to the particular mode of production: under the capitalist mode of 
production this gives us a bourgeoisie and a proletariat). According to a 
conventional Marxist approach, the Capitalist system is broadly understood 
as creating these two classes and these two groups are understood as 
engaging in a constant battle for the ‘surplus-value’ created by the working 
class. Ollman writes 
The class battle between workers and capitalists for the surplus-
value of the former is one to the death, the slow, timeless death of 
the workers. Given the capitalists’ superior position in society and 
their control over the most powerful weapon in this struggle, 
money, their indifference to the needs of workers issues in far more 
painful results than the parallel indifferences of workers to the 
needs of their employers.23 
 
                                                 
22  Ibid., 205.  
23 Ibid., 206. 
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This idea is pertinent to this study as there are many Marxists who 
understand religion as a tool used not only by ‘Agents of God’ but also by a  
ruling class to support the status quo/maintain their positions of influence in 
the capitalist system.  
 
As is the case with religion, many Marxists understand the creation and 
existence of Class as a value-Relation of man’s fourfold-alienation which 
he experiences in the Capitalist system. Again the standard Marxist solution 
to this problem is the replacing of Capitalism with a Communist society in 
which man exists in near perfect harmony with his work, product, fellow 
man and species-being. This however is not in the interests of those who 
are currently winning the battle for worker’s surplus-value and therefore 
have a stake in maintaining the status-quo. According to many Marxist 
intellectuals religions like ‘Wahhabism’ play an important role in this 
process as they help distract and suppress the working-class thereby 
limiting their developing of a class-consciousness. The idea of class-
consciousness which is typically understood by Marxists as an awareness 
of one’s place in a system of social class, is considered vital to the 
overthrowing of the Capitalist system and the establishing of a Communist 
state.24  
 
These three key elements, how Marxists understand the existence of 
religion, their understanding of the roles played by ‘God,’ ‘God-Objects’ 
and ‘Agents of God,’ and the role religion plays in maintaining class-
system, form my ‘Weberian’ ideal type. It is with these ideas with mind, in 
addition to my awareness of the different rhetorical techniques used by 
(Marxist) intellectuals, that I approach the deconstruction process.  
 
  
                                                 
24 For a better understanding of the idea of ‘class consciousness’ especially how it relates to ‘class 
struggle’ see Cliff Slaughter, “Marxism and the Class Struggle,” (1975). 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/slaughte.html.  
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Seeking solace, ‘Wahhabism’ as a Natural part of Capitalism 
 
Many Marxists see ‘Wahhabism’ as a natural part of capitalism. They 
understand the capitalist system to be so harsh and exploitative that people 
particularly those living in Saudi Arabia have had to turn to ‘Wahhabism’ 
or embrace a more ‘radical’ understanding of ‘Wahhabism’ in order to deal 
with these overpowering conditions. Often ‘Wahhabism’ is seen as 
providing an outlet for the frustration that these people feel. Some Marxist 
intellectuals see ‘Wahhabism’ as a ‘radical’ version of Islam responsible 
for inspiring and motivating ‘Islamic terrorism,’ and so they see it is a 
problem that so many people are turning to or embracing this faith. So in 
effect they blame the inequality created by the capitalist system for 
inspiring ‘Islamic terrorism’. Marxists intellectuals providing these kinds of 
representations will often use rhetorical techniques particularly 
metaphorical expressions that encourage their audience to think of 
‘Wahhabism’ as a natural part of Capitalism.  
 
Woods is among those who blame capitalism for people embracing 
‘Wahhabism’ which he considers to be a ‘radical’ version of Islam 
responsible for modern Islamic terrorism.25 More specifically Woods 
blames the inequality created in Saudi Arabia, which he understands as 
ruled according to ‘Wahhabi’ doctrine, specifically the difference in living 
standards between the ruling and working classes, for encouraging many 
Saudi’s embracing of more a ‘radical’ understanding of ‘Wahhabism’.  
…Saudi Arabia, is now very unstable. Despite its vast oil wealth, 
the living standards of the masses have fallen and discontent with 
the corrupt and degenerate ruling clique is growing. This is reflected 
in the increasing disaffection of the youth, which is attracted by 
religious extremism. It is no accident that most of the 9/11 suicide 
squad was made up of Saudis. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Alan Woods, “ Startling revelations about Bush’s foreign policy,” In Defense of Marxism, March 22, 
2007.http://www.marxist.com/revelations-bush-foreign-policy220307.html 
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Woods also blames these ‘Wahhabi’ terrorists for “waging war against the 
pro-Soviet government in Kabul.”  
 
Kumar offers a similar representation of ‘Wahhabism’.26 She blames the 
economic crises brought about by capitalism for inspiring and motivating 
many people in the Middle East for embracing Islam and many people in 
Saudi Arabia for embracing ‘Wahhabism’. Like many Marxist intellectuals, 
Kumar understands society as divided into classes and she claims that most 
people living in the working class who have sought ‘Islamic solutions’ to 
their problems have failed to recognise it is Capitalism that is primarily 
responsible for their poor living conditions. She also understands religion in 
general and Islam in particular as a tool used by the ruling classes (she calls 
them the “exploiting classes”) to help justify and support their positions of 
authority over the working classes. Building on the ideas of another 
Marxist intellectual Kumar writes  
Like all religions, Islam has adapted. Religious texts may be more 
or less fixed, but the ideas and practices they are made to justify are 
ever-changing, based on historical transformations that are 
independent of religious ideology…As Chris Harman notes,  
Islam is no different to any other religion in these respects. It 
arose in one context, among a trading community in the 
towns of 7th century Arabia, in the midst of a society still 
mainly organized on a tribal basis. It flourished within the 
succession of great empires carved out by some those who 
accepted its doctrines. It persists today as the official 
ideology of numerous capitalist states (Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Pakistan, Iran etc), as the inspiration of many oppositional 
movements.  
It has been able to survive in such different societies because 
it has been able to adapt to differing class interests…But at 
the same time it has gained the allegiance of the mass of 
people by putting across a message offering consolation to 
                                                 
26 Deepa Kumar, “Islam and Islamophobia,” International Socialist Review, 52 (2007), 
http://www.isreview/org/issues/52/Islamaphobia.html 
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the poor and oppressed. At every point its message has 
balanced between promising a degree of protection to the 
oppressed and providing the exploiting classes with 
protection against any revolutionary overthrow [Emphasis 
added].  
 
While the term ‘Wahhabism’ has not explicitly been used in this extract, 
Harman instead refers to Islam as the “official ideology of numerous 
capitalist” including “Saudi Arabia.” However elsewhere Kumar writes 
Saudi Arabia’s “…royal family adheres to the ultra-conservative 
Wahhabi/Salafi strand of Islam.” 
 
Pertinent here is Harman’s use of the term “flourished” when describing the 
existence of Islam in Saudi Arabia both historically and in more recent 
times. While this term can be understood in a number of different ways, it 
is commonly used when referring to the healthy or vigorous growth or 
development of a living organism especially as the result of a particularly 
congenial environment. Using nature as a source domain when describing 
the existence of religion encourages the audience to think of the existence 
of Islam in general and ‘Wahhabism’ in particular as natural parts of both 
empires and “capitalist states.”  
 
Bowie provides a similar representation in his treatment of the increasing 
popularity of ‘Wahhabism’ in Bangladesh.27 Bowie claims Saudi-
propagated ‘Wahhabism,’ which he understands as a ‘radical version’ of 
Islam responsible for inspiring and motivating terrorism, is becoming 
increasingly popular in this relatively poor nation. Bowie claims that many 
working class Bangladeshis embrace ‘Wahhabism’ as a way of dealing 
with their feelings of alienation or disconnection. These ‘Wahhabis’ (which 
Bowie also refers to as “Islamists”) have become so incensed with their 
living and working conditions and have become so ‘radicalised’ by the 
‘Wahhabi’ faith that they are now “demanding an end to the nation’s 
                                                 
27 Nile Bowie,  “Slave Labor, Wal-Mart and Wahhabism: Bangladesh in turbulence,” RT News, May 
26, 2013. http://rt.com/op-edge/bangladesh-garment-protests-islam-746/. 
  201 
secular identity.” Bowie writes 
The streets of Dhaka have been awash with protests, violence, and 
killing in recent times as the Bangladeshi public expresses its 
resentment to the exploitation of garment workers in the aftermath 
of the country’s worst industrial disaster in its history, and the 
rising tide of Islamists demanding an end to the nation’s secular 
identity [Emphasis added]. 
 
Pertinent here are the metaphorical expressions that help represent the 
increasing popularity of ‘Islamism’ including ‘Wahhabism’ in Bangladesh 
as ‘natural’ parts of capitalism. First Bowie has chosen to use the term 
‘awash’ which literally means ‘flooded with or covered by water or another 
liquid,’ when describing the current situation in Bangladesh. Second in 
choosing to use the metaphorical expression “rising tide” Bowie is likening 
the increasing popularity of ‘radical Islam’ including ‘Wahhabism’ to an 
uncontrollable force of nature acting from the ‘bottom up’ and lifting 
everything around it. As a tide rises its volume and strength increases 
making it extremely hard or impossible to resist. In drawing on these nature 
metaphors, which liken the current political situation to events in nature, 
Bowie understands and wants his readers to understand the rise of Islamism 
and ‘Wahhabism’ in Bangladesh as a natural part of man’s alienation in 
Capitalism. The implication is that ‘radical Islamism’ like ‘Wahhabism’ 
would be an absent or rather ‘unnatural’ in a Communist society where 
man lives in a state of ‘unalienation’. 
 
Mulholland uses a similar technique when representing ‘political Islam’ 
and “Wahhabi interpretations of Islam” as natural parts of the capitalist 
order.28 He represents ‘Wahhabism’ as a religion that helps people express 
their anger and humiliation about their oppressive living conditions. Like 
many Marxists Mulholland also believes that for working class people to 
embrace religions like ‘Wahhabism’ is the wrong way to deal with their 
oppression and subjugation. According to Mulholland, replacing capitalism 
                                                 
28 Niall Mulholland, “Religion and Society,” SocialismToday 114 (2007-2008), 
http://www.socialismtoday.org/114/religion.html. 
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(which he calls “the profit system”) with a socialist order is the solution to 
fundamental social problems. Mulholland writes 
The growth of political Islam is, at root, due to the terrible social 
and economic conditions faced by millions of Muslims…Political 
Islam, which in many cases was encouraged and fostered by 
western powers during the cold war, and by the Saudi petrodollars 
promoting Wahhabi interpretations of Islam, partially fills the space 
created by the failure of the left and Arab nationalism. It is an 
oppositionist channel for Muslims angered and humiliated by the 
poverty and oppression they face… 
But all forms of political or ‘radical’ Islam will prove to be a severe 
disappointment for the masses, as they do not represent a break with 
the profit system and class exploitation [Emphasis added]. 
 
Also commenting on the growth and popularity of religion in the ‘West’ in 
general of which ‘Wahhabism’ is a part, Mulholland writes 
New religions and mystical ideas…sprout up in the west, 
indicating the deep sense of alienation from modern capitalism 
among sections of the middle class and working class, and a search 
for an alternative to the profit system [Emphasis added]. 
 
Again we see a Marxist intellectual using a nature metaphor as a source 
domain when describing religion. Pertinent are the metaphorical 
expressions “growth” and “sprout up.” ‘Growth’ of course means the 
process of increasing in size and one of the ways in which it is commonly 
used is when describing the ‘the upward growth of plants’. The phrase 
‘sprout up’ is relatively more ‘nature-specific’ and is used when referring to 
things like plants that sprout from seeds in the earth producing flowers, 
fruits and vegetables. In using these nature metaphors Mulholland is 
expressing the typical Marxist belief that alienation provides the necessary 
conditions for the existence of religions like ‘Wahhabism’. Again the 
implication is that religion in general and ‘radical’ and ‘political’ Islam like 
‘Wahhabism’ in particular would not ‘grow’ or ‘sprout-up’ in a society free 
from Capitalist exploitation. 
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The authors of an article appearing on the Socialist World website (which is 
said to have been co-authored and approved by the Committee for a 
Workers International) also rely on nature metaphors when representing 
‘Wahhabism’ as a ‘natural’ part of the Capitalist system.29 Their article is 
primarily dedicated to understanding the current political and religious 
situation in Egypt following the end of the Mubarak regime. The authors 
claim the ‘radical’ and ‘Wahhabi’-linked ‘Islamist’ groups have become 
increasingly popular for Egyptians now living in a state in which they feel 
disconnected from and which has become even more hostile. The authors 
write 
In the vacuum that existed, as with other cases in history – Poland 
under Stalinism, in Iran under the Shah – religious forces, with 
roots amongst the masses, can initially provide a force, a pole of 
attraction, around which the opposition to dictatorial regimes can 
mobilise… 
…the more fundamentalist expression of right-wing political Islam, 
the Salafists around al-Nour, linked to the more fundamentalist 
Wahhabi brand of Islam emanating from Saudi Arabia and the 
doctrine of Al Qaeda, did well winning almost a quarter of the votes 
in both the cities and in the countryside [ Emphasis added]. 
 
Pertinent here is the authors’ use of the metaphorical expression “with roots 
amongst the masses.” The term ‘roots’ is generally associated with the 
organ of a plant lying below the surface of the soil. Using the metaphorical 
expression “with roots amongst the masses” helps describe the strength and 
pervasiveness of these “religious forces”. Again the using of a nature 
metaphor helps the Marxists intellectuals represent religion as a ‘natural’ 
value-Relation in capitalist societies and again the key point made by the 
authors is that the existence and increasing popularity of ‘radical Islamism’ 
like ‘Wahhabism’ is a natural product of the exploitation and inequality of 
the modern Capitalist system.  
 
                                                 
29 “Capitalist chaos – class struggle sharpens,” Socialistworld, January 21, 2012. 
http://www.socialistworld.net/doc/5562. 
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Using ‘Wahhabism’ to Maintain Positions of Influence 
 
Another popular representation involves Marxist intellectuals representing 
‘Wahhabism’ as a tool used by a ruling class to help legitimate their power 
and authority. More specifically these intellectuals tend to believe that 
ruling regimes use ‘Wahhabism’ to help justify and legitimate their claims 
to power, to oppress the working and poor classes, to keep these classes 
mired in a state of delusion thereby preventing class-consciousness and to 
encourage violence between the middle and lower classes both nationally 
and internationally. All of this helps to deflect attention away from the 
ruling regimes’ ‘illegitimate,’ ‘unjust’ and ‘tenuous’ claim to power. While 
this is a popular representation amongst Marxist intellectuals, unlike the 
previous sections Marxists rely on the proverbial mixed bag of rhetorical 
techniques when representing ‘Wahhabism’ in these ways.  
 
Some Marxist intellectuals have tended to focus their representations on the 
mutually beneficial relationship between the Saudi royal family governing 
the Kingdom and the ‘Wahhabi’ Ulama (the ‘Agents of God’) / relying on 
religion to justify and legitimate their rule, both of whom are seen as a part 
of the ruling class in Saudi Arabia. The Ulama is seen as providing the 
Saudi royal family with the religious legitimacy it requires and in return 
these ‘Agents of God’ are responsible for making laws that apparently align 
with ‘God’s word’ but in reality ensure they remain in positions of 
authority. Allan Woods’ representation of ‘Wahhabism’ provides a good 
example of this kind of approach. Woods writes 
For decades the House of Saud maintained itself in power by 
striking a compromise with the Wahhabi religious establishment. 
The royal family could enjoy its obscene wealth and lavish life 
style, its fast cars, whisky, gambling and prostitutes, as long as it 
allowed the clergy, supporters of the narrow and fanatical Wahhabi 
brand of Sunni Islam, to govern the religious life of the nation 
without interference from the state [Emphasis added].30 
                                                 
30 Woods, “ Startling revelations about Bush’s foreign policy.” 
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In a separate article Woods writes 
The degenerate Saudi ruling clique, conscious of its weakness and 
isolation from the population, arrived at a deal with the Moslem 
clerics of the strict Wahhabi sect, giving the latter a virtually free 
hand to operate in Saudi Arabia, on condition it encouraged Jihhad 
(holy War) outside Saudi borders only [Emphasis added].31 
 
Pertinent here is Wood’s using of the metaphorical expression “free hand” 
when describing the freedom the ‘Agents of God’/ “Moslem clerics of the 
strict Wahhabi sect” have in imposing their rule and sense of order on the 
Saudi people. The phrase “Free hand” can be understood as a ‘game 
metaphor’ and is literally understood as ‘having the freedom to act as one 
deems necessary’. There are a number of different contexts in which this 
phrase is used however one of the most common contexts is in card or 
board games. In these games all but one of the players is ‘locked out’ or 
momentarily prevented from playing allowing one player to have his turn 
often without being subject to the normal rules of the game.  
 
This relying on a ‘game’ metaphor fits perfectly with Woods’ describing of 
the Saudi ruling regime as enjoying “obscene wealth and lavish life style, 
its fast cars, whisky, gambling and prostitutes.” The point Woods is making 
is that ‘life is a game’ for the Saudi ruling class however only the Saudi 
people must follow the rules of the game which are set out by the 
‘Wahhabi’ religious establishment. The ruling class is free to do whatever 
they please which often includes indulging in activities that most Saudi 
people do not have the ability to experience. Woods is also offering a wider 
critique of capitalism which he understands to be unfair, unjust and 
hypocritical.  
 
There are also Marxist intellectuals whose representations of ‘Wahhabism’ 
treat it as a tool to maintain positions of authority focus on the relationship 
                                                 
31 Alan Woods, “’Delenda est Carthago’: US imperialism hell bent on war with Iraq,” In Defense of 
Marxism, January 21, 2003. 
http://www.marxist.com/languages/german/iraq_delenda_est_carthago.html. 
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between the ruling classes in Saudi Arabia and the US. Some Marxist 
intellectuals claim the US supports Saudi Arabia’s global promotion of 
‘Wahhabism’ which is understood as responsible for inspiring and 
motivating terrorism, when it helps support the imperialistic interests of its 
ruling class. An article published in Proletarian Revolution and appearing 
on the Marxist Internet Archive website provides a good example of this 
kind of approach.32 These authors write  
Successive U.S. governments have remained hostile to Iran, and the 
imperialist “war on terror” is widely perceived as a war on 
Muslims. But the U.S. ruling class is happy to work with 
reactionary Islamists in defense of its own imperialist interests. The 
U.S.-backed monarchy in Saudi Arabia uses its conservative 
Wahhabi brand of Islam to justify its rule.  
 
These authors also claim that the US, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the 
world’s ruling class use religions like ‘Wahhabism’ to distract the world’s 
working class, preventing them from developing class-consciousness. The 
authors write  
The bourgeoisie was once a progressive class striving for 
enlightenment. Now that it has secured its rule throughout the world 
it finds it more profitable to keep the people mired in ancient 
prejudice. Recent decades have seen a rise in fundamentalism in all 
regions and religions. 
 
Here we see the typical Marxist belief that the ruling class uses religion to 
help ‘keep the people in their place’. 
 
There are some Marxist intellectuals like those writing for the International 
Marxist Tendency who have more optimistic assessments about the modern 
political situation and see the downfall of capitalism and the establishing of 
                                                 
32 “Protest Execution of Iranian Gays! U.S. Imperialism: Hands off Iran!” Proletarian Revolution 78, 
July 19 (2006). https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/socialistvoice/iran7-19-06.html 
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a socialist state as inevitable.33 Recognising that ‘Wahhabism’ is an 
important tool used by the Saudi ruling class to maintain its position of 
authority, these authors claim that capitalism has made the Saudi royal 
family so “corrupt” and “degenerate” that even the ‘Agents of God’ / the 
“Wahhabi clergy” will not be able to prevent a socialist revolution. These 
authors write  
The Saudi regime itself, that bastion of reaction in the Middle East, 
resembles a pressure cooker without a safety valve. In such a 
regime, when the explosion comes, it will occur without warning 
and with extreme violence. The Saudi royal family is corrupt, 
degenerate and rotten to the core. It is split over the succession and 
there is growing resentment and discontent in the population. When 
the moment comes, all the oil in the kingdom will not save them. It 
is significant that now even the Wahhabi clergy is turning against 
them [Emphasis added]. 
 
Pertinent here is the authors’ use of the simile “resembles a pressure cooker 
without a safety valve” when describing the current political context in 
Saudi Arabia. A pressure cooker is typically used to boil a liquid like water 
or broth. The trapped steam increases both the internal pressure and 
temperature and the safety valve allows for the release of this pressure. 
Without a safety valve the internal pressure and temperature would 
continue to build up eventually forcing the cooker to explode. The authors 
use this simile to suggest that social revolution is inevitable.  
 
Also pertinent is the authors’ use of the metaphorical expression “rotten to 
the core” when describing the morality of the Saudi royal family. Again we 
see Marxist intellectuals’ using a ‘nature’ metaphor. We typically use this 
phrase when describing bad apples that we do not eat because they have 
rotted because of disease or worms. This is a metaphorical expression that 
makes judgements about morality. If a person or group is “rotten to the 
                                                 
33 “The Arab Revolution - Manifesto of the International Marxist Tendency. Part Three: The 
Revolution is not finished,” International Marxist Tendency, March 17, 2011, 
http://www.marxist.com/imt-manifesto-on-arab-revolution-part-three.htm. 
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core” they are understood as behaving in ways that are dishonest and 
immoral. The authors’ message is clear: the Saudi royal regime is immoral 
because it governs a system that oppresses the working and poor classes 
and because it uses ‘Wahhabism’ as tool to help them.  
 
‘Wahhabism’ as ‘backwardness’  
 
Some Marxist intellectuals maintain that the existence of the religion 
‘Wahhabism’ is indicative of man and society’s ‘backwardness’. Marxists 
tend to see religion as an unnatural phenomenon that is indicative of the 
alienation man feels in capitalism. Marxists typically believe that religions 
like ‘Wahhabism’ would not need to exist in under communism because 
humans would exist in near perfect harmony with their work, their fellow 
man and their species being. In this sense a communist society is seen as 
the highest, most advanced or ‘best’ expression of man’s capabilities. 
‘Wahhabism’ is therefore seen by many Marxists as an obstacle preventing 
the establishing of the ‘ideal society’.  
 
A good example of this approach is provided by the authors of an article 
appearing on the Marxist Internet Archive website.34 Echoing the thoughts 
of Marx, these authors believe that religion has turned against man. They 
claim the Saudi ruling class is using ‘Wahhabism’ to promote hostility 
between the Saudi people and between them and people belonging to other 
religious faiths thereby deflecting attention form themselves. The authors 
write  
Humanity is at a crossroads. Capitalism’s continued rule offers 
humanity nothing but more wars, executions, mass acts of terror and 
grinding exploitation and poverty. But the international working 
class, the one class with no essential interest in oppression or 
exploitation, has the potential to put an end to capitalist barbarism. 
To prepare our class for its revolutionary role, the most politically 
conscious worker…must [form]…a revolutionary party. Such a 
                                                 
34 “Protest Execution of Iranian Gays! U.S. Imperialism: Hands of Iran!,” Proletarian Revolution. 
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party works to expose the role of all leaderships that try to make 
peace with the capitalist system and thereby condemn us to the 
continued growth of barbarism. It fights against all types of 
backward consciousness that only foster divisions in the ranks of 
the oppressed and exploited [Emphasis added]. 
 
Here I highlight two pertinent metaphorical expressions that help show the 
authors’ ideas about progress or rather the lack thereof. First the authors 
claim “humanity is at a crossroads” which definitely infuses the current 
political situation with a sense of urgency. Here the authors are offering a 
critique of the Capitalist system in general of which ‘Wahhabism’ is a part. 
This metaphorical expression draws on a ‘movement’ metaphor specifically 
‘mankind is a vehicle’. A ‘crossroad’ is an intersection of two or more 
roads and both proceed in different directions therefore demanding the 
driver of the vehicle to make a decision. By describing humanity’s situation 
in this way the authors are suggesting that we as a collective must decide 
which ‘road we want to travel on’. The authors present us with two options 
which are indicative of how many Marxists make sense of the world. There 
is the ‘Capitalist’ road where man lives an alienated existence and which is 
filled with “wars, executions, mass acts of terror and grinding exploitation 
and poverty” or the “international working class” road that is free from 
“oppression or exploitation” and where humanity can create an ideal 
society.  
 
Also pertinent is the authors’ use of the metaphorical expression “backward 
consciousness” when describing those people ‘suffering’ from religion 
which includes ‘Wahhabism’. The authors are representing religious 
adherents including followers of ‘Wahhabism’ as ‘less developed’ than 
their non-religious/atheistic counterparts who enjoy a more ‘progressive’ or 
‘enlightened’ consciousness. States of mind or being specifically kinds of 
consciousness play a major role in Marxist theory. Marxists typically 
believe the developing of class-consciousness is integral to social 
revolution. Achieving this state of mind or being requires moving beyond 
identifying as belonging to a particular religious group and recognising that 
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one is a part of a class. According to the standard Marxist interpretation, 
recognising one is a part of an oppressed class is crucial to understanding 
that it is the ruling class who is responsible for their oppression and not for 
example ‘God’ that has been created by man to help fill a void in him 
created by Capitalism. According to a standard Marxist reading this 
realisation helps pave the way for social revolution and the establishing of a 
Communist state.  
 
Some Marxist intellectuals combine their representation of ‘Wahhabism’ as 
‘backwardness’ with a critique of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Marxist 
intellectuals like Pushkarevon provide slightly different interpretations of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to those offered by neo-conservatives.35 
Pushkarevon associates ‘Wahhabism’ with the ‘backwards’ and 
‘regressive’ nature of man while his analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict provides an interesting contrast with those representations provided 
by neo-conservatives. These differences in representations help highlight 
the important role prejudice plays in how intellectuals belonging to 
different intellectual traditions understand the ‘observe-dependent’ 
phenomenon ‘Wahhabism’. 
 
Pushkarevon rejects the claim typically made by neo-conservatives that 
there is an abundance of ‘Wahhabi’-inspired and Saudi-linked terrorist 
groups operating in the Palestinian territories. He concedes there are a few 
of these kinds of groups however he holds the US responsible for their 
existence. According to him it is the “U.S. intelligence services” that are 
sponsoring them. Pushkarevon writes  
Speaking of the Palestinian Islamists, we must pay attention to the 
fact that they are not North Caucasian Wahhabis. Wahhabism is a 
radical form of Islamic extremism and is the official religion of 
Saudi Arabia and backed by this same country. 
 
                                                 
35 Ivan Pushkarevon, “SOCIALISM IN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL!,” February 12, 2012. 
http://ideologicalfightback.com/peace-international-solidarity-2/. 
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In Palestine, there are Wahhabi, al-Qaeda organizations supported 
by the Saudis and the U.S. intelligence services, but they are scarce, 
and even the police of the Hamas party in the Gaza Strip have 
subjected them to harassment. 
 
Pushkarevon rejects the typical neo-conservative claim that there is a link 
between indigenous Palestinian organisations like ‘Hamas’ and 
‘Wahhabism’. Instead he claims that it is the foreign, non-Palestinian 
organisations like the “al-Qaeda organizations” that are influenced by 
‘Wahhabism’. Pushkarevon rejects the claim typically made by neo-
conservatives that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be understood 
primarily in religious terms. Rather than seeing the destruction of the 
‘Islamic enemy’ or removal or killing of the entire Palestinian population as 
a solution to the conflict, Pushkarevon maintains that a peaceful resolution 
can be achieved with the ending of Capitalism and an introduction of 
Socialism. Like many Marxists, Pushkarevon believes that religions like 
‘Wahhabism’ are value-relations of capitalism, and that they will disappear 
with the ending of capitalism. Pushkarevon writes 
Obviously, the resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies on 
the path of a socialist revolution in the Middle East. When in Israel, 
Zionism is overthrown, and in Palestine and Israel peace-loving, 
socialist forces and communists come to power, then past hostility 
and the hatred between the Palestinian Arabs and Jews will become 
a thing of the past.  Only socialism will bring peace, equality and 
friendship for the peoples on the ancient lands of Palestine and 
Israel… 
Of course, we cannot ignore that among Leftist Palestinians there 
are nationalist and even religious views.  But if you read, for 
example, what the Russian Internet “communists” say, there are 
similar trends. Nationalism and religion is a phenomenon peculiar 
to the backward masses, where they will tail the Communists and 
wither out with the development of the revolutionary struggle and 
socialism [Emphasis added]. 
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Pertinent here is Pushkarevon’s use of the metaphorical expression 
“backward masses.” This can be understood as drawing on the ‘direction is 
progress’ metaphor where forwards movement is indicative of progress and 
backwards movement of regression. The implication is that these religious 
people and the societies in which they live need to ‘progress’ and that this 
can only happen with the ending of Capitalism. The ideal society for 
Pushkarevon like many Marxists is a Communist or Socialist state. 
Religions like ‘Wahhabism’ are just momentary roadblocks that will be 
overcome when Capitalism ends.  
 
Let me turn now to the task of making sense of these representations by examining 
the role played by key themata. 
 
Making sense of Marxist Representations of ‘Wahhabism’ 
 
Holton writes that themata “become visible most strikingly during a 
conflict between individuals or groups that are committed to opposing 
themata” and it follows that atheism as a themata becomes most apparent 
when we consider the difference in opinion between intellectuals relying on 
religious understandings of the world and those who look for answers in the 
human condition.36 
 
Atheism is not the only key themata influencing how some Marxist 
intellectuals make sense of the world. Some of these intellectuals are also 
motivated by ideas about ‘progress’ specifically that states must go through 
certain stages of history before reaching an ‘ideal society’. Additionally, 
Marxist intellectuals rely on ‘nature’ metaphors when constituting or 
generating the world in which they live. These three key ideas are the focus 
of my attempts to make sense of Marxist representations of ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
  
                                                 
36 Holton, “The Role of Themata in Science,” 455. 
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The Atheism Themata 
 
‘Atheism’ is commonly used to classify a spectrum of non-religious 
believers, from those who question the existence of God in theological 
terms to those who are critical of theistic positions.37 Richard Dawkins is 
one of the most public and well-known contemporary atheists who insists  
There is something infantile in the presumption that somebody else 
has a responsibility to give your life meaning and point… The truly 
adult view, by contrast, is that our life is as meaningful, as full and as 
wonderful as we choose to make it.38 
 
Sagan shares much of the same kind of atheism as Dawkins. 
 
Atheism is more than just the knowledge that gods do not exist, and 
that religion is either a mistake or a fraud. Atheism is an attitude, a 
frame of mind that looks at the world objectively, fearlessly, always 
trying to understand all things as a part of nature.39    
 
This ‘master-narrative’ rejects the theistic belief that God is somehow 
controlling or ultimately responsible for mankind and instead places the 
responsibility of humanity firmly in the hands of people.40 Those motivated 
and inspired by this themata often advocate for the removal of religion 
from public life which is thought to yield a condition where order and 
innovation will progress much faster and naturally.41 We can understand 
many of the Marxists representing ‘Wahhabism’ in this study as belonging 
to this group of intellectuals who are motivated by atheism.  
 
We have seen that Marxists representing ‘Wahhabism’ have not engaged in 
the same kinds of theological discussions about the merits of it and religion 
                                                 
37 Frank Christopher Silver, “Atheism, agnosticism, and nonbelief: A qualitative and quantitative study 
of type and narrative,” (Phd. Diss., The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga), 9. 
38 Richard Dawkins, God Delusion (London: Transworld ,2006): 403-404. 
39 Attributed to Carl Sagan, 1985. 
40 Ibid.,15.  
41 Ibid., 21. 
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in general as scholars like Schwartz, Oliver and El Fadl have done.42 These 
scholars are all influenced by some kind of underlying religious themata. 
The Marxist subscription to the Atheist themata is perhaps most telling 
when we consider the conflict between these two groups of scholars. 
Following Holton’s describing about the nature of themata “All these 
[themata] become visible most strikingly during a conflict between 
individuals or groups that are committed to opposing themata,” recognising 
the opposing roles atheist and religious themata play in these instances 
helps us understand why these two groups of scholars (the ‘religious’ and 
the ‘atheist’) provide strikingly different representations about the same 
‘problems’.43   
 
In contrast to those inspired by varying religious ideas, Marxist intellectuals 
representing ‘Wahhabism’ never consider the possibility that the ‘Agents of 
God’ i.e. the ‘Wahhabi’ Ullama and the Saudi ruling regime who claim to 
rule with God’s permission, are making legitimate ‘truth’ claims. Instead 
Marxists work from the a priori assumption that either God does not exist 
and/or he does not have the ability to influence what is happening in the 
world. Influenced by these presuppositions, these Marxists intellectuals are 
motivated to study the human condition and man’s relationship to other 
men and the society in which he lives for an understanding of the modern 
political situation.  
 
Holton and Nisbet point out that themata often exist for long periods of 
time and can influence intellectuals working in a variety of fields.44 
Atheism is a themata that has influenced many different intellectuals 
working in a variety of fields including Theology, Religious Studies, 
Philosophy and Psychology.45 For example many ‘Western’ intellectuals 
driven by the idea there is no God have challenged the validity and veracity 
                                                 
42 Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam; El-Fadl, The Great Theft; Oliver, The Wahhabi Myth. 
43 Holton, “The Role of Themata in Science,” 455. 
44 Ibid., 461-462; Nisbet, Sociology as an Art Form, 29. 
45 Ralph W. Hood Jr, Peter C. Hill and Bernard Spilka, The Psychology of Religion: an Empirical  
Approach, 4th Ed., (New York: The Guilford Press, 2009). 
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of the Christian tradition.46 This focusing on the Christian tradition rather 
than for example the Islamic tradition is understandable when we consider 
the pervasiveness of Christianity in the ‘Western’ world and when we 
recognise that Islam has up until recent times been largely confined to the 
‘Eastern’ world. 
 
Many modern ‘Western’ intellectuals influenced by atheism have been 
motivated by the ideas of popular atheist authors. The work of Sigmund 
Freud provides the quintessential example. Rather than considering the 
possibility that God does exist, Freud treated religious beliefs as 
symptomatic of mental illness. In his writings published between 1913 and 
1927, Freud described religion and a dependence on God as driven by a 
need to for parental replacement in coping and seeking security in one’s 
life.47 Freud claimed that a psychologically adjusted individual could bring 
their id and superego into perfect harmony without needing to create an 
overarching deity to regulate their behaviour and he blamed a psychological 
development deficiency for a believer’s need for God.48 
 
While this is a relatively simple understanding of Freud’s theory of 
religion, the key point is that Freud saw God as an illusion and then a 
delusion and therefore saw religious belief as symptomatic of a 
pathological mind.49 Implicit to this argument is the idea that religious 
devotees are weak minded, that they use religion as a coping mechanism 
and that the atheist viewpoint is superior to the theistic position.50 As we 
have seen, these same ideas influence many in the Marxist tradition and 
many of those representing ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
                                                 
46 Sam Harris, Letter to a Christian nation (New York: Random House, 2006). 
Christopher Hitchens, God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (New York: 
Twelve Hachette, 2007). 
47 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo (London: Taylor and Francis Group 2001); Sigmund Freud, The 
Future of an Illusion (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1989). 
48 Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion. 
49 Silver, “Atheism, agnosticism, and nonbelief,,” 42. 
50 Ibid. 
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For example when describing religion in general and Islam and 
‘Wahhabism’ in particular, Deepa Kumar writes that they offer 
“consolation to the poor and oppressed,” while Niall Mulholland says they 
provide “ an oppositionist channel for Muslims angered and humiliated by 
the poverty and oppression they face” and act as an “alternative to the profit 
system.”51 In addition to these intellectuals who represent ‘Wahhabism’ as 
a coping mechanism, there are those that suggest that a theistic position is 
inferior to an atheist position. For example Pushkarevon claims that 
religious people in general are relatively “backward” in contrast to their 
non-religious Socialist counterparts.52 While the authors of the article 
appearing on the Proletarian Revolution website describe religious people 
as having a “backward consciousness.”53 The implication is that the non-
theistic (or atheistic) individuals enjoy a relatively “forward consciousness” 
which is conducive to the advancing and progression of society. 
 
More pertinent to this thesis is the role the themata atheism has played in 
the Marxist tradition. We can trace these ideas back to Marx. While 
influenced by the same atheistic presuppositions as Freud, Marx was a 
sociologist and not a psychologist and was therefore motivated to make 
sense of European society. From an early age Marx was motivated by a 
pursuit of an ‘observable truth’ rather than any kind of ‘religious truth’. He 
wrote that  
The pursuit of truth not to be impeded is qualified as serious and 
restrained. Both modifications point to something outside the 
content of the pursuit rather than to the matter to be investigated. 
They detract from the pursuit of truth. . . . with inquiry, restraint is 
the prescribed fear of finding the result, a means of keeping one 
from the truth.54  
 
Most of what Marx wrote about religion he wrote contemporaneously of 
the previous statement and these writings share its timbre of uninhibited 
                                                 
51 Kumar, “Islam and Islamophobia.”; Mulholland, “Religion and Society.” 
52 Pushkarevon, “Socialism in Palestine and Israel.” 
53 “Protest Execution of Iranian Gays! U.S. Imperialism: Hands of Iran!.” 
54 Karl Marx, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 70. 
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pursuit of what Marx deemed to be ‘true’.55 Apart from a brief flirtation 
with Hegel’s idea of a timeless universal spirit, Marx never really 
considered the possibility that ‘truth’ existed outside of the human 
condition and in the supernatural realm.56 According to Marx 
understanding the nature and the problems of the human condition could 
not be explained in terms of man’s relationship with God but rather in his 
relationship with his fellow man, his work, his product and his species-
being. 
 
Marx saw humans as a part of nature, of the material world, and as thus a 
subject within it. God and any veneration to a thing outside the physical 
experience of humankind was nonsense and alienating. Marx writes “All 
the mysteries which lead theory into mysticism find their rational solution 
in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.”57 The idea 
that the answers to mankind’s problems lie in man’s abilities and not in a 
God or God’s word continues to influence how modern Marxist 
intellectuals make sense of the world including how they make sense of 
phenomena like ‘Wahhabism’. Like Marx, the Marxists representing 
‘Wahhabism’ never considered religion to be a legitimate or acceptable 
way of understanding the world. Nor did they ever consider that the 
‘Agents of God’ like the ‘Wahhabi’ Ullama had legitimate claims to their 
authority.They are all critical of these theistic positions and have focused 
their attention on making sense of the kind of society man has himself 
created. For many Marxists there is no God or if there is he certainly has no 
control over mankind’s development.  
 
The ‘Nature’ Metaphor: Responsibility lies with Man and not ‘God’. 
 
The Marxist a priori rejection of God helps us to understand why many 
Marxist intellectuals have relied on nature metaphors when representing 
                                                 
55 Andrew N. McKnight, “Reevaluating Marx and Spirituality: Emancipation and the Search for 
Meaning,” Journal of Thought 40, no.1 (2005), 63. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Karl Marx, “Theses On Feuerbach,” (1845). 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm 
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‘Wahhabism’. For example we see Kumar use the term “flourished” when 
describing the popularity of Islam, Bowie claims the “streets of Dhaka have 
been awash with protests” and he also describes the “rising tide of 
Islamists.”58 Mulholland talks about the “growth of political Islam” and the 
“sprout[ing] up” of religion, the authors of an article appearing on the 
Socialist World write religion has its “roots amongst the masses,” and 
authors writing for the International Marxist Tendency claim the ‘Wahhabi’ 
Saudi Arabian regime is “rotten to the core.”59  
 
Danziger writes that scholars use generative metaphors when both 
conceptualising their theories and methods and when communicating their 
ideas and directives to their audiences and fellow researchers.60 In these 
examples we see Marxists are relying on nature metaphors when describing 
the existence of Islam in general and ‘Wahhabism’ in particular. In doing 
so they are also communicating to their fellow researchers and audiences 
that they should also think of religion in terms of ‘nature’ and not for 
example in terms of God, the legitimacy of Islam or ‘Wahhabi’ doctrine or 
man’s relationship with God which is how scholars like Schwartz, El Fadl 
and Oliver have understood ‘Wahhabism’.61 The pertinent point is that 
Marxists think and they also want their audiences to think that man and not 
God is in control of the situation.  
 
This relying on nature metaphors when thinking and talking about the 
world tells us a lot about how some Marxists see the world. It has for 
example often been associated with the adopting of an anthropocentric 
worldview.62 Anthropocentrism is the idea that human beings are the 
central or most significant species on the planet. According to this view 
nature is an instrument for human ends. The ‘dominator model’ of the 
                                                 
58 Kumar, “Islam and Islamophobia.”; Bowie,  “Slave Labor, Wal-Mart and Wahhabism.”  
59 Mulholland, “Religion and Society,” “Capitalist chaos – class struggle sharpens,” Socialistworld. 
“The Arab Revolution - Manifesto of the International Marxist Tendency. Part Three: The Revolution 
is not finished,” International Marxist Tendency. 
60 Danziger, Metaphors in the History of Psychology, 332. 
61 Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam; Khaled Abou El-Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the 
Extremists; Oliver, The Wahhabi Myth. 
62 Frans C. Verhagen, “Worldviews and Metaphors in the Human-Nature Relationship: An 
Ecolinguistic Exploration Through the Ages,” Language and Ecology 2, no.3 (2008), 1. 
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human-nature relationship is often seen as an essential component of this 
worldview.63 According to Francis Bacon this model holds that man is both 
a creator and primarily responsible for creating order. He writes 
Man, if we look to final causes, may be regarded as the centre of the 
world...For the whole world works together in the service of man; 
and there is nothing from which he does not derive use and 
fruit...insomuch that all things seem to going about man’s business 
and not their own.64 
 
Commenting on the generative role metaphors play, Schön maintains that 
“the essential difficulties … have more to do with the problem setting than 
with problem solving, more to do with ways in which we frame the 
purposes to be achieved than with the selection of optimal means for 
achieving them.”65 Framing the ‘problem’ of religion in terms of nature as 
these Marxists have done rather than for example in terms of God 
encourages their audiences and fellow researchers to look for answers in 
man’s relationship with nature rather than for example looking for religious 
answers to the problem of ‘Wahhabism’ and ‘radical Islam’.  
 
Danziger argues that individuals and groups of individuals tend to draw on 
similar metaphorical descriptions that have been used over long periods of 
time and which have come to be thought of “as expressing some kind of 
literal truth.”66 Also commenting on the long lives of the generative 
metaphors, Schön writes that the generative metaphor “derives its 
normative force from certain purposes and values, certain normative 
images, which have long been powerful in our culture.”67 Understanding 
man as a dominator of nature rather than for example understanding him as 
a servant of God or a small part of a divine plan, and understanding the 
issues we humans have to deal with in terms of our relationship to nature 
and not in our relationship to or with a God, have been taken as literal 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 3. 
64 Cited in Peter Marshall, Nature's Web. Rethinking Our Place On Earth (New York: Paragon House, 
1994), 184. 
65 Donald Schön, “Generative metaphor: A perspective on problem-setting in social policy,” 138. 
66 Danziger, Metaphors in the History of Psychology, 332. 
67 Schön, “Generative metaphor,” 147. 
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truths by many ‘Western’ scholars at least since the scientific revolution in 
the seventeenth century. 
 
It was during this time that scientists began to seriously question the role a 
‘God’ played in the history of mankind. The discoveries of fossils which 
pointed to the extinction of species prior to the human race led many to ask 
the question “if God had created every living form, how could gaps be 
explained in a chain of being that indicated continuity and plenitude?”68 
The Scientific Revolution encouraged many to abandon the notion of a 
Divine Origin and scientists instead sought to answer questions about 
nature without relying on a religious interpretation.69 This understanding of 
man and not God as ultimately responsible for the future and ‘direction’ of 
mankind became central to Marx’s critique of Capitalism centuries later 
and these ideas continue to influence modern Marxist intellectuals.70 
 
As we can see this way of ‘generating’ or ‘constituting’ the world has had 
implications for the ways in which some Marxist intellectuals represent 
‘Wahhabism’. Many Marxists take it as literal truth that mankind is 
responsible for creating the kind of the world in which we live. This 
includes religion in general and ‘Wahhabism’ in particular which are not 
seen or understood as divine creations or as part of some divine plan but 
instead are understood as creations of man. Moreover they are seen as 
unnecessary and unhelpful creations that are preventing man from creating 
what they understood as an ‘ideal society’. This leads us to another 
important themata influencing the ways in which Marxists make sense of 
the world.  
 
  
                                                 
68 Verhagen, “Worldviews and Metaphors,” 4. 
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70 For an understanding of Karl Marx’s anthropocentric worldview see John Clark, “Marx’s Inorganic 
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Progress  
 
The themata ‘progress’ is another important idea that has motivated and 
influenced how Marxist intellectuals make sense of the world and of 
‘observer-dependent’ phenomena in it like ‘Wahhabism’. We saw how 
Marxist intellectuals were keen to represent ‘Wahhabi’ societies and 
religious ‘believers’ as ‘backward’ and ‘regressive’. For example the 
authors of an article appearing on the Proletarian Revolution website 
describe religious believers as like the ‘Wahhabis’ as suffering from a 
“backward consciousness” and how Ivan Pushkarevon calls “religion… a 
phenomenon peculiar to the backward masses.”71  
 
Marxists get a lot of their inspiration from the belief that Capitalism will 
not last forever and that society must and will eventually progress beyond 
this stage. For many Marxists it is a matter of historical necessity the 
Capitalism be overcome and Socialist/Communist state be established 
putting an end to man’s alienation. This themata about progress which 
influences how some Marxists understand ‘Wahhabism’ has its roots in 
Marxism’s early writings especially in those of Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels.  
 
Marx and Engels understood history as a journey beginning with man’s 
unalienated existence, the breaking of this experience and then the 
returning to this experience. The journey is long and harsh but necessary 
and will end with the creating of utopic society where man exists (as close 
as is humanly possible) in harmony with his fellow man, his labour, his 
product and his species being. Quoting Lewis Henry Morgan’s apocalyptic 
belief, Engels writes that the integrity and justice of the gentile society will 
return from its diremption but in a “higher form.”72 This idea about 
progress continues to influence the modern Marxist tradition with its 
proponents believing in the value of overcoming alienation and in the 
                                                 
71 “Protest Execution of Iranian Gays! U.S. Imperialism: Hands of Iran!,” Proletarian Revolution. 
72 Friedrich Engels, “The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State,” (1884), 18., 
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‘goodness’ that can be found in the ‘progress’ of human history. There are 
a number of pertinent Marxist ideas associated with this themata about 
progress which can help us to understand why Marxist intellectuals 
represent ‘Wahhabism’ and the societies in which it appears as relatively 
‘backward’ and ‘regressive’ especially when compared with evolutionary 
stages nations in the Capitalist ‘West’ find themselves in. These ideas are 
the Primacy Thesis, the Development Thesis and ideas about the stages in 
history.  
 
Many Marxists understand human history as consisting of a number of 
consecutive stages. These ideas can be traced back to Marx who is 
understood as identifying five distinct periods in human history.73 The first 
stage is typically understood as ‘Primitive Communism’ and its defining 
elements are shared property, hunting and gathering and ‘proto-
democracy’. Second is the Slave Society which is considered to be the 
beginning of class society. Third is Feudalism which is characterised by its 
aristocracy, theocracy, hereditary classes and the nation state. Fourth is 
Capitalism which is marked by a market economics, private property, 
parliamentary democracy and Imperialism. Fifth is Socialism/Communism 
which having risen from a self-conscious movement of the vast majority, is 
characterised by the vast majority governing their own lives. Marx’s 
Development Thesis and Primacy Thesis help describe how society moves 
through these different stages.74 The underlying belief is that society is 
always changing and ‘progressing’ towards the establishing of an ‘ideal’ 
Communist society.  
 
The Communist state is considered by many Marxists to be the ‘ideal 
society’ and it is what they are struggling to establish. It is also held as the 
‘ideal society’ against which Marxist intellectuals measure the progress of 
societies including those in which religions like ‘Wahhabism’ are 
pervasive. In this utopia classes are abolished, the state withers away and 
                                                 
73 Karl Marx, Part III: History (1938). https://www.marxists.org/archive/korsch/1938/karl-
marx/ch03.htm.  
74 For an understanding of these theses see Jonathan Wolff, “Karl Marx”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edwarz N.Zalta (2011). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/marx/. 
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people take care of themselves without the need of government. This marks 
the end of what Marx calls a ‘prehistory’ of mankind.75 Now man is free 
from the mercy of productive forces and he can plan for the needs of 
society inclusively and democratically. It is now when the ‘real’ human 
history begins.76 
 
When Marxist intellectuals describe religious societies including ‘Wahhabi’ 
societies and the people that make them up as ‘regressive’ and ‘backwards’ 
they can be understood as comparing and contrasting the nature of these 
societies with periods in human ‘pre-history’. When Marxists look at the 
situation in many Islamic countries including ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia they 
do not see ‘advanced’ Capitalist societies like those in the ‘Western’ world 
which are closer to reaching the ‘ideal society’. Instead they see societies 
that are far less advanced in terms of human history i.e. they see societies 
that often resemble Feudalism.  
 
Marx himself did not show any particular interest in the Islamic world but 
he did write about non-‘Western’ nations of the world and about the impact 
that global capitalist forces have had on helping these relatively ‘backward’ 
societies ‘progress’. For example Marx wrote about the introduction of 
Capitalist relations in India. 
Dissolved these small semi-barbarian, semi-civilized communities, 
by blowing up their economic basis, and thus produced the greatest, 
and to speak the truth, the only social revolution ever heard of in 
Asia.  
Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness those 
myriads of industrious patriarchal and inoffensive social 
organizations disorganized and dissolved into their units, thrown 
into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing at the same 
time their ancient form of civilization, and their hereditary means of 
subsistence, we must not forget that these idyllic village 
communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been 
                                                 
75 Marx, Part III: History. 
76 Ibid. 
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the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the 
human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the 
unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional 
rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies.77 
 
What Marx is pointing to here and it is an idea that continues to 
characterise the modern Marxist tradition, is that ‘backward’ ‘primitive’ 
communities are bases for despotism and for alienation that will 
inevitability succumb to progress. The way Marx understands this Colonial 
India resonates with the ways in which some modern Marxist intellectuals 
think about other non-Western nations like ‘Wahhabi’ Saudi Arabia.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Marxists intellectuals have tended to understand ‘Wahhabism’ in one of 
three ways. Either they see it as religion that offers solace to those suffering 
from the effects of Capitalism, as a tool used by the ruling regime and 
‘Agents of God’ to maintain the status quo or as indicative of relatively 
‘backwards’ state of man and society which will be overcome once 
Capitalism ends and Communist state is established. As we can see, 
Marxists have used a variety of rhetorical techniques when representing 
‘Wahhabism’ in these ways. However the most popular techniques are the 
using of ‘nature’ metaphorical expression which aims to represent 
‘Wahhabism’ as a natural part of Capitalism and the using of metaphorical 
expressions that help represent societies and people who follow religions 
like ‘Wahhabism’ as ‘backward’. Marxist intellectuals’ have been 
influenced, motivated and inspired by particular themata and generative 
metaphors when representing ‘Wahhabism’. These themata include ideas 
associated with atheism and progress, and these generative metaphors 
include ‘nature’ metaphors. These ideas have motivated many Modern 
Marxist intellectuals to look at man’s condition and his relation with the 
world when making sense of ‘Wahhabism’ and they have encouraged many 
                                                 
77 Karl Marx, The British Rule in India (1853). 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/06/25.htm.  
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of them to understand ‘Wahhabi’ believers and the societies of which they 
are a part as relatively ‘backward’ and ‘regressive’ when compared to the 
‘West’ and in desperate need of ‘progress’.
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Conclusion  
 
From the end spring new beginnings 
Pliny the Elder 
 
I began this study with clear goals in mind. I wanted to address scholarly 
representations of ‘Wahhabism’ and deal with some of the problems with them. I 
wanted to address certain kinds of problems in the sociology of intellectuals and I 
wanted to address the how and why intellectuals belonging to the liberal, neo-
conservative and Marxist traditions represented ‘Wahhabism’ in particular ways. My 
interest in doing these things was in part provoked by competing representations of 
‘Wahhabism’ offered by different intellectuals particularly as they related to the 
‘situation’ in Palestine.  
 
I must again acknowledge some of the limitations of my study. I have only focused on 
five specific elements of discourse namely metaphors, similes, analogies, neologisms, 
and the structuring of accounts of violence, when deconstructing liberal, neo-
conservative and Marxist representations of ‘Wahhabism’. I chose to abstract/focus 
on these because of the crucial roles these play in the mythmaking process. There are 
many other elements present and there is the opportunity in the future to shine a light 
on these. Such an analysis may help reveal other kinds of themata and generative 
metaphors influencing liberal, Marxist and neo-conservative thought not identified in 
this study. Opportunities also exist for future research into how intellectuals 
belonging to other traditions have represented ‘Wahhabism’. 
 
My review of the scholarly literature showed that ‘Wahhabism’ was a hotly contested 
category. Some scholars like Gold and Schwartz provided deeply negative even 
hostile representations of ‘Wahhabism’ and were quick to blame it for inspiring 
Islamic terrorism. Others like DeLong-Bas and Oliver provided detailed historical 
accounts of ‘Wahhabism’ to dismiss claims that it was linked to contemporary forms 
of ‘Islamist’ violence. My work has showed that prejudice specifically particular 
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religious and political aims and goals and the kind of truth claims one relies on 
influences how one thinks about the observer-dependent phenomenon ‘Wahhabism’.  
 
For example if one fervently holds religious beliefs that are seen as incompatible with 
the perceived religious beliefs belonging to ‘Wahhabism’ as is the case with scholars 
like Schwartz then it is unsurprising that he or she will discount ‘Wahhabism’ as a 
perverted interpretation of Islam. If one is primarily motivated by specific political 
aims and goals as is the case with scholars like Gold who is motivated and inspired by 
his support for Israel then we can begin to understand why he might use ‘Wahhabism’ 
which as had a bad reputation since 9/11 in an attempt to discredit the pro-Palestinian 
‘terror groups’ waging a campaign against Israeli forces. And if one is unable to 
understand some of the problems of using historical texts to make sense of a current 
phenomenon without considering the evolution of the movement as DeLong-Bas has 
done then when can begin to understand why he or she might arrive at very different 
conclusions, for e.g. the founder of ‘Wahhabism’ at time promotes ‘peace’ and 
‘harmony’ therefore the modern ‘Wahhabi’ movement must also be peaceful and 
harmonious.  
 
The key point to be made here and which is applicable for anyone studying different 
scholars’ representations of phenomenon in the social world is that ones prejudices 
including their religious and political aims and goals and the different kinds of ‘truth 
claims’ they rely on influences the sense-making process. This helps to explain why 
so many scholars provide very different interpretations or representations of the ‘same  
thing’. However as we know it is not the ‘same thing’ at all because unlike things in 
the natural world phenomenon in the social world have no objective reality. 
 
The sociology of intellectuals also raised a number of problems. These had to do with 
whether or not we should treat intellectuals as ‘value-neutral’ mediators who are 
unconcerned with ‘big ideas’ and ‘grand narratives’ as Osborne proposes. What it is 
that defines or constitutes an ‘intellectual’, what their roles are and should be and to 
whom or what they owe their allegiance. The sociology of intellectuals also raised the 
issue of how we are to deal with different claims to truth.  
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Some like Mannheim and Parsons saw intellectuals as non-partisan and not attached 
to any group or class and inspired by ‘utopian ideals’. Benda and Orwell were among 
those who belonged to a group of scholars who treat intellectuals as a ‘class in 
themselves’ and saw them as ‘servants of truth’ and whose truth claims are motivated 
by a desire to ‘speak truth to power’. A third group which included Gramsci saw 
intellectuals as ‘movement and group-bound’ whose claims to truth often inspired by 
partisan politics and who were concerned with serving or helping advance the 
interests of a particular group or class.  
 
Equally I could not ignore the differences in interpretation provided by scholars 
representing ‘Wahhabism’. These differences point to problems in the sociology of 
intellectuals warranting an inquiry into the role played by intellectuals representing 
‘Wahhabism’. I began with the premise that what intellectuals do matter and their 
representations have implications for shaping public opinion and influencing the 
policy and decision making processes. This is especially important when we consider 
the recent tendency of ‘Western’ governments to ‘intervene’ in the Islamic world.  
Informed by ideas like dialectics, philosophy of internal relations and abstraction, I 
adopted a theoretical and analytical method that aimed at abstracting particular 
elements from the intellectuals’ representations of ‘Wahhabism’. What I found was 
that intellectuals belonging to the neo-conservative, liberal and Marxist traditions 
were in fact concerned with ‘big ideas’ and ‘grand narratives’, that they were 
motivated by partisan politics and advancing the interests of particular groups and that 
their representations were not ‘value-neutral’ but instead influenced by specific 
prejudices.  
 
I argue that intellectuals belonging to the liberal, neo-conservative traditions 
represented ‘Wahhabism’ in particular ways that aligned with the core beliefs of their 
respective traditions. Assuming the roles of ‘Movement Intellectuals,’ liberals who 
for example value liberty and secularism tended to understand ‘Wahhabism’ as 
among other things as restricting individual freedoms and as a threat to secular 
society. I found their representations of ‘Wahhabism’ to be shaped by key themata 
and generative metaphors related to ideas about individualism and progress which at 
least have their roots in the age of Reformation and Lasmarck and Spencer’s ideas 
about the ‘development’ of the human race respectively. This helps us to understand 
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why I found these liberal intellectuals using rhetorical techniques like the ‘Progress is 
Movement’ metaphor when representing ‘Wahhabism’ as an obstacle to progress, 
analogies that liken the current situation in ‘Wahhabi’ societies to past periods in 
‘Western’ history and neologisms like ‘gender apartheid’ and terms like ‘misogyny’ 
that convey the oppressive and restrictive nature of ‘Wahhabism’ particularly for 
women. 
 
I found that for neo-conservatives ‘Wahhabism’ was by and large represented as the 
enemy. These intellectuals see ‘Wahhabism’ as a ‘murderous ideology’ suitable for 
‘savages’ and that among other things is inspiring Palestinian ‘terrorist groups’ whose 
motivation to attack Israel according to them is primarily theological in nature. I 
determined that these intellectuals were motivated and influenced by themata and 
generative metaphors like Gods covenant with the Jews as detailed in the Hebrew 
Bible, that they are a part of a fated endless conflict between ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’ and 
that there exists kinds of humans who are inferior to them. My deconstruction also 
found that neo-conservatives tended to draw on rhetorical techniques that helped 
convey these ideas i.e. using metaphors dehumanising as well as the structuring of 
violent accounts that brutalises the ‘Wahhabi’ Other.  
 
With regards to the Marxist ‘Movement Intellectuals’ I also found that their decisions 
to use rhetorical techniques like the nature and movement metaphors when 
representing ‘Wahhabism’ was related to different themata and generative metaphors 
that affected how they made sense of the world. More specifically their ideas about 
‘progress’ and atheism, and generative metaphors that focus on man’s relationship 
with nature rather than for example looking to God for answers, saw them represent 
‘Wahhabism’ as amongst other things ‘backwards’, a ‘natural part of Capitalist’ and a 
tool used by the ruling regime to maintain their positions of authority.  
 
‘Wahhabism’ is clearly a contested category and this contest involves a variety of 
intellectuals belonging to different intellectual traditions and scholars who see the 
world and understand their roles as intellectuals in very different ways. More often 
than not these intellectuals are acting as ‘Movement Intellectuals’ whose motivations 
for representing ‘Wahhabism’ include a desire to impose a sense of order or to create 
and re-create the social world in ways that align their belief systems. Understanding 
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some of the why and how these intellectuals are doing this matters given their roles as 
‘producers’ or ‘mediators’ of knowledge in the modern world especially when we 
consider the implications these things have for things like public opinion and the 
policy and decision making processes particularly when it comes to making foreign 
policy.  
 
If we are going to rely on these representations of ‘Wahhabism’ in any way when 
thinking about and treating particular people and societies, or even more ‘intervene’ 
in foreign nations, and history says that this is likely to be the case, then it matters that 
we have an understanding of the how and the why intellectuals have represented 
‘Wahhabism’ in different ways. This becomes particularly important when these 
intellectuals do not as is so often the case explicitly describe the ideas and interests 
motivating and shaping their representations. This study is my humble contribution to 
this sense-making process.
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